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PREFACE
Even a superficial glance at research materials in most pub-
lic and university libraries would indicate that, where Latin America
is concerned, the larger and more powerful countries have tradition-
ally been the subjects of greatest interest to both scholars and
policy-makers. Most recently at my own university, an inflationary
process that has been accelerated by rising oil prices, has tended to
focus attention on energy related topics. This is understandable
inasmuch as scholarly interest is frequently, and quite rightly influ-
enced by subjects that are of worldwide concern. It may thus have
come as some surprise to many of my colleagues when I decided to
devote my energy and resources to a study of Costa Rica, an economi-
cally insignificant nation that has always been far from the center
of world attention.
My interest in Costa Rica began to develop after having famil-
iarized myself with the common themes of Latin American politics and
society: instability, authoritarian leadership, poverty, violence,
and uneven economic development. The relative lack of such problems
became the basis for my belief that Costa Rica possesses a political
significance that belies its international obscurity. Costa Rica
is afterall a democracy, and that is unusual for a Latin American
country. If for no other reason I thought, this tiny Central American
republic merited more serious scholarly attention.
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The historical research for this study began at the University
of Massachusetts in 1980. Field and library research in Costa Rica
was conducted in 1981. Although the investigation was undertaken
independently of any funding agency, I owe a debt of gratitude to
several institutions and individuals, without whose cooperation this
study would have been impossible. Most importantly, I would like
to acknowledge the support of Charles F . Denton, Director of the
Institute for Social and Population Studies (IDESPO) , at the National
University of Costa Rica in Heredia. The research facilities and
personal introductions provided by Dr. Denton were of key importance
in the completion of this research. I would also like to thank the
Faculty of Political Science at the University of Costa Rica which
was instrumental in making available to me the research facilities
of several public and private libraries. I am also indebted to the
Costa Rican Ministry of Labor and the Center of Democratic Studies
for Latin America (CEDAL) , both of which offered their full coopera-
tion and many important research materials.
Among the many individuals who contributed in one way or
another to the completion of this research I would like to give spe-
cial thanks to Humberto Moya Morux, Luis Fernando and Pricilla Moya
Morux, Geovanny Murillo, and Anabelle Cabezas Alpizar, all of whom
provided valuable material and moral support. Finally, I would like
to express my thanks to Howard Wiarda, Harvey Kline, and Kenneth
Flamm, all of whom read the manuscript and offered several important
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suggestions. Naturally
of this volume
.
I accept full responsibility for the contents
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ABSTRACT
Structures Of Integration And Labor Relations In Costa Rica:
Democratic Participation or Authoritarian Control
(May 1982)
Ralph Henry Russomando, B.A., American International College
M.A., University of Massachusetts, Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Howard J. Wiarda
For quite some time now, North American scholars of Latin
America have been concerned with the nature and the causes of author-
itarian forms of organization. Preferring to focus attention on the
more conspicuously dictatorial regimes, Costa Rican political struc-
tures and processes have not been of great interest to researchers
concerned with these questions.
The purpose of this study is to examine the nature, and the
degree to which labor organizations have been permitted to partici-
pate in an ostensibly democratic political system. In accomplishing
this, focus has been placed on two questions: how the process of
Costa Rican political development has served either to encourage or
discourage labor union organization and collective action; and how
labor activities, and influence, are currently confined by three
structures of integration: legal structures, bureaucratic structures,
and political parties.
viii
The first chapter of the research explores the apparent differ-
ences between the Costa Rican political system and other Latin
American political systems. Chapters II and III focus on the develop-
ment of the Costa Rican social struggle and the emergence of labor
organizations as mechanisms of collective self-defense.
The second part of the research is concerned with an analysis
of current structures of integration. Chapter IV explains conflict
resolution procedures, restrictions on union activity, and the vulner-
ability of labor organizations to patronal attack. Chapter V is con-
cerned with an analysis of the relationship between labor organiza-
tions and the Ministry of Labor and the decision-making structures
of tripartite organs in four autonomous institutions. Chapter VI
explains the nature of political party relationships and its effects
on the accomplishment of two important labor goals: Labor Code re-
form, and a more authentic labor representation in the autonomous
institutions. Finally, Chapter VI summarizes the research, and draws
comparisons between Costa Rican labor relations and the prevailing
pattern of Latin American labor relations.
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INTRODUCTION
In an area of the world noteworthy for its political insta-
bility, military dictatorships and extreme poverty, Costa Rica has
stood forth as a bold exception. A small country with few mineral
resources and a climate best suited to the cultivation of tropical
fruits, there seems little reason why Costa Rica should be distinc-
tive. Yet while the term "banana republic" may be used to connote
poor, politically unstable, dictatorial Central American nations,
it is a reference that has been applied only to Costa Rican agri-
culture; and not to its political system or social structure.
Political, Social, and Economic Conditions
Although Costa Rica possesses no more natural wealth than its
Central American neighbors, it has managed to avoid many of the politi
cal and social maladies that have plagued most Latin American nations.
Small scale family owned farms are still the cornerstone of the Costa
Rican land tenure system; compulsory public education, having been in-
stituted at the end of the nineteenth century, has accounted for one
of the highest literacy rates of any country in the hemisphere;
infant mortality rates are lower than the average for Latin American
countries; and comprehensive public health programs have all. but wiped
out infectious tropical diseases, and extended free medical care to
a vast majority of people.
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Besides these social accomplishments Costa Rica is distinguished
by a long standing commitment to democratic principles of government.
Unlike most Latin American countries, political opposition in Costa
Rica is able to organize and function without hindrance. Throughout
most of the 20th century, political power has changed hands frequently,
fairly, and peacefully. At the same time, an abundance of political
parties and organizations ranging in ideological orientation from the
extreme right to the extreme left, supposedly insures a liberal play of
ideas; and while the vast majority of people support one of Costa Rica's
two large moderate political parties, there is an overwhelming agree-
ment that all political, social, and economic philosophies, however rad-
ical or reactionary, have a role to play in public debate.
This of course does not suggest that Costa Rica has been com-
pletely free of the pressures that have played such an important part
in Latin American political instability. Like many other nations in
the region, Costa Rica's population has been expanding at an alarming
rate. While growth has dropped significantly in the last decade, the
economically active population between 1950 and 1973 more than doubled.
Between 1973 and 1979 it had increased by another 27%. This has pre-
sented policy-makers with an enormous surplus manpower problem that has
been temporarily solved by the expansion of the bureaucratic apparatus.
Between 1950 and 1975 the number of people working for the government
increased four times. While unemployment rates during the same period
decreased from 7.3% to 4.9%, this was accomplished largely through con-
tinuous deficit spending that has been covered primarily by borrowing
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abroad. At the same time the price of manufactured products, most of
which have to be imported, has outstripped price increases in Costa
Rica's cash crops and caused a severe balance of payments problem.
A recent currency devaluation has significantly increased the financial
hardships of the Costa Rican people.
Population growth has also taxed Costa Rica's educational facili-
ties, although pressures have been partially eased by a reduction in
the population growth rate, and an extraordinarily high drop out rate
that has principally affected rural areas. Statistics compiled in the
1970 's have shown that while 90% of Costa Rican children enter the first
grade, only 52% reach the 6th grade, and only 14% possess some high
school education. The result has been an increase in illiteracy that
belies Costa Rica's reputation for having one of the highest literacy
rates in the hemisphere.
A no less important concern to Costa Rican policy-makers has
been the productivity of the agricultural sector. Primarily based upon
banana and coffee production, agriculture is Costa Rica's most important
source of jobs and foreign exchange. The distribution of land has also
had an important social and political function inasmuch as the current
land tenure structure has contributed to the illusion that Costa Rican
farmers are owners rather than tenants. While it is true that the
vast majority of farmers cultivate their own property, the average size
of individually owned farms is less than 24 hectares. The National
Agriculture Institute has estimated that 43% of the farms that fall in-
to this category are too small to be economically viable; and in many
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cases owners have been forced to find employment on larger farms.
It might also be supposed that this tendency has accounted for the in-
creasing school drop out rate.
In recent years agricultural diversification has established
beef and sugar as foreign exchange earners; however the impact of sugar
exports has been diminished by a drop in prices. On the other hand
while beef production has become a more important source of foreign
exchange, it has not significantly eased unemployment problems in rural
areas; and the resulting exodus from the countryside has created unem-
ployment problems in the cities.
Nevertheless, while this description seems to fit a Latin American
mold, it would be a mistake to suppose that economic and demographic
pressures in Costa Rica have either reached the same extent, or produced
the same results that they have elsewhere in Latin America. The quality
of life for the majority of people is still much higher in Costa Rica
than most countries in the hemisphere; and there has been a continued
commitment to representative democracy, gradual change, and civil liber-
ties .
Historical Setting
If Costa Rica has been considered to be a model of political
and social development, it owes this distinction to an historical
experience that has set it far apart from other Latin American nations.
The early colonists of Costa Rica, like colonists elsewhere in the re-
gion, had hoped to discover gold and fabulously rich Indian cities.
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Having discovered only a few poor though fierce Indians, and having
found no appreciable deposits of valuable minerals, early immigrants
were forced to dedicate themselves to the cultivation of the land.
A few small commercial enterprises were established; but owing to the
lack of transportation facilities and a rugged mountainous terrain,
commerce was limited, and Costa Rica was forced to remain largely out-
side the Spanish mercantile system.
In this connection the productive potential of colonial Costa
Rican agriculture was limited by the absence of a large and docile
Indian population that could have been used as a cheap source of labor.
Large landholdings consequently did not emerge, as they did elsewhere
in Latin America. The small family owned plots that would become
the cornerstone of the Costa Rican land tenure system, produced barely
enough to satisfy the nutritional needs of the owner. Possessing few
manufactured items, and separated by heavily forested mountains, Costa
Ricans led a hard, crude, isolated existence, and learned to survive
on their own meager resources
.
The common poverty of colonial Costa Rica was shocking to early
travelers and governors. One representative of the Spanish Crown com-
plained that Costa Rica was the poorest, most miserable province in all
of America. An eighteenth century Bishop was even more appalled when
he discovered that the women of Heredia literally had nothing to wear
to Church. But the privations of Costa Rican life proved in the long
run to be a blessing. In other Latin American countries the exploita-
tion of mineral resources and the subjugation of whole Indian
xviii
populations produced tremendous disparities in wealth and small
oligarchic castes that preserved their economic power with political
power. This state of circumstances contributed greatly to the fre-
quent occurrence of military dictatorship and political instability
that has come to characterize Latin American politics. By contrast,
a common poverty that extended even to the Spanish colonial governors
of Costa Rica, helped to form a tough, free, and independent people
who, as one sociologist noted, had been born for liberty and equality.
Modernization and Popular Discontent
Despite this characterization, traditional land ownership pat-
terns changed considerably toward the end of the nineteenth century
owing to the development of the coffee industry and the integration
of Costa Rica into an international economic system. The concentra-
tion of land, as in so many other Latin American nations, created a
large class of propertyless farmers and a small agricultural oligarchy
that used the political system to protect its economic power. The
years between 1906 and 1936, during which Ricardo Jimenez Oreamuno
and Cleto Gonzalez Viquez took turns occupying the presidency, were
thus characterized by laissez-faire economic policies and infrastruc-
tural improvements facilitating an expansion of the coffee commerce.
The pattern changed considerably during the administration of Leon
Cortes Castro between 1936 and 1940 when the world depression called
for a more active state role in the solution of economic problems.
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This, however, was primarily a response to the needs of Costa Rican
businessmen, not Costa Rican workers.
It was in the period between 1906 and 1940 that the social con-
sequences of agricultural development and economic depression came to
be manifested in Costa Rican society. Previously independent small
landowners, who had migrated to the cities, formed a large class of
unemployed workers. Thousands of others who found employment on
coastal banana plantations endured low salaries and deplorable work-
ing and living conditions. The result of these developments was an
attempt to give organizational expression to popular discontent.
Thus in San Jose, the General Confederation of Workers was organized
and later transformed into the Christian democratic Reformist Party.
Somewhat later, communist labor organizer Manuel Mora formed the
General Union of Workers on United Fruit Company property.
The repressive measures that were applied to these worker or-
ganizations underscore the degree to which Costa Rican governments
served business interests. Although no labor organizations were in-
voluntarily dissolved, labor leaders especially during the depression
years, were frequently interned for disturbing the peace or undermin-
ing free trade. At the same time, demonstrations and strikes through-
out the period between 1906 and 1940 were forcefully broken up by
public security forces. While several labor-management disputes pro-
duced modest material gains, collective action was usually accompan-
ied by threats, beatings, and sometimes death.
xx
Labor and the Social Welfare State
The informal though repressive relationship that had existed
between the state and labor organizations through the administration
of Leon Cortes changed dramatically in 1940 with the election of Rafael
Angel Calderdn Guardia, a Christian democrat who, despite an early
reliance on conservative support, was committed to the task of social
reform. Between 1940 and 1948 Calderon undercut conservative backing
and, along with Church and communist party supporters, initiated a
series of reforms that not only eased the material burdens of the
lower classes, but recognized the legitimacy of working class collec-
tive action. Profiting from legislation explicitly guaranteeing the
right to organize, labor leaders began an intense union organization
drive that culminated in the formation of two large confederations:
the communist oriented Confederation of Costa Rican Workers (CTCR)
,
and the Catholic inspired Costa Rican Confederation of Workers
—
Rerum Novarum (CCTRN)
.
The CTCR and the CCTRN succeeded in grouping together several
previously independent unions and federations. At the same time lead-
ers from both confederations cooperated in the organization of non-
unionized workers. Consequently membership levels in both organiza-
tions increased dramatically between 1943 and 1948. This union de-
velopment, however, came to an abrupt end in 1948 when a hotly con-
tested election between Calderon Guardia and conservative candidate
Utilio Ulate Blanco precipitated a rebellion that resulted in the
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proscription of the communist party, the involuntary dissolution of
the CTCR, and the protracted decline and eventual dissolution of the
CCTRN.
Despite these harsh measures, the progressive social legisla-
tion of Calderon Guardia was not overturned in the subsequent period
of Costa Rican political development. Labor legislation still guar-
antees union rights; minimum salaries are adjusted yearly by govern-
ment organs that incorporate labor representatives; workers continue
to enjoy better living and working conditions, and more comprehensive
medical and sickness benefits than their counterparts elsewhere in
Latin America; and numerous new labor organizations have emerged in
place of the CTCR and the CCTRN to defend working class interests.
Statement of Purpose
Since 1948 Costa Ricans have reaffirmed their commitment to
democratic principles of government. The large National Liberation
Party (PLN) and the coalition of anti-PLN forces have taken turns
occupying the presidency. Control over the Legislative Assembly has
changed hands even more frequently. Both these tendencies have com-
bined to create an impression of political liberty and democratic
stability. This impression is at least partially justified, but on
the other hand the length of time that the tools of formal democracy
are employed should not be confused with the content or quality of
democracy; and if Costa Rican democracy is to merit a full measure of
credit, it must combine a commitment to formal democracy with an
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equally strong commitment to free competition among political and
social groups.
In this connection one must wonder, inasmuch as the rebellion
of 1948 was led largely by conservative elements that opposed
Calderon Guardia's labor legislation, whether or not current labor
guarantees and worker benefits disguise various forms of control and
repression that are more in keeping with the Latin American tradition
of authoritarian rule than the liberal democratic tradition that
Costa Ricans profess. How labor organizations are permitted to defend
their interests, and if labor relations are conducted on a more liberal
basis than other Latin American nations will determine to a large
degree whether or not Costa Rica actually is an exception to the rule.
In general terms it is to this question that the following re-
search has been dedicated. Specifically this has involved several
considerations including: the role of labor development in the rebel-
lion of 1948, and how the rebellion affected labor union structure;
recent interpretations and applications of labor legislation, how
union formation and conflict resolution procedures either encourage
or confine union organization and activity; and how labor organizations
have been able to affect labor legislation. The analysis has been
made with a view to determining the similarities and differences
between the Costa Rican labor relations system and the common pattern
of Latin American labor relations.
In accomplishing this objective attention was focused on legal
and representative structures. Where the representative structures
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are concerned, emphasis has been placed upon organizational form and
modes of participation. For lack of space and time, much less atten-
tion has been devoted to policy analysis, although this has been a
consideration in the most important of these institutions.
The ways that labor organizations have been permitted to par-
ticipate in decision-making bodies, rather than policy, have thus
been the primary basis for comparison to other Latin American coun-
tries. The structures that have been analyzed in the research were
selected with a view to identifying labor's most important contacts
in the political system. Throughout the research an attempt has been
made to point out the relationship among structures. Whether or not
labor is permitted to function freely or participate effectively in
one institution or structure has an important bearing on its ability
to act effectively in another institution. Furthermore, the nature
of these interrelationships can be used to determine the extent of
labor liberty or control.
It ought to be noted, nevertheless, that similarities in the
structures that integrate labor should not be confused with labor
relations practices. Widely differing policies between Costa Rican
bureaucratic organs, and the bureaucratic organs of other nations in
the region have in fact accounted for vastly differing material con-
ditions among the corresponding working classes. Where comparisons
have been made, it has thus been my intention to draw distinctions
between the concepts that underlie Costa Rican and Latin American
labor relations and the way these concepts have been applied.
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The magnitude of difference between labor relations theory and
practice in Costa Rica and other Latin American nations such as El
Salvador and Guatemala cannot be overstated. Most importantly, labor
leaders in Costa Rica do not run the risk of assassination or torture
as they do elsewhere in the region. Nevertheless Costa Rica's widely
applauded democratic stability and liberty will face the challenges
of population growth, high unemployment, declining prices in agricul-
tural goods, shortages in staple foods, and an energy shortage that
has caused widespread inflation. With this as an economic and social
setting, any similarities between Costa Rica and other more oppressive
and violent Central American nations, in either labor relations
theory or practice, are bound to be important. The possibility that
such similarities exist has been the inspiration for this research.
xxv
CHAPTER I
AUTHORITARIAN MECHANISMS OF INTEGRATION AND THE CASE OF COSTA RICA
Industrialization and modernization in Latin America have pro-
duced new interests that have made strong and persistent demands for
a greater share of national wealth and greater participation in pro-
cesses of decision-making. Governments, far from ignoring such pres-
sures, have sought to bring these new interests into their fold in
an effort to minimize social and political disturbances.
It was originally thought that the emergence of new social
groupings, along with rapid industrialization and urbanization, in-
creased literacy, the expansion and improvement of communication net-
works, and all those structural, and cultural characteristics commonly
associated with modernization, would produce sound foundation posts
for the development of pluralistic, democratic political and social
institutions. However, rather than creating a basis for the evolution
of stable, participant political systems, where independently organ-
ized groups would provide support for large mass-based aggregative
parties, industrialization and politicization , have often produced
crises in participation, concensus and distribution. Governments
have responded to these pressures by creating or adapting institu-
tions that would structure and limit, rather than give full expres-
sion to various group interests. 1
Where labor organizations are concerned, a variety of author!
tarian mechanisms have been used both to recognize and guarantee gro
rights and interests, and to harness working class radicalism while
regulating the flow of material demands. The application of these
controls is clearly revealed in the reaction of Latin American execu
tives to the emergence of workers associations around the turn of
the century. It is even more strikingly revealed in the legislative
responses that governments made when these associations were later
converted into large, combative labor organizations that threatened
to disrupt the social and political arrangements that supported the
interests of traditional agricultural elites and newer commercial
and industrial elites.
The threats, the demands, and in general terms, the power
capabilities of labor organizations were, in the first instance, lim
ited by the erection of legal frameworks which, while enumerating
collective rights, also created obstacles that tended to curtail fre
dom of association and independence of action. The labor laws of
the Latin American countries possess several important characteris-
tics that have been designed to accomplish these objectives. The
first is legal dispositions which make union formation a difficult
and risky undertaking. Stanley Davis and Louis Goodman have argued
that bureaucratic procedures that must be followed by unions in the
process of formation are time consuming, expensive operations that
require careful planning. The low level of unionization in Latin
America has been attributed to the problems such procedures cause
for labor leaders hoping to form unions. 2 But perhaps even more
fundamentally, bureaucratic problems, annoying as they may be, are
often complicated by the vulnerability of labor leaders to unsympa-
thetic employers whose actions are not sufficiently regulated by labor
legislation that ostensibly exists in order to guarantee the right of
association.
Secondly, regulations concerning the formation of unions are
often accompanied by membership requirements and by dispositions af-
fecting internal union organization. Davis and Goodman have found
that in many cases factories cannot unionize unless they employ a
certain number of workers. Labor leaders must meet several require-
ments, and severe limitations are placed upon union activities dur-
ing work time. Elections are closely regulated, and finances are
carefully examined. 3 Besides these, Labor Codes frequently place
bottom limits on the number of people required to form a union, and
contain extensive specifications on the structure and responsibili-
ties of the organizations' directive organs.
Thirdly, and perhaps more importantly, Latin American Labor
Codes, as ineffective as they may be in guaranteeing labor rights,
and as burdensome as they may be in their specification of union
formation requirements, are even more regulative in the prohibitions
they place on union activity. Robert Vernengo , for instance, has
compiled a variety of legal restrictions which, by prohibiting col-
lective action in certain sectors of production or among certain cate-
gories of workers, have limited the use of the strike in most Latin
American countries.
* Davis and Goodman have similarly shown that
in some countries the use of the strike may even be suspended alto-
gether for unspecified periods of time. 5
Along with legal dispositions that seem to limit unionization
levels, and confine labor union activities, structures of participa-
tion in some Latin American countries have served more to regulate
rather than articulate demands emanating from popular organizations.
Carrol Hawkins has shown, for instance, that the independence of
Mexican labor organizations has been severely limited by their rela-
tionship with the PRI. The once powerful and influencial CROM was
destroyed when labor leader Luis Morones attempted to steer an inde-
pendent course. The current Confederation of Mexican Workers,
Hawkins maintains, is heavily dependent on the goodwill of PRI govern-
ment executives. 6
Not the least of labor's problems has been the illwill of Latin
American governments, especially during periods of military dictator-
ship. Robert Alexander has shown that the Peruvian labor movement
has been greatly affected by the nature of governments at any given
period of time. Since the beginning of the century dictatorial
regimes have forced labor to operate clandestinely. Similar circum-
stances have obtained in several other Latin American countries such
as Ecuador, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Chile where military governments
have persecuted labor and have made independent activity an impossi-
bility. 7
Even in those cases where dictatorial regimes were not hostile
to the labor movement, organizational and operational structures and
procedures were created which, while perhaps designed to be more sup-
portive of labor interests than managerial interests, nevertheless
established patrimonial bonds between government, management, and
labor that prohibited the independent settlement of labor disputes,
and encouraged or required workers to look to the state rather than
the union, and to the political leader rather than the labor leader,
for the protection of their socio-economic interests. The Estado
Novo (New State) of Getulio Vargas, for instance, has had an enduring
effect on the nature of labor relations in Brazil. Corporate repre-
sentative structures, in this case, established the dominance of the
state in all aspects of labor organization and activity. The basic
unit of this structural scheme was the industrial union. All workers
in a given industry were organized into single unions, federations,
and confederations. The organization of unions outside the state
apparatus was an impossibility inasmuch as all organizations required
the official approval of the Ministry of Labor. Once established,
all forms of labor union operations, including elections, and the use
of union funds were strictly controlled by the ministry. No less
importantly, legal provisions removed collective bargaining from the
realm of labor activity. All disputes, whether of an individual or
collective nature, were resolved through the labor courts. While
the Estado Novo has long since disappeared, Robert Alexander maintains
that the experience of the corporate state has left government with
wide ranging controls over the relationships between workers and
employers
.
8
In a similar way, labor organizations in Argentina both prof-
ited and suffered from state dominance during the Peron era. While
the socio-economic position of the working classes may have been pro-
tected by justicialismo, the organizational and operational indepen-
dence of labor organizations was severely limited. Owing to a purge
of the labor movement, unions by the end of the Peron regime were
little more than tools of the political dictatorship. Moreover, it
was during this era that labor organizations became accustomed to
resolving their disputes in the Ministry of Labor. The negotiation
of nearly all contracts, Robert Alexander says, was centralized in
the ministry, and involved the heavy participation of Senora Peron.
Strikes were forbidden, except for political purposes, and individual
grievances involving violations of the law were handled through the
labor courts. Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, workers
were taught to believe that the protection of their socio-economic
interests would come from a state benefactor rather than from collec-
tive and independent union activity. 9
The Exceptional Cases
Corresponding to the persistence of dictatorial regimes, the
implementation of political, bureaucratic, and juridical control
mechanisms, and a realization that industrialization and moderniza-
tion in Latin America were not producing the liberal, pluralistic
institutions that they had in the United States, a large body of liter-
ature emerged that sought to reconceptualize Latin American develop-
ment in terms of the adaptation of traditional corporate structures.
In his study of the Iberic and Latin American labor relations systems,
for instance, Howard Wiarda argued that with few exceptions early
labor charters and labor systems, while perhaps being created by
regimes that were motivated by different objectives, had in common
a set of controls and provisions that were in keeping with a long
Latin tradition of centralized, state-directed, and Catholic inspired
authoritarianism, or natural corporatism. 10
Along with Wiarda, several writers conceptualized Latin
American development in terms of unique cultural attributes. Richard
Morse asserted that any changes in Latin America, occurring as a re-
sult of industrialization and modernization, had to be accommodated
to the enduring principles of Latin culture. Glen Dealy attributed
authoritarian organization to the persistence of Catholic monism and
the organic social theory of St. Thomas Aquinas. Claudio Veliz argued
that industrialization, rather than forming a sound basis for the
formation of liberal-pluralistic structures, provided occasion for
the reestablishment of the paternal-centralist structures that had
been set during the colonial era. Similarly, Richard Adams asserted
that the only change to have taken place in Latin America was the
expansion and centralization of vertical structures of organization.
Whereas in the past, government controlled the peasantry through the
hacienda, it now established its dominance through peasant leagues;
and in the cities, working classes were controlled through state sub-
sidized and directed labor organizations. 11
On the other hand, a large group of writers have attributed
Latin American authoritarianism to the inequalities created by capi-
talist economic penetration. According to the most radical of these
theorists, Latin American social and political structures were the
result of an alliance between foreign capitalist interests and domes-
tic capitalist interests. Inasmuch as the terms of this alliance
caused wide-ranging economic problems that called for authoritarian
solutions, Latin American nations, while having passed through many
historical stages, were linked by one enduring premise: external
dependence and economic exploitation. Following from this conceptual-
ization, the wide variety of controls that had been placed upon labor
were an economic necessity dictated to national leaders, either dir-
ectly or indirectly, by foreign interests. 12
Both of these conceptualizations have merit, but at the same
time it ought to be suggested that not all Latin American countries
have been developing within an authoritarian framework, or at least
not apparently. That is to say, while most nations in Latin America,
owing either to cultural motivations or external pressure, have
adapted or developed authoritarian control mechanisms to deal with
the disruptions created by emerging labor groups, nations such as
Costa Rica and Venezuela, with their apparently liberal, pluralistic
political institutions, stand as bold exceptions. In the case of
Venezuela, democratic institutions emerging after the overthrow of
dictator Marcos Plrez Jimenez have achieved a high degree of legitimacy
and stability. Costa Rica, on the other hand, is especially distinc-
tive in that it has been blessed by a relative absence of the social
and economic dislocations that have produced authoritarian regimes in
most Latin American countries. Like Uruguay and Chile until recently,
Costa Rica, by maintaining a long history of democratic rule, has been
considered to be exceptional.
Just as Uruguayan labor legislation had been excluded from dis-
cussions of the patrimonial aspects of Latin American labor relations,
and just as Chilean democracy had been seen to be the basis of a labor
relations system characterized by a high degree of direct negotiations
and limited government interference, it would seem that the long tra-
dition of democracy has accounted for a conspicuous lack of scholarly
interest in Costa Rica's labor relations system. 13 What attention
North American scholars of Latin America have devoted to the study of
Costa Rican politics has been intended more to praise its democratic
system of government than to criticize its political and social struc-
tures. While Uruguay had been viewed as a political Utopia, and a mode
of democracy for South American nations, Costa Rica has been seen to
be a Switzerland among Central American nations with its freely func-
tioning multiparty system, long tradition of individualism, and strong
respect for the democratic transition of power. lk
Understandably, while much of the research in Latin American
politics has been concerned with the patrimonial and authoritarian,
or the dependent and authoritarian aspects of development, Costa Rica's
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plural and liberal democracy has been treated as a given. Little at-
tention has been given to the critical examination of the nature and
evolution of Costa Rican political and social structures, and even
less attention has been devoted to the study of the Costa Rican labor
relations system, even though these subjects have been of keen inter-
est to Latin American scholars of varying ideological hues and concep-
tual predispositions.
In view of this neglect, and the installation of authoritarian
regimes in countries such as Chile and Uruguay, both of which have
also had strong liberal traditions, a systematic study designed to
trace the development of Costa Rican democracy seems now to be oppor-
tune. Inasmuch as the emergence of new social groupings during per-
iods of industrialization seems to have been a critical moment in the
development of Latin American political and social structures, the
subject of this research is subsystem autonomy; the focus is the struc
ture and operation of the Costa Rican labor union system. The spe-
cific purpose is to examine the nature and extent of labor inputs in-
to decision-making centers. The goal is to criticize the quality of
participation in order to determine the autonomy or dependence of la-
bor organizations in deciding matters that affect not only their own
immediate future but the course of national development as well.
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The Appearance and Reality of Costa Rican Democracy
There are many reasons why Costa Rica might qualify as a par-
ticipatory democracy. Elections are regular and honest; civil liber-
ties apparently are carefully guarded, political parties function
freely; there is an abundance of organized interest groups spanning
the entire social spectrum; and between the two major political par-
ties, power since 1948 has changed hands frequently and without dis-
ruption. Yet there is some evidence to suggest that constitutional
guarantees and a Labor Code that had been designed to enumerate and
protect basic labor rights, belie a political process which, while
providing liberal rights and benefits to interest groups represent-
ing the professions and business, has offered only control and patri-
monial concessions to the working classes.
Charles Denton has argued, for instance, that the democratic
political system that emerged after the 1948 rebellion has been able
to meet many of the demands of the prestige class. Lower classes,
on the other hand, have experienced more regulation than in the pre-
1948 period. Only once in the country's history, Denton has con-
tended, has a prestige group solicited the support of working class
groups. The result was a "revolution"; and since the National
Liberation Party is now securely entrenched, it no longer needs the
support of the lower classes. Participation for most Costa Rican
workers is thus restricted almost exclusively to the formal act of
voting. Supporting a similar view, Jacobo Schifter has asserted
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that the Costa Rican political system enforces an effective repres-
sion of worker demands in order to maintain the economic satisfac-
tion of the middle sectors. Schifter has indicted Costa Rican social
science literature, which, because of its ties to the PLN, has ignored
the problems of the Costa Rican laborer. He argues that unionization
is largely confined to the middle sectors which have important ties
in the political party system. Such ties, or inputs, insure contin-
uous demand satisfaction. Working-class groups, on the other hand,
do not have the same prerogatives. Furthermore, bureaucratic organs
such as the Ministry of Labor and the Ministry of Public Security use
legal dispositions to keep the working classes under control. 15
The opinions of Denton and Schifter nevertheless are not the
result of major research concerned specifically with the problems of
labor organizations. However, the amount of Costa Rican social sci-
ence literature dealing exclusively with either the development of
labor unionism or the nature of the labor relations system would seem
to vindicate Schifter's criticism. Even in Costa Rica, too little
attention has been devoted to this aspect of political development.
Nevertheless some major works, which have been concerned with various
aspects of labor relations, have produced valuable results. Vladimir
de la Cruz has written an important historical work that focuses on
the early development of labor organizations and the corresponding
emergence of class antagonisms. In an equally important investiga-
tion, James Backer traced the interest of the Catholic Church in the
social question, and provided a thorough account of Church inspired
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labor unionism in Costa Rica. Where the juridical integration of
labor organizations has been concerned, Bernardo Van der Laat has
written an article-by-article critique of Labor Code prohibitions
on the right to strike. Outside of these investigations, the most
important studies have consisted of historical works that have made
passing reference to the role of labor organizations in the rebellion
of 1948. 16
The research of de la Cruz, Backer, and Van der Laat, have
produced much in terms of the reaction of early nineteenth century
Costa Rican governments to the emergence of labor organization, as
well as current prohibitions on labor activity. No less importantly,
the historical literature that has been concerned with the rebellion
of 1948, as well as the testimony of Denton and Schifter, seem to
support the hypothesis that the Costa Rican labor movement reached
its peak of development, in terms of organization and high level
decision-making input, in the years immediately preceding the rebel-
lion of 1948; and that since then, its size, its independence, and
in general, its ability to participate freely and effectively in a
democratic decision-making process, has declined sharply.
The Framework of Analysis
With these interpretations in mind, the task of this research
is to identify the points of contact between labor and structures of
integration, then to analyse the nature of that integration in deter-
mining the restrictions or lack of restrictions on labor's participa-
tion. Three structures of integration are considered in the
14
analysis: the Labor Code, government ministries and tripartite pub-
lic institutions, and political parties.
Where Costa Rican labor legislation is concerned the most im-
portant subjects of consideration are requirements on the initiation
of collective conventions, limitations on the use of the strike, the
consequences of failure to gain juridical approval for union activi-
ties, the manner in which the code is interpreted by the labor courts,
and in general terms the extent and consequences of government involve-
ment in the resolution of labor-management conflicts.
With regard to the centralized ministries, the independence of
labor is analyzed in terms of the procedures required of unions
in the process of formation, the incentives for gaining official recog-
nition and the consequences of failure to gain official status, the
function of financial assistance to labor organizations, the role of
the Ministry of Labor in the resolution of labor-management disputes,
and the possible confluence of interest between public functionaries
and management.
As far as tripartite public institutions are concerned, par-
ticipation capability is analyzed in terms of the number of seats
made available to labor in the various directive bodies, especially
in relation to the number of seats that are made available to busi-
ness and government representatives, the selectorate responsible for
the placement of labor delegates and the methods of delegate selection,
the decision-making discretion of government delegates, and the possi-
ble confluence of interest between government and business delegates.
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The ability of labor to participate effectively in political
parties is determined in a way similar to labor's participation in
tripartite autonomous institutions. Objects of consideration in-
clude: labor's voice in the formulation of party programs, selection
methods for party leaders and electoral candidates, and the number
of labor leaders in the governing organs of the parties in question.
As an indicator of labors ability to influence both party decision-
making and public policy, a no less important subject of considera-
tion is the success, through their political party contacts, that
labor organizations have had in affecting legislative actions.
The following preview indicates that the research is basically
divided into two parts. Chapters two and three are concerned with
the historical development of the Costa Rican labor union structure
and the present distribution of labor forces. One of the objects
here is to determine the causes and effects of the 1948 rebellion in
relation to the development of the Costa Rican labor union movement.
For this reason a great deal of attention has been given to the germin-
ation of class confrontation in the first part of the twentieth cen-
tury, and its crystalization in the alignment of political forces
in the decade of the 1940s. In this connection a considerable degree
of importance has been attributed to the immediate and long-range
effects of the alliance between the Catholic Church, the Marxist Popular
Vanguard Party, and the National Republican Party of Dr. Rafael Angel
Calderon Guardia.
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The second part of the research is concerned with the form
and the effects of the formal and informal relationships that exist
between organized labor and certain structures of integration that
have an important bearing on the ability of labor to function in-
dependently and participate effectively in an ostensibly democratic
political system. Chapter IV is concerned with the manner in which
Costa Rican labor legislation protects labor liberties, and either
encourages or prohibits independent union activity. The last part
of this chapter includes three case studies that describe how free-
dom of action is conditioned by the way in which labor statutes are
interpreted. Chapter V opens with an analysis of the nature and the
effects of the relationship between labor organizations and the
Ministry of Labor and continues with a discussion of the form and
quality of labor participation in the tripartite directive organs of
four autonomous institutions. Finally Chapter VI will examine the
formal structural relationships between labor organizations and two
political parties: the Popular Vanguard Party and the National
Liberation Party. Apart from this, considerable attention has been
given to the balance of power between conservative and progressive
leaders in the PLN, and the effects of informal labor-party relation-
ships .
Without question, this study is not intended to be the final
word on the ability of Costa Rican labor organizations to either func-
tion freely, or participate effectively in important decision-making
structures. It is hoped, however, that the investigation will raise
17
important questions about the quality of Costa Rican democracy, ques-
tions which will both help to condition or change current conception
of Costa Rican government and politics, and provide material for fu-
ture research.
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CHAPTER II
THE SOCIAL STRUGGLE BEFORE 1948
The development of the Costa Rican labor movement was not
immediately accompanied by the establishment of juridical or bureau-
cratic mechanisms that intended either to protect working class inter-
ests or control labor union activities. It was only after communist
labor organizers had established a strong union movement on United
Fruit Company properties that any serious legal attempts were made
to recognize the existence of a labor union movement, and to define
the parameters of union activity. However, the subsequent implemen-
tation of constitutional amendments recognizing basic labor rights,
and the Costa Rican Labor Code, rather than being viewed as legal
mechanisms of control and cooptation, were considered to be radical
innovations that were calculated to transform social and economic
structures in a way that would disrupt the power of agricultural,
commercial, and industrial groups. The role of Marxist elements in
the formulation of what was seen to be radical labor legislation,
the influence of communist party functionaries in Costa Rican govern-
ments between 1943 and 1948, and the prospect of further radical
reform in the following presidential administration precipitated a
coalition of conservative and progressive opposition forces that
dedicated itself to the removal of Marxist elements from positions
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of power. Circumstances surrounding the rebellion of 1948 indicate
that the Costa Rican labor union movement, after having been either
ignored or repressed by a series of liberal governments in the 1920s
and 1930s, had achieved an unprecedented level of influence which
would not be reconstituted in the period after 1948.
Early Unionization
The first Costa Rican labor organizations, were created around
the middle of the nineteenth century for the purpose of mutual aid.
Some of the earliest of these guild associations were the Societies
of Aid, organized by a group of craftworkers for the purpose of provid-
ing assistance to incapacitated workers; the Society of Artisans, a
professional association that established savings accounts, schools,
clubs, and libraries; and the Mutual Society of Bakers, organized with
the participation of both workers and employers. Outside of some
isolated activities by European immigrants involved in the construc-
tion of the Atlantic railroad, labor organizations in the nineteenth
century did not venture to defend their socioeconomic interests either
by questioning a political and economic system that served capitalist
interests, or by challenging employers who enjoyed virtually unlimited
control over factory or farm work forces. 1
An interest in the excesses of capitalism, the exploitation
of the working classes, and the feasibility of labor organizations
as a means of self-defense was first expressed in the 1890s when
Bishop Augosto Thiel Hoffman published "El justo salario de los
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jornaleros y otros puntos de actividad que relacionan con la situation
de los destituidos de bienes de fortuna." Bishop Thiel recognized
the inflationary tendency created by external economic dependence
and the financial burdens this placed on the laboring classes. In
his publication Thiel emphasized the Christian right to financial
renumeration sufficient for the support of a worker and family, and
suggested that government should take an active part in protecting
workers from the abuses of capitalism. Toward this end he proposed
the creation of a joint commission of workers and employers that would
have the responsibility of regulating salaries, and he justified the
creation of labor organizations as a means of socioeconomic self-
defense
.
Thiel 's interest in the problems of the working classes has
been seen to be motivated primarily by a desire to create a political
organization powerful enough to unseat a liberal government that was
responsible for a series of anti-clerical legislation that severely
limited Church activities. With the intention of building a base of
support among day laborers and artisans, he formed the Catholic Union
Party: a short-lived electoral vehicle based upon the liberal papal
encyclical "Rerum Novarum." 2 Despite his motives, and the brief
history of the Catholic Union, Thiel can be credited with having been
the first spokesman of popular interests, and the first critic of a
political and economic system that served the interests of the Costa
Rican coffee oligarchy. His opinions on economic dependence, the
social responsibility of employers, and the role of the state in
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insuring the well-being of the working classes would be recalled two
decades later when increasingly severe social problems called into
being a more permanent opposition to the liberal state.
Although Thiel's activities failed to win anything concrete
for the laboring classes, either in terms of organization or economic
benefits, economic and demographic changes between the end of the
nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century created
an urgency for social reform and an incentive for the development of
labor organizations. The population of Costa Rica increased from
146,000 in 1870 to 300,000 in 1900. At the same time the concentra-
tion of coffee production combined with a fall in coffee prices cre-
ated a new class of propertyless workers, and an excess labor supply
that produced both an exodus from the country and a high degree of
unemployment in the cities. Out of this crisis the League of Workers
was organized in September 1900 in order to support the candidacy of
legislative deputies sensitive to the interests of the working classes
However, owing to compromises with traditional parties, the League
accomplished little; but around the same time, other organizations sue
as the Union of Carpenters, and the Union of Bakers were created in
1905 along with the Union of Shoemakers, the Union of Bricklayers,
and the Union of Typographers. The purpose of these organizations,
in contrast to the guilds of the latter nineteenth century, was to
defend worker socioeconomic interests by demanding concessions from
employers
.
3
By the beginning of the twentieth century labor leaders had
gained valuable organizational experience, and, owing to contact with
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European immigrants, they had begun to develop an awareness of con-
tradictions between the factors of production. Also important in
this connection was the creation of the Centre Germinal (Promotion
Center), an educational institution dedicated to the purpose of
"imparting a sociological vision" to workers. 4 This combination of
developments contributed to the union of several labor groups in
the General Confederation of Workers (CGT) : a conflict oriented
organization, created in 1913, that established shorter work days,
higher wages, and checks on inflation as its principal objectives.
The confederation stated that,
The union of the workers is an imperative necessity in
order to accomplish objectives that are not within the
reach of isolated groupings. The union of different
groups of workers requires the creation of a representa-
tive body as much to direct difficult labors and to
solve problems that damage the interests of our class
as to provide an awareness of public subjects that
are of interest to the collectivity. 5
The CGT draws significance from two facts. It was the first large
combative labor union in Costa Rican history. In that sense, it
offered itself as a possible counterweight to the power exercised by
employers. No less importantly, it brought a higher degree of organ-
ization to a labor movement which up to that time was noteworthy only
for its disorganization and isolated activities. It thus represented
a much higher stage of organizational development. 6
The existence of a class consciousness, as well as the capacity
of labor to coordinate activities, was demonstrated when the carpenters
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and cabinetmakers of San Jose initiated a strike at the beginning
of 1920. On January 26, shopworkers, dissatisfied with salary re-
ductions, submitted a petition for higher salaries and an eight hour
workday, and served notice that a strike would commence on February 2
in the event of non-compliance. With the rejection of the petition
the strike was initiated. During the course of the day, workers
paraded before other factories in San Jose exhorting employees to join
Shortly after the movement was initiated twenty-five factories repre-
senting a variety of industries were closed down, as more than one
thousand workers demanded higher wages and shorter workdays. The CGT
declared its solidarity, and helped sustain the strike by providing
material support. On February 4, after an audience with the President
the government decreed an eight hour workday and a twenty percent
increase in salaries
.
7
With drastically different results the Workers Federation of
Limon declared a general strike in protest of low salaries and a
United Fruit Company cost-cutting policy that involved a massive
release of workers. The company refused to concede and asked for
protection of company property. The government dispatched security
forces which promptly arrested strike leaders and burned down federa-
tion headquarters. The CGT once again declared its solidarity with
striking workers and contributed valuable financial assistance until
a border dispute with Panama prompted the confederation to recommend
a termination of the movement. 8
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Paralleling the emergence of labor-management conflicts in
the early 1920s two important reform movements were created that
would have an enduring effect on Costa Rican labor development.
The first was the Centro Socialista (Socialist Center), instituted
by Marxist Aniceto Montero in 1919. Montero studied Marxian
Socialism in Europe and returned with the determination that Costa
Rica would follow Europe down the path of socialism. He called for
reductions in the price of ^ood and manufactured items, reduction
in interest rates, lower taxes, display of all international agree-
ments, and a government returned to the people. His long range
revolutionary goals were expressed in this way:
The people of Europe are challenging the foundation of the
old society. The fire of reform is invading the universe
and it is necessary that we too study and solve our social
problems
. . .
The movement is sure. The reactionary
bourgeoisie is met by the rebellion of the proletariat,
precursor of the revolution; to the despotism from above,
the heroism from below . . . for private property,
expropriation
. . . The nation asks for social reform
. . .
Costa Rica is arising from the ashes of a shameful past,
thanks to the orientation that socialism is giving to the
popular forces of the nation. 9
Montero' s ideas however, would not have as much impact on the labor
movement of the 1920s as they would on a generation of labor
leaders that would emerge in the 1930s.
The second important movement had its roots in the progressive
papal encyclical "Rerum Novarum" and the Catholic Union Party of
Bishop Augosto Thiel. Father Jorge Volio first showed an interest
in social reform in 1902 when he established the Catholic periodical
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"La Justicia Social." Volio's criticism of the capitalist system
soon passed beyond the endurance of a conservative ecclesiastical
authority and he renounced his vows in order to pursue social reform
more actively. Volio indicted Costa Rican government and society
in these terms
:
This democracy is a farce, that the rich should devour the poor
who agonize in poverty, hoping that they will be given crumbs
out of compassion, as though they had been given souls out of
compassion, as though they were less than dogs. 10
Despite the tone of his rhetoric, Volio's reform proposals did not
contain the fundamental changes propounded by Montero, although, as
one writer commented, his thinking ranged far beyond that which would
fall within the realm of respectability for a Christian of that
epoch. 11 Nevertheless his ideas were firmly based upon the principles
of Christian democracy as they had been expressed in the papal
encyclicals of the preceding century.
Unlike Montero 's Centro Socialista the ideas of Volio would
have a much more profound effect on the immediate structure of Costa
Rican labor. At least during the 1920s his political movement suc-
ceeded in establishing itself in the minds of the Costa Rican labor-
ing class as the embodiment of progress and the mechanism of social
redemption. His influence among Costa Rican labors was most strikingly
revealed when on January 25, 1923, the General Confederation of
Workers took the decision to dissolve the confederation and form
the Reformist Party with Volio as its head. 12 The party program,
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published one month later, stated that the inefficiency of personalist
groups inhibited the progress of the nation by producing a wave of
corruption that saturated Costa Rican government from top to bottom.
Political leaders lacked vision, and as a result, government lacked
vision. More importantly, the party accused Costa Rican governments
of provoking a crisis in political life through their complicity with
the privileged classes. This called for the creation of a well-
organized and permanent political party that would replace idols with
ideas. The reformista policy platform possessed fifteen points in-
cluding the introduction of the referendum as a constitutional right,
laws covering workers accidents, municipal autonomy as a means of en-
couraging communal development, political rights for foreign residents,
correction houses for minors, the nationalization of subsoil and all
natural wealth, the devolution to the state of all land left unculti-
vated for more than fifteen years, intensification of rural education,
the expropriation of land needed for public use, the construction of
centers of popular culture, the creation of cooperative societies,
the condemnation of houses deemed uninhabitable, agrarian reform, and
the promise to pursue social reform without compromising principles
for the sake of political alliances. 13
This basic party policy of rejecting any and all political
alliances was ignored in 1924 when Volio, as the reformista presiden-
tial candidate was sent against liberal candidates Ricardo Jimenez
Oreamuno and Alberto Echandi Montero. A deadlock among the three candi-
dates prompted Volio to enter into a compromise with Jimenez. Volio
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supported a move to make Jimenez president with the promise that
reformistas would be appointed to the posts of Secretary of Educa-
tion and Secretary of Development, and the assurance that Jimenez
would support certain reformista reform proposals. The agreement
seemed to have represented a victory for social reformism but in
forming the alliance Volio abandoned the party principal of non-
alliance. Again in the presidential campaign of 1927, Volio
agreed to support the liberal National Union Party under Cleto
Gonzalez Viquez in exchange for acknowledgement of the reformista
program and the promise that Viquez would encourage social reform. 11*
The compromises made by Volio disillusioned the rank and file
of the Reformist Party. A movement that had begun with great aspir-
ation failed to produce enough in terms of concrete benefits to sus-
tain the image that it was the only party that was capable of satis-
fying the needs and desires of the working class. In the early 1930s
the communist party began to challenge the Reformist Party for con-
trol of the progressive movement. By betraying its social convic-
tions through the collaboration with conservative candidates, the
party left itself vulnerable to communist deputies who never hesi-
tated to draw attention to the legislative ineffectiveness of Volio
and to the lack of ideological clarity to which these failures were
attributed. Largely owing to its collaboration with liberal candi-
dates, the party rapidly declined after 1928. Other reasons account-
ing for its dissolution were associated with the timing of its
emergence and its policy program. In the first place, the campesinos,
31
who were still insulated from the radical thought of Aniceto Montero'
Centro Socialista, as well as the anarcho-syndicalist ideas brought
over by European immigrants, were not ready to accept new ideas.
One writer commented that the Costa Rican people at that time didn't
want to think about change, national renovation, or revolution. 15
Also, there was a lack of understanding between Volio and the ecclesi
astical hierarchy. Even though Volio had strong Catholic sentiments,
he never succeeded in winning the support of the Church. Furthermore
from the right, Volio was opposed by both the cafetaleros, and an
emerging class of industrialists who committed their support to the
liberal administrations of Jimenez and Viquez. Finally, from the
left, the party was heavily criticized by a newly created communist
organization which viewed the Reformist Party as a basically bourgeoi
movement that obscured the fundamental conflict between employers and
the state on one hand, and the workers on the other hand. 16
Nevertheless the importance of the Reformist Party in the de-
velopment of Costa Rican labor should not be underestimated. Most
importantly, the party was the first reasonably stable political
movement to challenge the foundations of a liberal political, and
economic system. 17 There was little in the reformista critique of
capitalism that differed from the old Catholic Union, but Volio
was much more dedicated to the task of reform than Augosto Thiel.
Because the movement was able to survive over a decade, through
several presidential elections, it can be considered to be Costa
Rica's first progressive, if not radical political party. By virtue
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of its relatively long life, the party was able to publicize the
inequalities of Costa Rican society much more profoundly than any
movement that had existed up to that time. Secondly, and no less
importantly, the dissolution of the party, provided the opportunity
for the communist party to establish a dominion over the social re-
form movement.
Despite his failure to win either the presidency or a legis-
lative majority for his party, several important reforms emerged
from the 1920s and early 1930s that can be attributed to Volio's
efforts. An eight hour workday was established, along with minimum
wages; accident insurance was instituted; and perhaps most impor-
tantly, the office of Secretary of State for Labor Affairs was cre-
ated in 1928. The creation of the labor office at least represented
the recognition of labor as a social group that either deserved some
form of representation, or merited some form of control. Previously
there was no constitutional or institutional acknowledgement of labor
organizations. As one historian noted, the relationship between
the working classes and government was practically non-existent. 18
The Economic Crisis of the 1930s
Between 1920 and 1929 Costa Rica enjoyed a period of economic
prosperity. Although the price of coffee declined on the interna-
tional market after 1927, production levels, except for one dramatic
decline in 1923, registered a fairly steady climb. At the same time,
foreign exchange earnings for the decade more than tripled.
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TABLE 1
COSTA RICA: COFFEE EXPORTS IN KILOS AND DOLLARS, 1920-1929 19
Years Crop in Kilos Dollars
1920-1921 13,336,381 3,835,134.88
1921-1922 18,616,803 6,677,760.00
1922-1923 11,088,400 4,709,136.42
1923-1924 18,210,760 8,427,472.52
1924-1925 15,352,863 8,403,354.16
1926-1926 18,249,045 10 623 969 39
1926-1927 16,153,980 10,611,178.76
1927-1928 18,841,798 12,379,558.38
1928-1929 19,676,115 12,225,517.66
However, the repercussions of the world economic crisis of the
1930s were dramatic, most particularly between 1930 and 1932. De-
spite a modest increase in production between 1932 and 1933, the
price of coffee showed a consistent decline, except for a partial
recovery between 1933 and 1934. Foreign exchange earnings declined
accordingly. Furthermore while coffee production never fell below
the 1928 level, dollar earnings between 1938 and 1939 were scarcely
higher than the revenues from the 1920-1921 crop.
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TABLE 2
COSTA RICA: COFFEE EXPORTS IN KILOS AND DOLLARS, 1929-1939 20
Year
Crop
in Kilos Dollars
Price
Der Kilo
1929-19 30 23,536,645 10,419,445.96 0.41
1930-1931 23,014,687 10,115,640.58 0.41
1931-1932 18,499,038 5, 395,069.40 0.27
1932-1933 27,777,939 7,971,117.41 0.27
1933-1934 19,062,662 7.516 406 32 u . Jo
1934-1935 24,238,534 5,541,018.06 0.27
1935-1936 21, 326,158 5,089,961.94 0.27
1936-1937 26,519,984 6,106,026.00 0.27
1937-1938 24,981,132 4,938,053.00 0.23
1938-1939 20,244,531 4,644,401.00 0.26
The crisis in coffee earnings was paralleled by a disaster in
the banana sector. Production, which had been declining since 1913
was practically wiped out by Panama disease. Except for a recovery
between 1924 and 1926, production decreased until 1937 and again after
1938. The United Fruit Company subsequently transferred its opera-
tions to the Pacific Coast, thus precipitating a serious unemployment
crisis in the Atlantic region.
TABLF 1
COSTA RICA: BANANA EXPORTS, NUMBER OF BUNCHES AND DOLLARS, 1920-1939"
Year Bunches Dollars
1920 8,652,473 H
,
UZM-
,
4U6
1921 8.318 581 j j ol) J , 661
1922 7.171 619
->,U0 J,455
1923 7.454 114 j , ZUU
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Z
1927 7,869,175 5 QH1 8R1
1928 7, 323,481 5 49? 611
1929 6,112,170 k 584 1 27
1930 5,834,045 4 175 S
19 31 5,079,944 3 174 965
1932 4,313,379 2 450 784
1933 4,293,383 1 981 561
1934 3,210,169 1 602 106
1935 2.908 836 1,493,512
1936 3,887,677 2,073,163
1937 5,509,673 3,049,969
1938 5,033,424 2,806,547
19 39 3,429,787 1,911,084
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The economic crisis affected both importers and the state
apparatus, whose operations depended largely on funds derived from
customs duties. The government was consequently forced to take a
series of remedial measures including a three year suspension of
the American and English debt, the emission of bonds, and a restric-
tion of credit. The most significant social consequences of the
crisis were increases in the rates of unemployment, and a correspond-
ing increase in human suffering. In 1932 the number of unemployed
reached 8,863 or about six percent of the economically active popula-
tion. This however did not take into account the large number of under
employed, for which there are no statistics. 22 These developments,
by sharpening class antagonisms, encouraged popular receptivity to
social and political criticism, and provided communist party organ-
izers with an opportunity to mobilize the vast numbers of unemployed
and underemployed, who constituted a new forum for radical Marxist
rhetoric
.
The communist party was organized in 1931 by Manuel Mora and
Jaime Cerdas under the name the Bloque De Obreros Y Campesinos (Worker
and Farmer's Block). Its historical antecedents go back to the Centro
Socialista of Aniceto Montero, but it was more directly inspired by
the Revolutionary Association of Worker Culture (ARCO), an educa-
tional association founded in 1929 by Gonzalo Montero Berry for the
purpose of disseminating socialist ideals. The association evolved
into a center for Marxist studies that became the nucleus of the com-
munist party. Also important was the CGT, which although part of
Volio's Reformist Party came increasingly under communist influence.
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Shortly after the party was organized, Mora and Cerdas began organ-
izing workers in the banana zone. Despite company opposition, govern-
ment suspicion of communists, and ethnic divisions among workers,
Mora and Cerdas managed to create the General Union of Workers on
United Fruit Company property. The UGT would become the core of
the Bloque. 23 In fact the entire zone would become the exclusive
dominion of communist labor organizations for decades to come.
The Bloque' s first program demonstrated a radical revolution-
ary position, and an implaceable opposition to reformism that was
reflected in a sharp indictment of Volio's Reformist Party:
Reformism says that the redemption of the worker can be obtained
gradually as capitalists made concessions; communism sustains
that these concessions must be wrested from capitalism. That is
the difference in theory. In practice, your Party, in addition
to having no ideological orientation, would be a good example:
ten years of parliamentarianism without any practical result for
the workers, ten years of shameful collusion with the monied
classes
.
2 k
The Bloque attributed social injustice to a dependent and semi-
colonial economy that was controlled by the United States and England,
The solution to this state of affairs called for the abolition of
private property, and the socialization of the means of production.
At the same time however, these goals were understood to be part of
a long range plan that would be achieved only after a social revolu-
tion had occurred in the large industrialized nations. As part of
its short range plan, the party developed an extensive policy pro-
gram that included the creation of worker and peasant councils; the
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creation of a social security system that would provide funds for
unemployment, accidents, sickness, old age, and maternity; abolition
of work for children under fifteen, and the regulation of working
conditions for women—along with equal pay for men and women per-
forming similar functions; the obligation of work for everyone over
eighteen; an eight hour workday for non-burdensome work and a six
hour workday for people involved in unusually difficult jobs such
as mining; a minimum wage board controlled by workers and peasants;
public housing; public health facilities; the expropriation of un-
cultivated land; the nationalization of the means of transportation;
increased state intervention in economic and social matters; the
nationalization of subsoils; state control of utilities; tax reform;
and importantly, laws guaranteeing labor rights. 25
The revolutionary proposals of the Bloque and the efforts
that were being devoted to the organization of the labor force pro-
voked a two-pronged response from the Ricardo Jimenez government:
the repression of what were judged to be communist inspired labor
demonstrations, and direct government involvement in the solution of
labor disputes. The combination of those two countermeasures under-
scored a carrot and stick approach to labor unrest. The extent and
nature of labor activities, and even the right of labor organizations
to exist, depended entirely on the disposition of governments which
before 1940, usually interpreted worker demonstrations as threats
to the social peace. The flowering of Costa Rican laissez-faire
liberalism, as historian Oscar Aquilar Bulgarelli has noted, occurred
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during the administrations of Gonzalez Viquez and Ricardo Jimenez,
who, in addition to being the leaders of public opinion between 1906
and 1936, were the principal defenders of the upper classes. 26
Along with its clamor for recognition, and the independent
development of organizations that presumed to channel and articulate
the demands of labor, there was a corresponding attempt on the part
of Costa Rican government to establish itself as the patrimonial
caretaker of the working classes, a tactic whigh might be seen to
be designed to counteract the influence of frequently radical labor
leaders. Consequently, the consistent use of repressive measures
against labor organizers and leaders, along with an occasional and
partial acceptance of worker demands, distinguished itself as the
most important feature of labor disputes. The immediate commitment
of security forces during strikes and demonstrations, arrests fol-
lowed by direct appeals to executive power, presidential audiences,
and executive decrees became routine strike resolution practices.
A wave of labor unrest associated with the effects of the world
depression demonstrated this sequence of action. In 1933, unem-
ployed San Jose workers initiated a demonstration. Security forces
were immediately dispatched. Clashes occurred after which police
opened fire in an attempt to disperse workers. At the same time,
communist party leaders and labor organizers were arrested, communist
clubs and offices were closed; and a government order prohibited the
formation of groups larger than two. 27
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In a much more serious confrontation at the beginning of 1934,
workers in San Jose issued an ultimatum to the owner of La Renaciente
shoe factory. Production decreases between 1930 and 1934 prompted
management to initiate a three day work week Salaries were reduced
forty percent and many workers had been fired. At the same time,
the cost of living had increased, and the lack of government action
permitted the development of deplorable living conditions. Manage-
ment on this occasion had reduced the salary of an individual worker;
however factory workers, supposing the reduction to be general, sub-
mitted a petition expressing three points: that the salary reduction
was financially unbearable; that the lack of forewarning was unjust;
and that the salary reduction should be removed. When the letter
was ignored, shoe workers went on strike. 28 The movement in its
initial stages involved four hundred workers from La Renaciente
factory, but participation was broadened with the involvement of
workers from other shoe factories who had presented similar demands.
Shortly after the movement was initiated, the shoeworkers of Limon
sent a message of solidarity, and the Federation of Graphic Arts
Workers provided financial support. 29
The Secretary of the Department of the Interior granted an
audience with strike leaders who complained that while hours and
salaries had been reduced, factory owners had not lowered the price
of shoes. 30 In this instance, the President encouraged factory
owners to partially accept worker demands; but with the refusal of
employers to either remove the salary reduction or negotiate with
worker representatives the movement continued and subsequently ex-
panded with the participation of shoe workers in Grecia, San Ramon,
Guadalupe and Cartago. By February 10 the Tapia, Bravo, Brenes,
Carlos Guevara, and Francisco Hernandez shoe factories capitulated
to worker demands. One week later the shoe workers in Cartago and
Guadalupe triumphed, raising the number of shops to accept worker
demands to twenty-five. By February 17, only four establishments
refused to capitulate. 31 La Renaciente factory, where the strike
originated, was the last to accede to worker demands.
The Bloque De Obreros Y Campesinos was instrumental in pro-
viding financial support and organization in the shoe worker strike.
Later that year it led the banana workers of Limon in a major cam-
paign against the United Fruit Company. The immediate cause of the
strike was the silence of the company to a list of demands submitted
by labor leader Carlos Luis Fallas. A strike was called involving
ten thousand workers that paralyzed the entire industry. An accord
was reached between the Jimenez government, the workers, and the
company, but when United Fruit failed to comply with the agreement,
the strike was reinitiated. 32 The list of worker demands included
salary increases, hourly wages for dock workers, payment every two
weeks, free housing, provision of tools, the application of work acc
dent laws, emergency medical treatment, parity between commissary
store prices, and local store prices, annulment of the banana con-
tract with the Jimenez government, elimination of coupons as a means
of payment, and the recognition of the Union of Atlantic Workers, as
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well as all other unions. 33 With the commencement of the new strike,
Jimenez dispatched troops. Violent confrontations occurred between
strikers and government forces. The movement was eventually broken
up, but not before workers were able to gain some minor concessions
including higher salaries, to be paid through wages or by contract;
payment by the month, with the right to ask for advances; company
housing on fincas with work camps; transferral of sick workers to
hospitals in Limdn or San Jose; construction of emergency clinics
on each finca; price parity between commissary stores and local
stores, along with the construction of new commissary facilities;
prohibition of company reduction of the value of coupons awarded to
workers; preferential treatment for Costa Rican workers; and the
recognition of the Union of Atlantic Workers. 34 Four years later the
United Fruit Company transferred its operations to the Pacific
Coast, but almost immediately Bloque labor organizers were instru-
mental in the formation of the Federation of Pacific Banana Workers. 35
Despite the frequent use of public security forces to break
up strikes, and the internment of communist labor organizers, the
Jimenez administration was much more tolerant of union activities
than the subsequent administration of Leon Cortes. Historian Manuel
Rojas Bolanos asserted that increased state economic intervention
after 1936 was paralleled by increased repression of popular forces.
During the Cortes administration, various measures were taken to
induce an economic revival. The International Bank was converted
into the National Bank of Costa Rica, and the superintendency of
banks was created for the purpose of regulating capital, reserves,
and credits of private banks. 35 But during the same administration
union leaders were frequently interned, and rank and file union mem-
bers were fired by public order. 37
Catholicism and the Social Question
Owing to the conservatism of the Catholic hierarchy after
Augosto Thiel, the Church paid only enough attention to the social
struggle to condemn any attempts to enflame class antagonisms. In
so doing, the communist party had become the unchallenged leader of
the social reform movement. The success of the Bloque in mobilizing
popular support led to a rethinking of the social role of the Catholic
Church. The Church hierarchy didn't show a serious interest in labor
organizations until the tenure of Archbishop, Victor Manuel Sanabria
Martinez in 1940, but a concern for the deprivation of the lower
classes began to emerge from the rank and file clergy in the early
1920s. In 1923 Padre Carlos Meneses asserted that:
the actual times ask that a priest know how to defend the
economic interests of his parishioners. If a priest doesn't
know how to organize a union or point out the general bases
for a rural union, or a consumer cooperative, or a society safe
from the accidents of work, to the most steadfast of his
parishioners, sooner or later, will come the socialists and
they will know how to do as atheists what couldn't be done by
priests. 38
In August of 1924 Padre Manuel Zavaleta recognized the rising cost
of living and the need for higher salaries. He expressed particular
concern for the rural worker, who he insisted, did not receive a
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sufficient salary. He stated that the workers could accomplish their
objectives through organization and the use of strikes. In September
of the same year, Padre Matias Cornelio Rojas called attention to
the utility of the non-conflict oriented labor organizations that
had been emphasized in the encyclical Rerum Novarum, and pointed out
the importance of savings accounts and societies of mutual aid. In
November 1924, Padre Carlos Borge spoke of papal justifications of
worker organizations, and like Rojas, supported the idea of mutual
aid societies. Moreover, he lamented the image the Church had as
an enemy of the people. The next month Padre Emeterio Martinez indi-
cated the importance of agrarian unions, and especially mixed unions,
as a means of incorporating people into Catholic life. 39
The more vocal of these socially critical priests, especially
Carlos Meneses, were scolded by the Catholic hierarchy, but during
the course of the 1930s when the Bloque established itself as a major
social movement, emphasis was placed upon the need to create some
form of organization that could offset communist influence. Never-
theless in 1931 Padre Alfredo Hidalgo attacked the Bloque program
saying that it upset the order created by God. He defended private
property, and social hierarchy, and asserted that because there would
always be poor people, communist revolutionary propaganda deceived
the people by raising false hopes. Hidalgo's opinions, as James
Backer has noted, reflected the maintenance of conservative attitudes
within the Church hierarchy. No reference was made to the need for
any type of positive action, and a strong emphasis was placed on
resignation and passive acceptance
.
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A few years later however El Mensajero Del Clero began to show
a greater interest in Catholic social responsibility and Catholic
social organization. In 1935, in an article entitled "Lecciones sobre
la question social," attention was given to an employer's responsi-
bility for the well-being of contracted workers. Employers were ex-
pected to respect the human dignity of employees, and not make slaves
out of their own brothers. They were seen to have an obligation to
provide financial renumeration sufficient for a workers family and a
moral commitment not to injure the poor either through violence, fraud,
or usury. It was also stated that work loads should not exceed the
capacity of workers either in intensity or duration. The length of a
workday depended on the tasks that were being performed. In this con-
nection, women and minors merited especially favorable conditions. 1* 1
In 1936 Jose Miglia published an article attesting to the social
function of wealth. Asserting that the wealthy must use their money
in a way that would do the greatest amount of good for the greatest
amount of people, Miglia argued that capital could be considered to
be used justly when it satisfied the necessities of the people, and
unjustly when workers were given to extreme necessity. Miglia also
proposed limits on private property, and suggested that while small
property should be encouraged, the power of acquisition should be limi-
ted. Moreover, the wealthy had the special responsibility of using
their resources to construct, maintain, and improve public facilities.
Society, Miglia believed, should be constructed in a way that would
permit everyone to enjoy a relative well-being 2
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One year later El Mensajero Del Clero published a commentary
justifying the existence of labor organizations, asserting that they
were a product of and necessity in contemporary society. At the same
time however a great deal of attention was given to the need to cre-
ate organizations that would promote rather than upset social har-
mony. Labor organizations, it was stated, had been converted into
machines which were used in an unjust struggle that encouraged class
hatred and threatened to destroy society. Unionism was justifiable
when it was based upon Catholic truth rather than individualistic
egotism or communist collectivism. It should be supported not by
class hatred but by justice and love. The Mensajero proposed an
integral conception of unionism that would
consist in the stable organization of workers in the same pro-
fession, established and governed in accordance with the princi-
ples of faith, Christian morality; that would be an instrument
of harmony and peace through its use of mixed committees that
would form a bond between classes. It would be formed by
Catholics, and would have as its objective the study, promotion,
and defense of worker interests. 1* 3
Labor organizations, it was argued, should at each moment regulate
their actions according to moral principles. The Church confirmed
the right to form such organizations, separate as well as mixed.
However, it was added, the Church rejected unlimited individualism
as a concept that damaged the position of the weak. On the other
hand socialism and communism subjected the individual to the needs
of the state. This signified a loss of liberty that would inhibit
the development of the personality. Private property was still
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defended by the Church, although with the qualification that it should
not be used exclusively for personal benefit. Regarding salaries,
employers were obliged to provide a form of enumeration that would
enable workers to develop personal values. A relationship of mutual
responsibility that had its basis in the concepts of solidarity and
brotherhood, was seen to be the only way to satisfy material needs
without sacrificing spiritual values. 1* 1*
Throughout the 1930s the Church broached the subject of labor
organization with reservation, and qualification. There was a reluc-
tance to address the conflict of interest between classes and a fail-
ure to acknowledge a need for combative worker organizations. The
Church recognized the utility of unions but only reluctantly. An
emphasis was placed upon solidarity, brotherhood, and mutual concern
which reflected the conception that there existed a natural harmony
between classes that was perhaps more fundamental to the question of
social justice than material well-being. But after the installation
of Victor Sanabria as Archbishop in 1940, the Church took a much
more critical view of social relations and began to show a serious
interest in the organization of labor unions. Santiago Arrieta
Quesada correctly asserted that Sanabria was the only Bishop who
attempted to mold the policies of the Church to the realities of
the modern world. He believed that the physical world was the instru-
ment of human liberty, and he hoped to mend the breach between the
spiritual and the temporal. Though firmly anti-communist, he didn't
believe that communism could be combatted through political or legal
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action, but through social justice. He succeeded Quesada said, in
awakening the interest of the people, the government, and the Church,
to serious social problems that required quick solutions. 45
The Catholic-Communist Alliance
The preceding analysis indicates that labor had demonstrated
a power capability in the 1930s. Early in 1934, the shoe industry
of the Central Valley was paralyzed. Later in the year, banana pro-
duction in the Limon area came to a stop. Workers showed their unity
through declarations of solidarity, sympathy strikes, and financial
donations to strike committees. But despite these demonstrations of
collective action, labor remained in the wings of the political
system.
Through the course of the century some legislation of a re-
formist or integrative nature had emerged. In 1901 minimum wages
were established for workers involved in commerce; in 1912 minimum
wages were established for laborers and servants; compensation for
overtime work was instituted in 1920; a social security office at
the National Bank was established in 1925; the office of the
Secretary of State for Labor Affairs was created in 1928; minimum
salaries for all occupations were instituted in 1933; in 1936 work-
ing conditions were regulated in accordance with age and sex; and
in 1937 employers were obliged to pay workers in cash rather than.
coupons."46 At the same time the Bloque guaranteed some worker
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representation in the National Assembly. Nevertheless the relation-
ship between labor and government had not been formalized by this
legislation. Labor was unintegrated juridically, and for the most
part, politically as well. Moreover, the informal relationships
that did exist, as the strikes of the 1920s and 1930s had shown,
were most usually repressive in nature. However in the 1940s, owing
to an alliance between Christian and communist forces, a series of
reforms were introduced that completely changed the relationship
between labor, employer, and government, at the same time threaten-
ing the power of the cafetalero and emerging industrial elites.
In 1940 Dr. Rafael Angel Calder6n Guardia came to power at
the head of a conservative movement that was financed by members of
the oligarchy. 1+7 But besides being a conservative candidate sup-
ported by capitalist and conservative elements, Calderon enjoyed
immense popularity with the popular classes. Like Jorge Volio, he
had studied at the Lovaine in Belgium, and having been thoroughly
imbued with the principles of Catholic social justice, maintained
a commitment to the problems of the lower classes, and a determina-
tion to find a Christian solution to social, political, and economic
inequality
.
Calderon criticized liberalism for marginalizing the lower
classes and creating a situation of social injustice. His ideas
were guided by the encyclical Rerum Novarum which held that capitalism,
as the product of a society imbued with liberal political, and
economic thinking showed little concern for the weak. Repudiating
laissez-faire capitalism, his thinking embraced the idea that the
state should have the capacity to safeguard individual well-being.
The Costa Rican political, social, and economic system denied the
majority of people their legitimate, natural, and legal right to
benefit from natural wealth. It condemned people, through low salar
ies and perpetual inflation to a state of servitude. CalderoVs
thought never implied radical change. Jorge Salazar contended that
he was not a revolutionary, but a reformer who sought to eliminate
social injustice and reduce class antagonisms by offering Christian
social democracy as an alternative solution to the social problem.
His thinking blended principles of Christianity, socialism, and
liberalism. From Christianity it took the ideas of equality, jus-
tice, solidarity, peace, harmony, and social coexistence. From
socialism it incorporated the ideas of state intervention; and from
democratic liberalism, the principles of civil liberties, individual
dignity, and the parliamentary method. 1* 8
Circumstances in the 1940s were propitious for the creation
of a political alliance that would group communist and non-Marxist
reform movements. The German invasion of the Soviet Union, and the
substitution of bourgeois liberalism with fascism as the principle
international villain, provoked a change in communist rhetoric and
tactics. The Bloque softened its criticism of bourgeois democracy,
and suspended its proposals for radical revolutionary change. So-
cialism became a long-range objective. The immediate task was to
work within the parliamentary system and collaborate with any
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political movement that was disposed to initiating reforms intending
to strengthen the social, economic and political position of the
lower classes. Accordingly Manuel Mora emphasized the similarities
between Marxist and Christian thinking. In one address before the
National Assembly he contended that "socialism is not the enemy of
democracy but a realistic defense for democracy.- 9 And in a response
to an attack issued by conservative deputies he asserted: "It is
upon misery that you are trying to build the human personality.
The individual can not develop his potential until his economic
problems have been solved." "We are not against individualism; we
are against the egotism that passes for individualism." 50 Mora drew
upon the Christian concept of integral humanism by making frequent
references to the links between man's material, moral, and spiritual
needs. He said: "We want to free the spirit of man from the unbear-
able burdens of economic depravation." 51 And in response to the
criticism that socialism was based upon a hierarchical conception of
political organization, he contended: "We want hierarchy, but a
moral and spiritual hierarchy, not a hierarchy based upon gold." 52
At the same time, CalderoVs Catholic social thinking impressed
Sanabria and progressive members of the Church hierarchy. Upon tak-
ing power El Mensaj ero del Clero stated that:
On the 8th of May of 1940 Costa Rica experienced a legitimate
triumph upon receiving as President the young Dr. don Rafael
Angel Calderon Guardia, elected to the presidency by an immense
majority of the Costa Rican people on the 2nd of February. 53
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Calder6n, for his part, encouraged Church support by defeating anti-
clerical legislation. In 1942 he abolished restrictions on Church
educational activities and legislation prohibiting the presence of
religious orders. 51*
Relations between the Church and the Calderon government were
further strengthened when, between 1941 and 1942, a series of laws
creating the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social (Costa Rican Social
Security Institute-CCSS) caused an erosion of Calderon's conserva-
tive support. The Caja provided insurance for sickness, maternity,
invalidity, and death. Its funds were derived from contributions
from workers, employers, and the state. But in addition to being
an important development in the history of Costa Rican social reform,
it precipitated a strong reaction from commercial and agricultural
groups who were afraid of losing paternalistic control over their
employees, and who were forced to shoulder a significant financial
burden for the Caja's operations. James Backer maintained that the
fact that workers now had the right to state medical assistance
signified that they were no longer compelled to solicit aid from
their employers. Nevertheless, Calderon's legislation won the
complete support of Sanabria who considered the creation of the
Caja to be a concrete expression of Catholic social doctrine.
Shortly after the institute came into existence the Bloque
published its revised political program. The party called for the
development of national industrial potential; the creation of a
National Council for Industrial Promotion; banking reforms to
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facilitate industrial credits at low interest; the protection of
domestic industry; modification of contracts with foreign based com-
panies; the nationalization of public services; a moratorium on
external debts; the expropriation of uncultivated land; the creation
of cooperatives; limitations on land tenure; and the editing of a
Labor Code. At no point did it criticize the parliamentary method
or call for reforms calculated to destroy existing socioeconomic
structures. 56 Later that year a group of capitalists visited Manuel
Mora and broached the subject of a possible coup d'etat against the
Calderon government. Up to that time relations between the commun-
ist party and Calderon had been cool and it was supposed that a coup
d'etat might be able to count on Mora's support. Mora not only re-
jected the idea, he revealed the plans to Calderon and offered to
strengthen his government with the full support of the Bloque de
Obreros Y Campesinos
.
5
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Having committed the support of the Bloque to the Calderon
government, Mora resolved to reduce tensions with the Catholic
Church. To accomplish this the Bloque was dissolved in 1943 and
the Popular Vanguard Party (PVP) was created in its place. Mora
then wrote a letter to Sanabria expressing his hope to create a
powerful progressive block, and asking if there was any reason why
Catholics should withhold their collaboration. 5
8
Sanabria
responded in the following terms:
The Party first decided to dissolve itself as a party, and then
to form a new grouping, that neither in its name nor in its pro-
gram, contains anything that might signify the word Communist.
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Nor does it pretend to impose a dictatorship of the proletariatso stated Mr. Mora two nights ago, nor is U an enemy of priva^property nor does it promote, nor does it persecute religion
IuthenMcall
0r
r
the
" proclaims to be ana tically Costa R1Can Party, and that its only objective isto end misery and ignorance in Costa Rica.
Can I condemn the new party? No, I can't. And if I were to
"and""; 2 fiVe reaS °nS f° r that "ndeLa-tio , and I don't have them.
Later that year Trabajo
,
the communist party organ, explained that
"Christian doctrine is not incompatible with the needs of the work-
ers. If the two have ever been separate, it has been because of
interference from reactionary political forces." 60
Having constituted an alliance between his own National
Republican Party (PRN)
,
the Popular Vanguard Party and the Church
(the Block of Victoria), Calderon announced a proposal to initiate
a series of constitutional amendments. The Social Guarantees, as
they have been called, both enumerated individual socioeconomic
rights, and acknowledged the right of the working classes to act
collectively in the defense of those rights. Equally importantly,
especially in the long run, the Guarantees named the state as the
protector of the working classes. In specific terms the Social
Guarantees declared the responsibility of the state for stimulating
production, and distributing wealth adequately; the family, as the
most fundamental element of society, merited the special protection
of the state; work was declared to be an individual right and a
social obligation. The state was responsible for providing all citi-
zens with honest, useful, and duly renumerated work that would not
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degrade the individual; all workers received the right to a mini™
salary that would be fixed periodically; patrons as well as workers
were given the right to unionize; collective conventions were given
the force of law; workers had the right to declare strikes; workers
fired unjustly had the right to indemnization; the state was respon-
sible for encouraging the creation of cooperatives; labor courts
were established; and the state would provide low cost housing for
workers. 51 The Guarantees were a prelude to the much more comprehen-
sive legislation contained in the Labor Code. Formulated with the
heavy participation of PVP functionaries in the Calderon Guardia
government and put into operation on Independence Day in 1943,
calderonistas, communists, and Catholic workers launched a demonstra-
tion in support of what they called the second day of independence
for Costa Rican labor.
Integration and Organizational Growth
Owing to a shift in the balance of power in the Catholic hier-
archy in the 1940s, the Church prepared to initiate an intensive labor
organization drive. In this connection Archbishop Sanabria was an
impelling force. His dissatisfaction with the social indifference
of the Catholic Church was expressed in 1938 when he said: '"The
social question! A word of transcendental value today. What has the
Church done to resolve this question and what can it do now.'" 62
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ofth^ 1 n0t Place itself at the margin
It deal SS ?UT 10n ' 1° C°mPlexity» »uch because
of 1 h fundamental questions of justice, of charity andChristian equality, as because, message that it is of peaceamong men, it is concerned with anticipating and curing thecauses of dissention among men and proposing for these grave
ErSrX^S" S01— to say, the solutionis
Three years later he made an unprecedented reference to the right
of workers to demand social justice, and of the obligation of the
state to assume the responsibility for the well-being of the lower-
classes. The workers had the right to demand, he contended, a form
of renumeration sufficient for the support of a family. The employer
who imposed too low a salary did violence to the worker. The state
must therefore protect the working class by directing, urging, and
punishing when necessary. 61*
It is clear that Sanabria's subsequent organizational initia-
tives were attributable to a serious concern for the economic deprava-
tion of the lower classes, but it was in large part a reaction to the
organizational advances of the communist party. The labor strug-
gles of the 1930s, the repressive measures employed by the state to
discourage labor activity, as well as the modest gains that had been
achieved through united action, served both to enhance feelings of
class loyalty, and encourage the sentiment that positive gains could
only be achieved through struggle. Class and party were replacing
the Church as objects of loyalty, while conflict and militancy were
replacing Christian harmony and brotherhood as bases for collective
action.
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But if economic depravation and communist intrusions were
important factors in redirecting Church thinking, there can be no
doubt that the Social Guarantees and the Labor Code provided the
stimulus for action. The constitutional amendments and the code
integrated labor juridically. They provided a measure of legitimacy
and legal authorization of unionization efforts. A subsequent in-
crease in the number of unions, both Catholic and communist, is
testimony to the importance of these two documents.
Between 1942 and 1943 Sanabria ignored conservative advice
and authorized Padre Benjamin Nunez Vargas to begin organizing
Catholic labor unions. At the same time the communist party began
a major organizational drive in the Central Valley. The Comite
Nacional Sindical de Enlace (National Union Coordination Committee)
,
established at the beginning of 1943, was shortly converted into the
class conflict oriented Confederation of Costa Rican Workers (CTCR)
.
During the same period Nunez created fifteen unions, and in September
the Center for Costa Rican Unions—Rerum Novarum was established
with Nunez as President of the Junta Directiva (Directive Committee).
Nunez stated that the Center was intended to be for people of all
political and religious dispositions. It was neither communist nor
socialist, but personalist. Its intention was to communicate ethical
norms and morals that were common to all religions. Furthermore
it was created not to debilitate class cohesion or to create a basis
of opposition to non-Catholic unions, but to promote cooperation
among workers. Nevertheless in dedicating itself to this task,
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religion could not be excluded, inasmuch as the well-being of the
working classes, Nunez contended, could not be permanent if action
did not have a religious basis. 65
The Center immediately began incorporating independent
federations and unions and in April 1944, Center delegates agreed to
establish the Costa Rican Confederation of Workers-Rerun, Novarum
(CCTRN)
.
In May the CCTRN, with five thousand members belonging
to ten federations was officially constituted for the purpose of
coordinating and amplifying a union of forces in order to in-
sure the workers of the promotion of their economic and social
well-being, in defense of the rights, and in accordance with
Christian principles of social justice. 66
The Constituent Acts of the confederation professed a respect
for the right of the Catholic Church to intervene in social affairs,
but the confederation declared its independence from ecclesiastical
authority and declined to promise that it would commit itself to the
Church in the prosecution of its socioeconomic ends. It asserted
political independence, with the qualification that it would not be
indisposed to either proposing policies intending to improve the
socioeconomic conditions of the working classes or supporting any
political party of a reformist disposition. 6
7
In an address to the
General Assembly Sanabria nevertheless asserted that Rerum Novarum
would be guided by Christian principles of social justice. It was
neither anti-communist, anti-socialist, anti-left, nor anti-red; but
pro-social justice. Its purpose was to promote spiritual as well
as socioeconomic interests a i •ASk1"8 the «».bership to accept
Christian solutions to the socialS0Cl 1««ion he asserted:
"The PapalEncyclical are not exclusively Catholic or Christ! H^ ian documents but
numan documents as well." 68
The agreement that had heen reached between Sanabria and Morabecame the basis for *n ali-t a alliance between Catholic a nH „n u d communist labor
organizations that consi^PHsisted of a synchronization of activities
between the CCTRN and the CTCR Rn^. Both confederations agreed to
respect each others dominance in factor^ hm ctories where unions had alreadybeen established, while inD n0n"un—ed factories, workers would
choose between the two confederations The In. loser was then given the
-Sht to organize unions-without inter!ereuce-in another non-
lionized faetory . At the same tlme> the^ de
dntelligence Committee, was established in order to hlunt shoc.s
between conizations and to facilitate information exchange.
X-
-rms of unity, and political in£luence, the period between
»« and 1948 must he considered to he the hi8hpoint in Costa Rlc an
labor development. The labor force was equally divided between two
lar8e organizations that may have been hased upon different world
views
; but as the alliance between the CCTRN and the CTCR shows
Catholics and
_ists were able to a8ree on basic objectives, and
combine their activities in brin8i„g 8reater organization to the
-rking classes. During this period the vast majority of unions and
federations belonged to one of the two confederations . » WMle there
60
can be UttU doubt that the ideological dlfferences betueen Cathoii^
and communists had not dlsappeared> these differences^
into a competition that SCrengthened che ln£iuence ^^^
as the CC™ and the CTCR subsequently devo£ed eMrmous^ ^ ^
organization o £ non-unionized workers. Bet„efin ^ ^^
membership increaqpH f r„„ e .from flve thousand t0 £i£ty thousand
^ ctcr^
sion was equally dramatic.
The political consequences of these developments, having been
based upon reform legislate made possible by the alliance betKeen
the Church, the Popular vanguard Party and Calder5n Guardla , s ^
were of enormous importance. Between 1940 and 1944 Calderdn's reli-
ance on Catholic and colonist support increased in proportion to the
defection of conservative support. The reward for this loyalty was
the appointment of colonist and CCTRN representatives to high rank-
ing positions in the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social and the newly
created Ministry of Labor and Social Security as well as several other
public bureaucracies. The Calderon government actively encouraged
labor unionization, and on frequent occasions, interposed itself in
a paternalistic fashion, between employer and worker during labor
conflicts. But the difference between the paternalism of the 1940s
and the paternalism of preceding administrations was that the state
was now taking the side of labor. With the institutional influence
that labor had gained in the public administration, the personal in-
fluence that labor leaders enjoyed as presidential advisers, and the
commitment of the executive office to social reform, it would not be
61
-*
- an
-aggeration to contMd caider5n
_
-«^ a pertod of intense union activity during „hlch ubor™ ^ unprecedented degree Qf poiit±cai tnfiuenca
_ ^^
;
le doubt is the fa- that
-
-
labor
, through CCTRN
and Popular Vanguard functionaries not only in the CalH -uiu- deron govern-
ment but in the subsequent Teodoro Pir.Hoa xcad government, was suffi-
ciently strong to give rise t-n a , .x o a coalition of opposition forces that
was held toeetheT- u8 only by its opposition ^ ^ ^
hensions of increasing communist political influence.
Opposition to the Block of Victoria r,™ fv came from two principal
sources: the conservative National Unification Party ( PuN ) under
Journalist Otiiio Ulate and the Social Democratic Party (SDP) under
Jose Figueres. The PUN »as formed from the defection ofu " r commercial,
cafetalero, and industrial elements that h*A kx ad been responsible for
launching CalderoVs political career. The smaller SDP on the other
hand was composed of the Balance of reformist elements, most particu-
larly students, who viewed Calderon as a corrupt and ineffectual
demagogue, whose style of leadership represented a continuation of
the old Ricardo dimene; form of personalistic leadership, and whose
party was no more than a personalistic following that would not be
ahle to sustain a social reform initiative once Calderon retired from
political life. Ab ove all the SDP called for the opening of a new
era of Costa Rican democracy through the creation of a doctrinaire
62
decades earlier, upon ideals rather than idols.
The SDP, organized in 1945, had lts orlglns ^ ^^ ^
the Study of National Problem (Centre), a group or students and
Professors forced in 1940 for the purpose of investigate and pro-
posing solutions to fundamental political and social problems. The
Centre professed three objectives • 1 Whoc . l) the scientific study of
political and social problems, 2, the discovery of Costa Rican his-
torical reality and 3) the perfection of the democratic system.'"
Curiously, the policy propositions that the Centre propounded through
the course of the decade were identical to those being undertaken
by the Block of Victoria. The centristas were much more critical
of the style of Calderon's leadership than his political beliefs or
policy initiatives. Accordingly the ideological propositions of the
Centre incorporated the same criticism of capitalism as Calderon's
Christian reformism. Early in Calderon's administration the centristas
blamed liberal economics for the high concentration of capital and
Its attendant problems of low consumption levels among the lower
classes, unemployment, and individual misery. The centristas argued
that economic anarchy, social disequalibrium, political insecurity,
and moral damage to the working classes had historically been replaced
by disciplined and authoritarian political orders. Economic liberal-
Ism, in their view was the cause of communism and fascism. But the
injustices of the liberal state, they contended, could not be cor-
rected by authoritarian solutions of either the right or the left.
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Their answer to the social „a questron Uy ln thfi perfectlon
_
replacement of liberalism tv,
** MChin«^ ° f ^ democratic system
must be brought into the service of society bvl y ensuring economic
any viable alternatives for socia, rpfx l reform, and lamented that the
great tragedy of Costa Rican politics was that then campesinos hadbeen left with no choice but th*e communist party since it had
traditionally been t-ho «„ihe only movement dedicated to the solution of
rural misery. 7
1
respite the interest that Calderon Mediately began to show
t-
-ese problems, the Centro contended that social reform nouXd not
he accomplished democratically unless it was carried out by a doctri-
naire political party. The logic behind this contention was that
"hen a group agreed to institute programs serving the collective good
it was necessary to have a plan based upon log ical conclusions derived
SCient" iC
°
f
* Once the solution had been
specified, the group proposing the reforms needed to have some sort
of organizational infrastructure that could take control of the state
-binary and put its program into operation. The function of a
permanent structure was to impose a constant popular action in the
solution of serious public problems. Parties were thus converted into
organs of the people by means of which individuals could much more
easily pursue the collective good.- Reforms that owed their content
and application to the imagination and personal influence of a single
werebound tob—h >~ ~r, and much
* *.— «. »as the situatIon that obtained in costa R;ca
Besides being much lessm^
reHCCW
^ ~«*— - ««—
-
- civlc Btttt!
, A „ell.
~- ldeol°——
-p— w« party „as seen
m° St 6ffe"tW "« - »—« education lnasmuch as tt
served to
create a consciousness in f-k,.
ectly affected them offeri^ T*'*
° f the problems th« dir-
theoretical and P«ctL"l ldLs rt.f " thetheir soiution; the doctrinaire , • * " the basls f°*interest, and ^Int^lTT^^],?^ civic
But more importantly, ln thls connectloni^^ ^^
an histories! and nationai reality. elt was not only ^^
that was important, but pl«nt a so the past inasmuch as the future con-
sisted of a synthesis o f the two,- Io the centrlstas^^
Political development had reached a stage at wbich doctrinaire
political psrties could no longer be avoided.
The reasons for the opposition of conservstives was much more
objective. In mi Caldero-n declared m Germny
_ ^ ^
that time had been Cn^ta p,Voios Rlca s major coffee customer. Costa Rica
exported 600,000 sacs of coffee to c™.tt Germany a year, as opposed to only
200,000 sscs to the United States, The closing of trade Mediately
incurred the hostility of the cafetalero elite. The subsequent cre-
ation of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social further alienated the
cafetaleros as well as commercial and industrial sectors. Capitalis-
tic groups also began to develop apprehensions about Calderon's
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--o th e publicdeficitwasl>5i7) 733 cows
^ ^ «~
-
-Zones. The balance of tr;de
owing to the loss of the German market also h.C
'
became increasingly un-
favorable after 1942 „W*2. ^ governnient responded to fisMi
» noating bonds and tncreasing taxes
_
7s
_^ ^C3PiUliSt
"»^ the public deficit t0
bespread eormption and admlnlstrative dtsorde^ ^ caide^
8ove_ „as widely rMomed us corruption a^ administrative
the result of PRN reform proiects «!«j . Several new administrative
departments and publir i-nat-** •c xnstxtutxons came into being during this period
such as the Ministry of Labor and the Caia tw .cn c j Costarricense de Seguro
Social. Equally important was the funds rW6 r that were devoted to public
facilities and low cost housing ^ conservatives may have heen
justified in leveling their crlt icism agains£^ mlsnanagement
and corruption, deficit sPendi„g and increased taxes were a by
-prodoct
of the social welfare <?t-pt-p fh*+ i_ .s a e that was bexng created by the PRN. This
was at the root of conservative opposition.
The reform-oriented centristas leveled the same criticisms
against the Calder6n government. Lamenting the demise of public ethics
they also complained:
in\ri;„\nro
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«
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» «* ~^B ng o ne p rt ose w o occupy public posts ue
cacquxsm, and at each moment public opinion is ignored. 76
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in response to the public debt they complained ^ thefe _ ^ ^
" Justify the £act that „hUe
_ suffering ^ ^ ^
high deficit, the governs should see £u ^ 77
Curiously in «, la«er criticise, the Centre lgnored the flscal
implications of policies which had heen proposee in its om pro-
gram.
After the congressional elections of 1942 it became clear that
Calderon could no longer count on the support of the bourgeoisie.
Historian Manuel Rojas Bolanos imputed great significance to the
elections inasmuch as the PRN nn t-nn rK
,
up o that time was trying to run a
middle course between social reform and conservative support. It
became apparent however that the opposition Cortesista party was
drawing support both from capitalistic sectors and the
At the same time the communists showed their electoral strength by
polling more votes than any other opposition group. This left Calder6n
with two alternatives: either to abandon social reform and reforge
the links with the conservative elements that brought him to power,
or to accelerate social reform and look for a new base of support. 78
Choosing the latter alternative the PVP-PRN alliance was formed.
Shortly after the Social Guarantees were instituted followed by the
Labor Code, and several other important social reform projects.
The Labor Code added a new dimension to the conflict between
calderonista and opposition forces. Administrative incompetence,,
corruption, the creation of the CCSS, deficit-spending, and tax in-
creases were burdensome to capitalist sectors; the Labor Code
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ore the
however, represented a direct threat to patronal power. Bef
-de was instituted, employers established salaries and Sl working hours
unilaterally. Workers were C °mplete disP°-l of employers.
The Labor Code however, establ-i*^blished a state agency composed of govern-
ment official
•
emPl0ye
"' Snd that fixed salaries per-
iodically. Morenvpro e , rndemnrzation claus£s prohmted
between government and the United Frult Conpany
_ ^ ^_
-CO was a g„ver»ent within
. gov_ t . ^ ^
more the employers of t-ho o~he company than servants of the Costa Rican
government. Shortly after th» „„jJ e node was implemented Calderon commun-
icated to all g0vernment officlals that in conflicts between the
company and its employees, they were henceforth expected to protect
fhe weaker side.- Historian Samuel Stone placed transcendental
stance on the implementation of the code, saying that it repre-
sented the culmination of a sixty year process that hegan at the
end of the nineteenth century when a succession of liberal anti-clerical
governments began to wrest political power from the cafetalero
oligarchy, u was during the Calderon-Picado-Mora period that their
economic and social power was being threatened .«
»
The centristas showed ambivalence to these progressive reforms.
Before the Block of Victoria had been constituted they reacted
favorably to Church criticism of capitalist economics. When
Sanabria published his Pastoral Letter on "just salaries" they
argued that such reforms represented only the beginning of the
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confrontation to a series of aadlV"Se Pr°ble
- «"««i„g the nation."
- implication was that reforms affecting soclal ^^ ^
stations had to be accompanied by reforms affectlng
-«*«*-.. When the Soo ial Cuarantees
_ ^^
democracy, but thay disclaimed any suooorr f rtpp t or the government that
instituted the reform adding that:
we believe tha t the iuridir-ai ,„ c
must be accomPanied--if not IrlrlZT ?,°
ncerni^ s°c"l material
ment of popular orientation with r " *^ P°"tical move-
wlll impel and promulg^L thele «fo
r
rm::-°
nal th"
» the eentristas had a criticism of Costa Ri can society it
-s the lack of a well-organi 2ed, professionally-led, ideologically-
based political party. This was the most consistent theme of Centre
publications throughout the Calderon administration. After 1943
however, this was accompanied by harsh indictments of the communist
Party and apprehensions of the administrations.
„illi„g„eS s to respect
democratic liberties. One month after the labor Code want into effect
the Centre reasserted its support for the content of CalderSn's re-
forms, inasmuch as they represented an attempt to transform social
and economic structures in a way that benefited the lower classes.
"Nevertheless," it stated,
while we support these coincidences with our own thinking we
ul Zt^T-
deSPi
r
"a" 1
-"? *l°Sans thrift."*sed against us by the vanguardistas, to use the richt of
oT la^hl 1C to th ff CltlZen ° f 3 ieL^ holds as
8
the° firsthis rights, a irm our opposition to extremism, be it
communist or faqri<=t-. ~
Politics and persoLiistic
r
po
P
n Jf
011
°
f anti
-P^riotic
anything in the present or 11 tl' V,™ °^os±^on tothat signifies fiscal disorder thf ™8 adminis trationPeople, nepotism, the defeat o f uVTT^ ° f thecerning education, disrespect for sTfl le^S. la^ eon-silence the liberal awareness t ^ t0
unspeakable excesses. 83 People, and any other
The centrists critlci2ed the comuntsts a ^ ^
consistency Khlch they thQught betrayed ^ Ueoi^
that was calculated to servP i-h* i - •e the ultimate purpose of instituting
revolutionary changes in Cost-*sta Rxcan SOC1al and political structures.
Communism was seen tn ho ^ ™o be a movement under foreign direction that
threatened democratic liberties wMnh •o hic , m the centrists view, had
already been badly abused by the Calderon administration. Their
-strust of communism was stated in a publication that indicted the
PVP for being
in obedience to a orejgn order t \ °™ dete™™ation or
name to accomplish d ',
° Change its ^™ and its
Places little importance in Jl, °PP°rtunistic group that
black, provided th "serves their b"" ^""^ " " lled
country, disorient, ™ l k, o jective of dominating the
stability an * '
PlaCi"8 " M"0nal
Costa Rican peopjef" awareness and morality of the
Corruption and mismanagement between 1940 and 1944 had been
an important source of opposition to the Calderon government. However
it should be carefully noted that the increasingly strong ties between
the PRN and the PVP and the suspicion that the democratic right of
suffrage would not be respected in the presidential elections of
C3USed
°
PP0Sitl
™
- — - Block of Victoria as
.
revolutionary
£hat _ ^^^^ ^ o^^democracy in order to redirect m,„
" C° UrSe ° f -"°nal development.
Shortly before the election, th. ca s, the Centre launched a strong attack
gainst government forces, asserti„8 that demagogic leadership
Ues, irresponsibility, and sectarianism were threatenin8 to L.
-sta RiCan social peace, destroy traditional political institutions
-d deny the liberal play of contrary opinions.^ To the centrlstas
'
-ere was more at stake in the elections than honest government and
eoonomic stability; the parliamentary system and democratic civil
liberties hung in the balance. To canity10 pitalistic sectors the election
presented an opportunity to overturn the progressive policies that
affected them, or to at least postpone and dilute future reform legis-
lation. To the Block of Victoria, on the other hand, a victory was
needed in order to consolidate the gains of t**m he previous four years.
Manuel Mora stated that
the leg-
The Block of Victoria offered its record of legislation as a
political platform. It proposed to consolidate and broaden democ-
racy by giving it an economic content that would guarantee the well-
heing and liberty of people from all social classes. It promised
to respect and execute the principles of the Social Guarantees and
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the Labor Code; to raise living standards and tQ^ ^
support to the Just aspirations of workers and peasants .„
In the subsequent elections Leon Cortes led a coalition of
bourgeois and campesino elements against BlocK of Victoria candidate
Teodoro Picado. Picado won by a 2 to 1 ma • uo Z 1 margin but the opposition
accused the government of electoral fraud. Jose Pigueres counted
after the election that the First Republic of Costa Rica had died
Asserting that the nation needed a rehirth, he promised that a second
republic would open up a new epoch in Costa Rican democracy, stating
that, "If we are dignified men, we win re turn the blow that these
Incompetents have dealt to the fatherland.""
The defeat of Cortes precipitated a movement toward the unity
of opposition forces. The Centre which up to 1944 had rejected any
direct political action became the core of the Social Democratic Party
With respect to government institutions it called for: the cre-
ation of a doctrinaire political party; constitutional reforms lim-
iting executive power; a prohibition of the reelection of deputies;
a stronger Judicial branch of government; and electoral organs inde-
pendent of executive authority. In the area of agricultural reform
it proposed: the creation of an agricultural school; increased
agricultural production; the creation of cooperative farms; the in-
corporation of the campesino into political life; and better rural
living conditions. It also proposed to protect and refine the
Labor Code, and to nationalize public services. 69
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Toward the end of the P-ir>^~ j • .icado administration the SDP counted
on the support of the CCTRN. What is r»ri nwn cu ous about Rerums' deser-
tion from the Block of Victoria is that the rh u ,C urch maintained an
offlcial position o£ cooperatlon „ith the comunist^ sa^ ria
«hc led the Church hierarchy, and Benjamin Nunez
. who led the CCTRN
were thus at cross ^^ ^^ ^ ^
Partially explained hy the contributions the Centre made to Catholic
unionization efforts. A great m*ny CCTRN leaders were drawn fro.
centrists ranks. Of greater importance however, were the conflicts
that emerged between the CCTRN and the CTCR, despite the Comite de
Intelligent. Problems began to arise when the CCTRN intruded on
the CTCR by initiating unionization drives on United Fruit Company
Property. The Catholic confederation defended its action by asserting
that it was applying che prlnclple of ^ ^
ever only reinforced the communist argument that Rerum Novarum was
impeding labor unity.
The problems between the confederations were aggravated by
the dissatisfaction of the* pptpm t-~ •r e CCTRN to increasing communist influence
in the Picado government 90 tqa a <-ut. By 1948 the communists had gained im-
portant posts not only in the CCSS and the Ministry of Labor but in
the police force, the army, the Ministry of Public Works, the
Electric Railroad to the Pacific, and the postal and telegraph ser-
vices. These developments were noted by the American Embassy in a
memorandum which stated that:
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'the situation of uncert-a-inhv ^ a
Rica is in many aspects :taiLr'o"h:r
r
H
lty
,
that^ ™
Europe today. Although thi 1° " "h\ch Prevails in Eastern
»ight be worthwhile to point out that H J* "grated, itin a recent declaratlonPto J^'J" aya de la Torre of Peru,
'the Czechoslovakia of the western Spher"^^ M« »
These apprehensions were combined with public pollcl es that
contravened the economic interests of conservative sectors. In 1946
«- legislature approved an increase in property taxes affecting
Urge farms, mcome tax scaies were aiso readjusted. This provoked
a strong reaction from the Chambers of Agricuiture and Livestock
Coerce, industry, and coffee and sugar producer associations, aid
of Which threatened to withhold the payment of taxes. Manue! Roj as
Boianos described the attitude of capitalist sectors during this
Period by saying that the imposition o£ _ taxes ^
situation of national producers who had been exhausted in recent
years by such reform as holidays for workers, advance notice and
severance pay for employees who had been fired, vacations, salary
increases, shorter workdays, social security, and price
tn 1947 capitalists translated their opposition into the
"Huelga de Brazos Caidos," a national boycott that was supposed to
express popular dissatisfaction with the Picado government. However,
the "boycott" was organized by conservative Otilio Ulate, who had
on several occasions been indicted by Manuel Mora for his anti-labor
policy positions. Mora complained that in Ulate 's view the politi-
cal participation of the workers should be confined to the staple
act of voting: that their only function was to work and collect a
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salary," ln any case the strike ^ ^^ ^
-susses, The government reacted ^ ^^^ ^_
lently, £urther alienatlng both conservattve Md ^^^^^^
sides of the opposition.
In the s. year opposition forces, consisting of the pro-
gressive SOP, Ud hy dose Pigueres, the oid Democracic Party of ^
Cortes, and the National Union Party, fen by Otilio Uiate, convened
a political convention fnr t-u^o the purpose of sen<Jing a single candl<Ute
against Caideron in the 1,48 elections. Af ter lengthy deliberatlons
conservative Otiiio Uiate was endorsee as the opposition presidential
candidate, ft. progressive-conservative coaiition represented a
hodgepodge of politicai forces, whose attitudes on social policy
were diametrically opposed Tho-i^ „ iy . Their only point of agreement was that
the PRN and the PVP had to be removed from power.
In the subsequent elections Uiate defeated Caideron by a sub-
stantial margin. The electoral tribunal then declared Uiate the
president-elect; but claiming that there had been significant pro-
cedural irregularities in the elections, Caideron submitted a pro-
posal to annul the results. The legislature, which was dominated
by PRN and PVP deputies, immediately approved the proposal, shortly
thereafter, opposition forces took up arms, and after a brief but
costly rebellion, the Picado government was overthrown, and Jose
Figueres was placed at the head of a revolutionary junta.
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Concluding Remarks
The constitution of opposition forces, and the sources of
dissatisfaction with the Bloc, of Victoria, were so diverse, that
any generalization concerning the causes and sources of the revolu-
tion must necessarily he unsatisfactory. Samuel stone interpreted
the revolution to he the result of liheral social policies that
threatened the power of the coffee oligarchy. The social reform,
he argued,
production.'"
s«""ty increased considerably the costs of
Similarly, Manuel Rojas BolaHos contended that the revolution must
be understood to be the result of an intense period of class antagon-
isms, which, in addition to partially breaking the hegemony of the
oligarchic classes, eliminated, at least for several years, the possi-
bility of a strong and independent proletarian political organize-
tion
On the other hand it would be possible to argue that class
conflict was not as important as the struggle between a movement
that was paternalistic, personalistic
, and traditional in style of
leadership, and a movement that proposed to bring a higher degree
of organization and rationalism to democratic political structures.
According to this view, the revolution issued from a tendency toward
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institutionally a„d structural sophistlcatlon
. Both
tations have aerlt, but where labor is concerned, there ca„ ^^
aoubt that the rebenion introduced
. period of organljational ^_
clina during „hich labor organl2ations uere euher coQptad ^^
°r vengefully repressed. How and to what axtant tM.dL e e his occurred will
be the next subject of discussion.
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CHAPTER I J i
DEMOBILIZATION AND REALIGNMENT
Where labor organizations ware concerned, the period between
1948 and the mid-1960s „as charactered by stagnation and decay
The Revolutionary dunta, in a decree that prohibited the existence
of parties with programs, methods, and antecedents thought to be
antidemocratic. forrpH i-h<* jj ic, t ced the dissolution of the PVP. Party leaders
"ere either exiled, Jailed or executed. At the same time, the CTCR
was accused of violating a prohibition on political activity. The
matter was deferred to the labor tribunals by Benjamin Nunez, then
Minister of Labor, where a decision was rendered to dissolve the
confederation. 1
In the void that was created by the disappearance of the CTCR,
Rerum Novarum was given an unprecedented opportunity to establish
absolute control over the labor union movement, but instead of tak-
ing advantage of this position, the confederation entered a prolonged
period of organizational decay. The reason for this was partly
associated with Rerum's rapid growth in the early years. Dramatic
increases in membership in the 1940s were not accompanied by gains
in organizational stability. The movement was held together largely
by the charisma and prestige of Benjamin Nuhez, but during the late
1940s and early 1950s both Nunez and several other important Rerum
13
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Novarum leaders 1pf> ru„ -> ule t the labor movement to take ^ pQsts ^ n^
£°rmed NatiOMl Ub"a"»
— -— 0£ the relationship
between th. CCTRN and the „ „m fae ^
_^^but at this point it Qhn„u usnould be noted that- <-u~ •at the inexperienced and in
-* cases incapahle secondary leaders ^^^^ these ^^
allowed personalistic and procedural confUcts Cq^ ^^
sion and disciDlinp n f t-v,^ 9L J-f-Line or the movement.
By the nid-l,50s the proofs 0£ lncompetent leadership
-bined with the appearance of peronlst tendencifis ^^ ^
affiliate,. Various leaders proposed t0 change the lnternaUonal
affiliation of the CCTRN from the damocratlc Interamerlcan
ation of Workers (C!T) to the Peronist Latin American Union Workers
Croup (ATLAS)
.
The suose q oent battle culmlnated fa ^ expulsion ^
several important leaders ^ ^ Qf ^
National Confederation of Workers (CNT)
. The CNT never baca« an
it disappeared. Ultimately, it served only to weaken to CCTRN.
But the Peronist exodus was oniy one of several significant
defections that occurred In the 1950s. The National Pederatlon of
Workers, and the Independent Pederatlon of Banana Workers (FETRABA)
chose to follow independent routes; and In the late 1950s the
National Pederatlon of Puhlic Works Workers with three thousand mem-
hers and the National Agrarian Federation with eight unions left the
CCTRN
.
By the late 1950s RN membership, which at its high point
had numhered upward of fifty thousand was reduced to a mere four
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thousand members. The M inr >majo complaint of defecting un . ons chat
the CCTRN had placed the interests of the PLN ah -n bove the interests of
the workers. Historian James Backer i„ , ,, in placing great significance
on this tendency asserted that the PLN was composed primarily of
.iadle-class elements who were not interested in the problems of
the working classes. Owing to their mistrust of labor anions, theyhad little to offer thp i a Kn . m 3^j-iCL me l bor movement.
Also associated with the decline of the CCTRN was the grow-
ing conservatism of the Catholic Church after the death of Sanabria
in 1952. Sanabria was replaced by Archbishop Ruben Odio Herrara
a conservative who placed more emphasis on the straggle against com-
munism than the problem of the working classes. Oaring Herrara's
tenare the Church became more interested „ religious socialization
than social activism, and correspondingly began to emphasize the
traditional virtues of obedience and resignation. The few activist
priests who did emerge after the revelation were scolded by the Church
hierarchy.
»
I„ l 960 Herrara was sacceeded by Archbishop Carlos
Humberto Rodriguez Quiros, who althoagh expressing more of an inter-
est in social problems, was nevertheless preoccupied with the spir-
itual functions of the Church. This succession of conservative
prelates combined with a heavy financial dependence on wealthy
farmers to caase a loss in relevance among the popalar classes.
Churchmen once again propounded the virtues of a rural life in which
country people accepted poverty in exchange for assarances of heavenly
gain. 5
86
Government Suppression
Despite the persecution of communist labor organizations after
1948, the President of the Revolutionary Junta, Jose Figueres, fol-
lowed a policy course aimed at lessening the economic burdens of
the lower classes. Taxes on wheat were suspended in order to reduce
the price of bread, and salaries were increased for sugar and coffee
workers. In the same stroke, Figueres placed a ten percent tax on
capital over fifty thousand colones and nationalized the banks.
Curiously, despite the fact that the revolution was precipitated by
the unwillingness of the Block of Victoria to permit the installa-
tion of a conservative President, Figueres' policies, while at the
head of the Revolutionary Junta, represented a continuation and an
expansion of the social reforms that were instituted in the previous
eight years. Importantly, the Social Guarantees, and the Labor Code
were left in tact. But in 1949 the junta was dissolved and conserva-
tive Otilio Ulate was installed as President of the Second Republic.
Beginning in the latter half of the Ulate administration and extend-
ing through the decade, a series of labor struggles underscored the
anti-union attitude of post-rebellion governments and revealed a
consistent pattern of carrot and stick tactics that would character-
ize labor relations for decades to come. Several important strikes
occurred in the San Jose region, but the most significant of these
confrontations occurred in the banana zones and involved labor organ-
izations that were thought to be under communist influence.
The union that would take part in most of these struggles,
the Federation of Banana Workers and Unions (FOBA)
, was formed in
1952 through the union of several independent unions in Puerto
Cortes, Quepos, Golfito, and Palmar Sur. Shortly after it was con-
stituted, FOBA initiated proceedings for a collective convention.
Labor requests included salary increases, the construction of com-
missary stores and dispensaries, living quarters, and holidays.
The Compania Bananera de Costa Rica (Costa Rican Banana Company)
rejected the federation's demands, at which point the matter was
brought before the labor courts. The courts rejected the collective
conflict stating that the federation lacked sufficient support to
solicit a collective convention. When on May 1, 1953-a national
holiday-the company fired forty-six workers for refusing to comply
with a workorder, FOBA called a strike that paralyzed production in
the Pacific region. The strike was immediately declared illegal and
security forces were dispatched from San Jose. One day after the
commencement of the movement, the entire Junta Directiva of the
federation was arrested, and in confrontations with security forces
one worker was killed and five others wounded. The next day more
security forces were sent from San Jose. Renewed confrontations
led to more injuries, and the arrest of several more federation
leaders and thirty-four rank and file members. 6
With the declaration of illegality the company refused to ,
deal with workers collectively. Federation leaders asked the labor
courts to form a conciliation tribunal but the request was refused.
FOBA than appealed to the Superior Lahor Tribunal, but the labor
court's judgement was upheld. After subsequent ratings with com-
pany officials, President Ulate proposed a solution involving a com-
mitment from the company to maintain the continuity of labor con-
tracts, in exchange for which workers were to promise to follow
legal channels in requesting collective conventions. The company,
however, refused to guarantee employment to striking „orUers. FOBA
proposed its own solution but Ulate refused to deal with federation
representatives
.
7
On June 27 the Minister of Labor held interviews with labor
and company representatives. In the negotiations the company
promised to consider the federation's requests, but made no commit-
ments. With this promise the strike was brought to an end. Later
however, FOBA complained that the company rejected the collective
convention, refused to pay lost salaries, and initiated repressive
measures against union leaders. 8
The PLN administration of Jose Figueres between 1953 and 1958
displayed an attitude of tolerance for the labor movement. Never-
theless persecution of unions thought to be under communist influ-
ence continued. What stood forth with striking clarity in both the
Ulate and Figueres administration, and for that matter, subsequent
administrations of either PLN or opposition variety, was a sequence
of action that occurred with such regularity as to become a standard
conflict resolution procedure. A request would be made for a collec-
tive convention. It would be rejected and a collective conflict
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would be caned. In the subsequent^^ ^ ^
be delayed or the conflict would be rejected
. A strike^ ^
be caned and Mediately declared illegal. The subseq uent dispatch
of security £orces would be clos£ly
^ ^ ^
arrest of union leaders and strike organizers. This would he accom-
panied by the direct involvement of Executive Power in the form of
the Minister of Lahor, and on occasion, the President himself, in-
terviews would be granted, and settlements would be made. Following
the strike, the company would reinitiate the repressive measures
against labor leaders that led to the conflict i, fri . In few cases would
settlements be made between company officials and union leaders,
and in fewer cases would settlements be respected.
The first demonstration of this sequence in the Figueres ad-
ministration occurred in 1954. In January of that year FOBA and
FETRABA collaborated in a strike in Puerto Gonzalez Vfquez
. The
movement began on January 7 and involved 1,200 workers on twelve
Plantations. Labor inspectors were sent to the area to investigate
the cause of the strike, and as the movement developed, the Director
General of Labor Relations was sent, along with the Minister of Labor,
and finally President Figueres. The federations had complained that
because of diverse forms of payment, some workers were not earning
enough money to cover the minimum necessities of a single worker,
much less a family. The General Salary Office had submitted a report
stating that the minimum costs of basic necessities was 15.50
colones per day. Inasmuch as many workers were earning only 11.20
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colones per day> FOBA and FETRABA asked for salary raises up ^ „ ^
colones. They also called fox Che hlrlng of Spanlsh speakers ^
company medical facil i t-i o<= or^es and an end to the repressive measures that
had been taken against labor leaders Th« f a. e federations argued that
the company was prohibiting the exerci^P of , •s ui se union rights by firing
workers attempting to unionize. 9
A strike was called and immediately declared illegal by the
regional labor courts. Security forces, sent to the area with orders
to break up the strike, arrested all labor leaders associated with
the movement. Two weeks after the strike was initiated, President
Figueres intervened personally, upon the request of the labor feder-
ations. After conducting interviews with labor and company officials,
Figueres declared that labor unionism had to be accepted by both
the company and the government, but that labor activities should
show a sense of responsibility. The tactic used by communist unions,
of initiating strikes without concern for production, would not be
tolerated. 10
Figueres proposed that the company agree to continue the con-
tracts of the striking workers, without reprisals, and recognize the
legitimacy of the democratic labor movement. In addition, living
quarters and hygienic facilities would be constructed, but minimum
salaries would be left up to the National Salary Council. Any salary
discussions that the federations wished to take up with the banana
company would be initiated when the workers returned to work. The
proposal was refused by the strike committee but accepted by the
athe
Lar
91
FETRABA leadership. F0BA asserted that the agreement
VOrkeI d6feat
-
lnaSmUch » " stained no firm guarantees that
company would not reinitiate repressive measures against particul.
unions after the strike had terminated . > > Nevertheless, shortly after
Figueres submitted his proposal the strike came to an end.
In this case the Figueres proposal succeeded in dividing the
strike movement. At the samp Mmo . .n e time, the recognition that was given
to the democratic labor movement, and the promise of the company not
to exact reprisals from striking workers, could be understood to mean
that any company actions intended to weaken, or destroy a class-
oriented labor movement would receive the tacit approbation of the
Figueres administration. FOBA was a communist led labor organiza-
tion. FETRABA, on the other hand, was of Christian origins. FETRABA
thus had every reason to accept the Figueres proposal, but inasmuch
as FOBA was not considered to be a democratic labor movement, either
by the company or the government, there was no guarantee that it
would be protected should the company decide to initiate repressive
measures. In fact, the Figueres proposal called for such action.
In the long run however, the recognition of the legitimacy
of the democratic labor movement was a hollow gesture that left the
question of legitimacy of action in the realm of interpretation.
What union activities would be considered faithful to a democratic
movement and what activities would not, depended entirely on the
disposition of the government. In this connection, unions could not
be more sure of their rights than they were in the period before
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the Block of Victoria, inasmuch as any strike that threatened to
interrupt production in a critical sector could be construed to be
subversive, thus setting into
.otion the repressive mechanisms of
the company and the state.
A movement that demonstrated a similar sequence of action took
Place in the following year. Once again FOBA and FETRABA collabor-
ated in a strike on property owned by the Compania Bananera de
Costa Rica. Demands included a forty percent salary increase,
shorter workdays, better housing, the construction of a hospital at
the Laurel Finca, transportation facilities for children, special
schools for adults, protective equipment for workers using sprays,
and respect for labor rights. The company rejected labor's demands
and the matter was brought before the labor courts. In an unusual
decision the Golfito labor court granted the federation permission
to strike, at which point the company attempted to undermine the strike
movement by asserting that many of the signatures on the grievance
document were forged and that the strike did not have the neces-
sary sixty percent approval. The court ordered a plebiscite on
each plantation, but ninety-five percent of the workers voted in
favor of the movement
.
Upon the start of the strike 1,600 workers were involved.
The government, in customary fashion, dispatched military units headed
by the Minister of Public Security. Fearing an expansion of the
movement, the Minister announced that he would not tolerate a
Guatemalization of the banana zone and that force would be used if
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the movement continued At- =. the same time, echoing company officials
the Ministry of Labor refused to deal with communist labor represent
tatives. FETRABA, the non-communist oriented federation, was re-
peatedly approached in a ministry attempt to achieve a separate peace.
Certain that FETRABA would eventually yield, FOBA accepted a ten
Percent salary increase, but was forced to accept the condition that
no more strikes would be initiated for the next two years.-
A much more violent, though typical encounter occurred at the
end of 1959. Once again FOBA and FETRABA joined together in a strike
on banana company property in Puerto Corte's in response to the
company's non-compliance with provisions of the Ley del Trezavo Mes
(Law of the Thirteenth Month). According to th-f<= l ,1,.n^Luiu cms aw the company was
required to pay workers an extra month's salary at the end of the
year. Management on this occasion agreed to pay only one week extra
salary. The federations presented a collective conflict before the
Golfito labor courts with one petition: payment of the entire
Trezavo Mes. Before the legal process had been exhausted, a strike
was called that gained the support not only of banana workers, but
workers in company shops, docks, trains, and offices. The strike
was immediately declared illegal and workers were ordered by the
court to return to work. It was added that since an illegal strike
had been initiated, the company enjoyed the right of terminating all
labor contracts. 13
The Ministry of Labor, speaking for the executive authority,
announced that the decisions of the Labor Tribunal would be respected.
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Conservative President Mario Echandi Jimenez, „ho succeeded Jos ,
Figueres in 1,58, promptly sent public security forces to the area
with orders to put an end to the
_nt. The Echandi government
subsequently reinforced security troops with civil guards and the
Resguardia Eiscal (Treasury Guard), and placed all elements under
the command „f the Labor Court o£ GQl£lto
_ cushes strik^s
and police forces followed immediately Clashes „„h *•A ^cx . ui n and beatxngs were
repeated.
The government in this case was particularly anxious to bring
the movement to an end inasmuch as it occurred at a critical time in
banana cultivation. The Minister of Labor along with the Minister
of Health who had been sent to the area earlier to negotiate with
workers and company authorities, thus proposed the payment of lost
salaries along with the guarantee that there would be no reprisals
after the strike had ended. The ministry also promised the presenta-
tion of amendments in the Trezavo law and suggested that the company
pay two weeks salary instead of one. The offer was rejected by both
the company and the federations. Subsequently, several strike leaders
and rank and file union members were arrested. More confrontations
between police and workers followed, but the strike sustained its
momentum. lk
The situation in Puerto Cortls was complicated when dock work-
ers in Limon threatened to go on strike for the same reason as FOB
A
and FETRABA. A dock worker's strike would have been particularly
disruptive inasmuch as workers were preparing the shipment of several
tons of sugar. Security forces were consequently put on alert and
Public authorities began recruiting workers, in the event that a
strike was installed. A collective conflict had been submitted to
the Superior Tribunal of Lim5n but after negotiations^^
and management failed to produce a settWnt, the court ruled an
end to the collective conflict. In this instance, Labor Code
restrictions prohibited dock workers fro, initiating a strike. The
only allowable alternative would be arbitration, but if both parties
don't give their consent, the collective conflict is terminated.
The absurdity of this procedure was expressed when the court stated:
"from a legal point of view, relations between the employees of the
Northern Railway Company and this business, are normal. "^
Two weeks after the strike in Puerto Cortes was initiated
President Echandi made a personal appeal to workers. The government
subsequently ordered the payment of the Trezavo Mes but the company
argued that inasmuch as the strike had been declared illegal, it had
the right to terminate all labor contracts. It then proceeded to
fire all workers involved in the strike. After a meeting between
company and embassy officials, and the rejection of a counterproposal
from the United States Ambassador, the government offered to pay
seventy-five percent of the Trezavo Mes or that portion of the salary
refused by the banana company, if the company agreed not to fire
striking workers. The company agreed to rehire striking workers, •
but only with the understanding that their previous contracts had
been broken. Despite the assertion that the settlement was damaging
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to worker interests because It dldn . t contain sulficisnc
that there would be no reprisals, the agreement was accepted and
the strike came to an end. 16
In the meantime the Atlantic Federation of Workers and the
Union of Dockworkers announced that a strike would not be called.
The Labor Court of Lim6n subsequently declared that the Northern
Railway Company had only to pay twenty-five percent of the Trezavo
Mes or one week's salary. The company was also obliged not to ini-
tiate reprisals against union leaders. The promise however, applied
to the period of time immediately following the strike. After that
Northern was free to take whatever actions it deemed appropriate. 17
It is probably worthwhile to note that the length of time
during which the company was prohibited from taking repressive action
corresponded to the amount of time that was required to load the
sugar harvest. What should also be emphasized, in the case of the
Compania Bananera de Costa Rica, is the condition that was applied
to the renewal of labor contracts. The company had previously fired
all striking workers. This meant that all workers had to sign new
contracts when they were rehired, and since the Labor Code does not
make unmistakeably clear the precise terms upon which new contracts
must be based, the company was under no firm obligation to provide
workers with the benefits they had previously enjoyed. The banana
company made this clear in their settlement with FOBA and FETRABA.
Equally important was government complicity in company designs
to take repressive measures against labor organizations. In both
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the Puerto Cort,s af£air and Lim ,n threat>
through the Minister of Labor> the labor
dent himself, created the lmpression that appiicaUon o(^
cive measures to the termination o£^ ^ ^
or legal, were intended not to weaken labor organic ions, but to
protect the pnblio good. What stands forth wtth striking clarity
xn all strike movements throughout the 1950s is the use of a carrot
and stick tactic. The dispatch of public security forces, vioience,
and arrests, were always accompanied by audiences with the Minister
of Labor or the President, and the offer of settlements that appeared
to represent at least partial labor victories. But agreements that
Provided higher salaries and added benefits, usually carried stipu-
lations that left labor leaders and labor organizations extremely
vulnerable to employer attack. Moreover, the frequent refusal of
government proposals by company officials, created the impression
that national political authority was being compromised by economic
power~i„ this case the economic power of a multinational corpora-
tion. Nevertheless the position of Costa Rican governments with re-
gard to company labor policy reflects a coincidence between the
desire of political authorities to insure the smooth flow of produc-
tion and the desire of business to insure the smooth flow of profits.
While economic concessions won by labor through government
sponsored settlements might have served short-term economic inter-
ests, government involvement must be understood to have been damaging
to labor's long-term interests inasmuch as it undermined the
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structural growth of labor organizations, and representee a rejec-
tion of independent labor activity. Unlike the Block of Victoria
governments in the 1940s, which intended to encourage the structural
development of labor and which acted on behalf of labor's interests
as they were frequently articulated by communist cabinet members and
advisors, governments in the post-revolutionary period distributed
token economic benefits only as a requirement of production.
The application of force by government authorities, and un-
favorable legal judgements made by labor courts were accompanied
by company persecution of unions. Executive authority, Judicial
judgement and company action formed a three-pronged mechanism of
control that accounted for a low level of unionization in the post-
revolutionary period.
The most common tactic used by employers to insure a compla-
cent workforce was the arbitrary release of troublesome employees.
Several cases of anti-union attacks after 1952 underscored the post-
revolutionary attitude of employers toward labor union activities.
In 1952, for instance, the Imprenta Termo initiated reprisals against
the Union of Graphic Arts Workers after it initiated proceedings for
a collective conflict. In the same year the Secretary General and
several rank and file members of FOBA were arrested and beaten by
police. The Secretary General of the Union of Golfito and union mem-
bers were arrested while gathering signatures for a collective conven-
tion. In typical fashion, the Campania Bananera de Costa Rica
threatened to fire workers who proposed to join a newly formed union.
ry
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The next year several leaders and rank and file members of POBA were
-rested by the Resguardia Fiscal while gathering signatures for a
collective convention. In May of that year Banana workers in Palmar
and Esquinas were fired en .sse after a May Day parade. In
November several leaders of a union associated with FOBA were fired
while gathering signatures for a collective contract. The company
claimed that the workers' production levels were low, and that they
had been insubordinate on several occasions. 18
Company action against unions in the post-rebellion period
was frequently accompanied by persecution on the part of bureaucratic
agencies. A not untypical incident occurred in 1960 when the Minist
of Labor authorized an investigation of the Association of Social
Security Workers (AESS)
.
Unions in any case were required to sub-
mit reports of activities, organizational changes, and funding
sources every six months. But on this occasion the AESS had been
accused of being of subversive orientation; consequently the political
orientation of its leadership was subjected to close government
scrutiny. Shortly after, an investigation of the financial assets
and funding sources of the Federation of South Pacific Workers (FUTRA)
was ordered. Eventually the organization was dissolved involuntar-
ily. 19
Labor leaders complained that government persecution was aimed
at class oriented unions. The AESS had been an affiliate of Rerum
Novarum. During this time no repressive government action was taken,
but after the union switched its affiliation to a more combative
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confederation, special investigations were ordered.- DeSpite this
claim, state persecution of the labor movement affected the CCTRN
as well. m 1956
,
for ^
^ ^
Republic recommended the dissolution of Rerum Novarum claiming that
it was financed by the PLN. Also in 1957 the Union of Graphic Arts
Employers initiated a campaign against unions in the printing indus-
try. Their justification was that printing unions were associated
with the CCTRN, which, having been subsidized by the PLN were in
violation of the law and subject to dissolution. 2
1
While company and government actions against the labor move-
ment were supposed to be directed against communist oriented organ-
izations, ideological orientations, as they appeared both in state-
ments of goals and tactics, were interpreted so broadly as to make
almost any union or confederation in any sector of production, a
suspect of subversive activities. In this way anti-union action
lacked the focus that it was supposed to have. Thus in 1953, com-
munist affiliated labor leaders issued an indictment against what
was believed to be a general offensive against the labor movement.
Agricultural workers, it was asserted, were afraid to organize
unions because of the employment risks. In the construction indus-
try employers acted with such impunity that unionization had become
a clandestine activity. The same situation prevailed in all other
industries. Furthermore, they contended, employers ignored legisla-
tion concerning severance pay, overtime salaries, paid vacations,
minimum salaries, and social security. At the same time, legal
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judgements, rather than profctinj labor against abuses, served in
combination with anti-union company and government actions, to weaken
the iabor union movement. In this way, it was argued, workers lost
confidence in union activity and preferred to deal with employers on
an individual basis. 22
The annual report, issued by the Ministry of Labor at the be-
ginning of 1954, at least confirmed that the labor movement since the
rebellion had experienced a period of decay. Data on unionization re-
vealed that no more than sixty unions were functioning at the end of
1953. The newly formed General Confederation of Costa Rican Workers
(CGTC), with 1,953 members was the largest labor central. Its more
important affiliates included the Union of Construction Workers with
160 members; the Union of Flour Industry Workers with 106 members;
the Union of Banana Industry Workers in Quepos with 104, in Puerto
Cortes with four hundred, and in Golfito with 469; and the Union of
Grocery Workers of Limon with 318 members. The CCTRN, with 1,795
members, was the second largest central. Its more important affili-
ates included the Costa Rican Musical Union with 347 members; the
Costa Rican Textile Union with 136; and the Union of Juan ViSas Workers
with 265. The Peronist oriented National Confederation of Workers
followed with 1,186 members. Its more important affiliates included
the Union of San Jose Municipal Workers with 169 members; and the
Union of Electric Railroad Workers with 706 members. The nonaffiliated
Federation of Workers of the Province of Cartago and FETRABA numbered
121 and one thousand workers respectively. Other independent unions
numbered 909 workers. The number of unionized workers had been reduced
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to 6,964. 23 The CCTRN alone, at the peak of ir a ,
,
*l cn ts development boasted
a membership of over fiffv n,„P fl£ty thousand. Shortly after these statistics
were published the Director of the General Labor Office stated that
only a few years earlier there were more than four hundred unions
functioning. The decline was associated with the fact that labor
unionism was frequently equated with communism. 2 '
Reunionization
The repressive measures that were employed by state institu-
tions and employers in the 1950s did not change substantially in the
following decade. This is not to say that all administrations since
the 1948 revolution persecuted labor with equal alacrity, although
anti-union company activity in the following decades did not differ
measurably.- What it does mean is that the vulnerability of labor
to anti-union attacks on the part of patrons depended largely on the
disposition of the labor courts, which in turn were dependent upon
the executive authority. Furthermore, the kind of response that
work stoppages elicited from the state depended largely on the atti-
tude of the executive authority. Nevertheless, changes in administra-
tions did not amount to a difference between support and repression;
they rather signified differences in degree of oppression, some govern-
ments being more tolerant of labor activity than others.
But despite an unfavorable political atmosphere economic changes
in the 1960s, brought about by the creation of the Central American
Common Market and a dramatic increase in American investment, both
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stimulated union grnut-h or,,-?owt and encouraged a proliferation of labor con-
federations, until I960, American invests amounted to S 74 7
Million. Between I960 and 1965, an additional »«.3 million were
brought into Costa Rica 11,00= •. These investments produced new industries
and an increase in production, especially in manufacturing and
industry. With 1963 as a base for instance, industrial production
since 1948 had increased 154 percent At n,„. the same time, cattle
production increased 114 neront n i •p rce . Working classes, nevertheless did
not profit as much as a new managerial class that emerged out of
economic development. Throughout the period, workers suffered from
low salaries and unemployment. One economist noted that popular
groups, having paid the price of development, were impelled toward
unionization as a means of protest. 25
If)/.
TABLE 4
DISTRIBUTION OF ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION BY SECTOR 1950-1973"
Annual Annual
Increase Increase
Sector 1950 1963
1950-1963 1963-1973
in % *„ ?
Agriculture 159,691 200,309 213,226 1.7 0.6
Ml n i nai I-L 11 J_ lift 875 1,233 1,557 2.6 2.3
Industry 32,100 46,205 69,917 2.7 4.0
Construction 12,548 23,960 39,078 4.8 4.8
Electricity 1,541 4,429 5,531 7.4 2.2
Transportation 9,922 15,316 24,964 3.2 4.8
Commerce 23,054 39,665 67,675 4.1 5.2
Services 51,878 76,117 163,365 2.9 7.3
TOTAL 291,819 407,284 585,313 2.5 3.6
But in terms of labor organization the most important by product
of economic growth was a dramatic increase in the size of the work
force. From 291,819 in 1950 the economically active population more
than doubled by 1973. While the number of workers in the agricultural
sector increased, the sectors that registered the largest increases
were commerce, transportation, construction and industry. Also in-
creasing dramatically were the number of people involved in the elec-
trical industry. Furthermore the period between 1963 and 1973 showed
an acceleration in the yearly rate of growth.
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TABLE 5
UNIONIZATION LEVELS BY SECTOR (PERCENTAGES) 2 8
Sec tor
1963
1973
Agriculture
0.4
Indus try-
0.4
Electricity
9.7
Construction
1.2
Commerce
1.7
Transportation
11.9
Services
8.4
TOTAL
2.6
5.7
5.9
69.3
5.5
2.1
30.5
19.9
10.9
Accompanying increases in the economically active population
were dramatic increases in levels of unionization. In this connec-
tion, unionization increases in the agricultural sector were far out
of proportion to increases in the number of people involved in agri-
cultural production. The electrical industry on the other hand, while
not occupying a large portion of the work force showed a particularly
sharp increase in unionization levels. At the same time the number
of union workers in the transportation industry almost tripled between
1963 and 1973. The number of union workers involved in industry also
showed a sharp increase. What is noteworthy about these figures is
the relationship between increases in the economically active popula-
tion and unionization increases. While the number of people involved
in industry lncreased from „>2M ^^ ^ ^^ ^
percentage of unionized workers uuring the sa.e period increased over
fourteen a*.. In all sectors
, the^ rf ^ ^
out of proportion to sectorai work force increaseg
_ ^ ^^
cate that the reunionization of the Costa Rican „„rk force Kas „
part attributable to a slackening of iabor repression between 1963
and the early 1970s. In faet see writers have noted that the pitch
of anti-labor action dropped during the 1960s but rose again during
the PLN administration of Daniel Oduber between 1974 and 1978. 29
Ministries
Autonomous
TOTAL
TABLE 6
PUBLIC SECTOR GROWTH 30
Institutions Number of Employees
1955 1975
22,093 45,288
2,780 35,625
24,873 80,913
Increase
Absolute
23,195
32,845
56,040
Percentage
105%
1,181%
225%
Another significant development occurring around the same time
was a pronounced growth of the Costa Rican state apparatus. In terms
of labor activity this is especially important since the Labor Code
established special conflict resolution procedures for public employ-
ees. Between 1955 and 1975 the number of people employed in the
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standing bureaucracy more than doubled. But even more drastic was
an increase in the number of people employed in the auto_^
tutions. such increases serve to show that development in the post
war period was largely the responsibility of the Costa Rican state.
At the same ti.e the growth of the public sector presented an unusual
opportunity for union growth. This is probably attributable to the
lack of patronal oppression in the public sector, owing to the exis-
tence of certain guarantees which prohibit the arbitrary release of
state workers
TABLE 7
UNIONIZATION BY SECTOR: 1973 31
TOTAL 550,410 57,748
Population Number % ofOccupied Unioni^pH r> _ •u zed Participation
St3te 72,847 31,648 43.4
Prlvate 477,563 26,100 5.5
10.5
The data also show a relatively low level of unionization in
the private sector. On the other hand the large number of unionized
government workers might lead to the mistaken conclusion that unions
in the public sector are strong. However these high numbers must be
considered in conjunction with legal provisions that restrict labor
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activities in the public sector much more severely than in the pri-
vate sector. Nevertheless, this does not mean that these onions
have heen rendered ineffectual. Even though strikes are prohibited
fro. all public employees, the threat of a work stoppage in a vital
public service exerts pressure on government patrons to accede to
union demands. For this reason, public workers enjoy higher salar-
ies than workers in the private sector. On the other hand, govern-
ment concessions at the bargaining table are usually attended by
threats against unions contemplating more assertive action. Public
sector unions must thus accept offers that are delimited by yearly
budgetary allocations to bureaucratic organs.
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TABLE 8
UNIONS ORGANIZED YEARLY: 1965-
Year
.
Number of Unions
1965
l i
-L
_L
1966
1967
26
1968
9QZO
1969
19
1970
30
1971
33
1972
31
1973
29
1974
33
1975
41
In terms of organizational growth, the reunionization of the
Costa Rican work force showed a gradual acceleration between 1965
and 1975. The forty-one unions created in 1975 represented a twenty-
four percent increase over the year before. The majority of these
unions were located in San Jose, and the banana zones on the west
coast and Lim6n. Sixty-six percent of all Costa Rican unions in 1975
were located in the San Jose region while other provinces such as
Guanacaste and Heredia located only two percent and four percent of
Costa Rican labor unions.
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Once again the increase in the nunber of lab<jr .^.^
« not considered in conjunction with other data, might lead to the
.istaUen conclesion that anti-union activities tapered off in propor-
tion to the number of organizations constituted each year. However
these data do not take into consideration the number of unions that
were dissolved for reasons ultimately associated with company anti-
union action. Por instance, by 1975
, 196 unlons out Qf ,^ q£
452, constituted since 1945, were dissolved by the Ministry of Labor.
This represents an extremely high forty-three percent.
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TABLE 9
SIZE OF UNIONS: 19 75 3
3
Size
less than 20 members
between 20 and 50
between 51 and 100
between 101 and 200
between 201 and 300
between 301 and 400
between 401 and 500
between 501 and 600
between 601 and 700
between 701 and 800
between 801 and 900
between 901 and 1000
between 1001 and 1500
between 1501 and 2000
between 2001 and 2500
between 2501 and 3000
between 3001 and 3500
between 3501 and 4000
Number of Unions
7
111
49
35
13
10
7
5
2
2
3
7
1
2
2
2
258
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Another sig„1£lcant aspect of the reunlonlzatlon^ ^
oean the size of Costa Rlcan labor organizations. ^^
several unions „lth
_ ^^ ^
Stations are extremely Uks[ half of the 25g
-ions in 1 975 contalned less than members whiie
Percent of all unions contained less than four hundred members. This
reflects the continued prevalence of small businesses but at the same
time it iHustrates the importance of labor unity. The
of small unions is a tendency that has produced some concern during
labor conferences. 3' Us significance derives from the fact that
judicial approval of a collective conflict requires the support of
sixty percent of all workers in an area of production.
Country
Ecuador
Peru
Venezuela
Brazil
Panama
Mexico
Costa Rica
TABLE 10
COMPARATIVE UNIONIZATION LEVELS 1975 3
5
EAP
6,225,800
3,871,613
3,014,674
29,557,224
488,335
8,054,822
585,313
Population
Unionized
345,380
1,300,000
680, 000(a)
4, 000, 000(b)
80,580
1,954, 350(c)
% of
Unionization
15.5
33.0
21.5
16.0
24.0
10.9
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seances must anti-union
^ ^ ^
excluded
.
Realignment
The proscription of the CTCR by the Revolutionary Junta in
1949, and the subsecuent decay o £ the CCTRN, although serious hlo„s,
did not completely dismantle the Costa Kln*„ i wL Rican labor movement. In the
post-revolutionary nerind a nor, „7 P o ew generation of labor leaders, who had
been members of the old ptpr »iCTCR, along with a large phalanx of Rerum
Novarum defectors, became key figures in * H« iy ngur a developmental process
that culminated in the prpa finncre t o of several new confederations, both
communist and non-communist.
CGTC- In the early 1950s a large number of new labor leaders cre-
ated the Comisi6n Obrera Sindical (Worker Organization Commission),
trough the efforts of this organization, twenty-nine unions and four
new federations were established by 1952. In March of the following
year the Federation of Workers of San Jose, Heredia, Cartago, Alajuela
and Puntarenas, and the FOBA convened a general assembly that led to
the creation of the General Confederation of Costa Rican Workers
(CGTC)
.
The new organization adopted the program of the old CTCR
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and affiliated itself on the international level with the Latin
American Federation of Workers (CTAL) and the World Federation of
Unions (FSM)
.
By 1957 the CGTC included four thousand members in
four federations and non-federated unions. 36
Pressure to withhold legal recognition of the CGTC was strong,
but owing to the fact that .any of its leaders were unknowns in the
'
labor union movement, juridical personality was granted. 37 Despite
repressive measures, the CGTC profited greatly from the reunionization
drive in the 1960s, and maintained itself as one of the largest labor
organizations throughout that period. By 1980 the CGTC, with 20,487
members representing 19.2 percent of the unionized labor force, be-
came the largest confederation in Costa Rica. The CGTC showed its
greatest strength in the San Jose region where 30.2 percent of its
membership was located, but it also possessed great strengh in the
banana zones of Puntarenas, where 20.9 percent of its membership was
located, and Limon, where 20.0 percent of its membership was located.
By far, it had also been the strongest labor organization in these
zones. In Puntarenas and Lim6n for instance, the CGTC included 5,203
and 5,962 workers respectively. The next largest organization included
only 1,011 and 1,407 members in the same areas. 38
The ideological and programmatic orientation of the CGTC re-
flected the statutes of the CTCR. Underdevelopment was the result
of a semi-feudal economy that was perpetuated by the existence of a
latifundia system, and by the exploitation of multi-national corpora-
tions. Inasmuch as national industries could not compete with large
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American-based companies, Costa Rica was forced to remain a producer
of primary materials. At the same time the exploitation of multi-
national corporations was supported by a reactionary bourgeoisie.
This state of affairs most usually left Costa Rica with external
debts that were paid at usurious interest rates, with loans from the
more developed countries. Programmatically
, the confederation placed
great emphasis on unity of action and organization in the labor move-
ment. It called for improved living and working conditions, indus-
trial development, effective agrarian reform, liquidation of the
latifundia system, and national independence. 39
In the early part of 1981 the CGTC dissolved itself voluntarily
in order to facilitate the integration of several previously indepen-
dent unions. Nevertheless, the larger organization that subsequently
emerged, which will be discussed in a later section, adopted the con-
stituent acts of the CGTC, and maintains the same tactics with regard
to the advocacy of workers rights.
FOCC. The Costa Rican Federation of Workers and Farmers emerged in
1964 as an alternative to the communist-oriented CGTC and the non-
combative CCTRN. In following a middle course between socialism and
militancy on the one hand, and complacency and ineffectiveness on
the other hand, the FOCC claimed to be inspired by the Christian
social doctrine of Jorge Volio. Although it declared its indepen-
dence from ecclesiastical authority, Catholic social action groups
played an important role in its creation, and like the CCTRN, space
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was provide, for . prlest who acted ^ ^
theless, this space was fluently left open ln order tQ preserve
an impression of independence. However, the federation affiliated
itaalf on the international level with Christian organi 2atio„s such
as the international Confederation of Christian Unions (CISC), and
the Latin American Confederation of Christian Unions (CLASC) -
The FOCC asserted that the popular classes of Latin America
suffered from a t„o-pronged oppression: political dictatorship and
economic depravation caused by capitalist economic penetration.
It proclaimed its support for democracy but stated that the basis
of political freedom was economic freedom. Inasmuch as the lack of
economic freedom was seen to be the cause of political dictatorship,
a stable and authentic democracy depended upon the full participation
of the working classes in activities affecting national development.
But along with genuine democratic participation, and a comment to
the well-being of the working classes, emphasis was placed on the neo-
Thomist conception of an integral human development in which economic
vindication was viewed as the basis of a triad that included moral
and spiritual values. Human dignity began with economic justice,
but it could not be achieved unless material values were supplemented
by moral and spiritual values that were communicated to man by God.
Authentic liberty ultimately depended upon God. Accordingly, work
was viewed as an activity, which in conjunction with spiritual
values, would create a dynamism that would propel man toward liberty,
justice, and ultimately, a more perfect life." 1
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Where labor was concerned, the collect!™ contract was con-
feree to be the expression of a better understands between tbe
Actors of production, as well as an instrument o f social transforma-
tion. Owing to employer oppression, the number of contracts in oper-
ate in the mid-1960s was low. The POCC thus asserted that the aspir-
ations of the working class had been impeded by the arbitrary release
of workers who had been associated with labor organizations."
Accordingly, it called for the defense of the inalienable rights
of the workers through the establishment of a "fuero sindical""
that would protect labor organizers fro. anti-union patronal actions.
Like the CGTC, the FOCC believed that the unity of the work-
ing class was indispensable, not only i„ defending socioeconomic
interests, but in protecting the nation against foreign interference.
It thus sustained the principles of autonomy and independence and
asked for the collaboration of all other organizations with similar
concerns and goals. On a programmatic level it declared its support
for any organization or policy proposal that would improve the moral,
material, and economic lives of the working classes. The federation's
short-term proposals included the improvement of medical assistance
programs, credit agencies, paid vacations, and the construction of
sports facilities. More importantly however, the FOCC called for
combined working class action as a means of intensifying the struggle
for a just and equitable salary. Furthermore, in order to insure
working class participation in developmental programs, the federation
called for authentic labor representation in the autonomous institu-
tions. **
118
Owing to the integration of previously independent onions
in the period Mediately following its creation, the FOCC changed
its name to the Costa Rican Confederation of Christian Workers and
Farmers (COCC). By the early l 970s, the new organization included
two federations and twenty-four unions, and showed its greatest
strength in the San dose region. However, it only claimed a member-
ship of 2,032. The principles and program of the FOCC were carried
emphasis was placed on the fundamental transformation of social and
economic structures. The COCC declared a classist and revolutionary
position and called for the education and radicalization of the popu-
lar classes as a basis for profound structural change. Its defini-
tion of principles and goals made collaboration with communist unions
that much easier; nevertheless, the COCC actively criticized the
CGTC for being controlled by external forces. However, programmatic
radioalization and the fear of communist influence, caused a deter-
ioration in relations with the Church hierarchy that presented the
confederation with an opportunity to assert its independence.' 5
Present Distribution of Labor Forces
CTC. The COCC, from its inception, had been criticized for its lack
of independence from Church authority. The radioalization of the
COCC program would destroy any suspicions of the kind were it not.
for a heavy subsidization from international Catholic organizations.
In 1969, the COCC had a budget of 031,573,70 (approximately #3,160.00)
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con-
Of that, eil.263,70 (approximately IIMoQ)
_^ ^
tributes from the La tin ConfederatiQn of chrisuan UniQns
»» did- o f this state o£ affalrs> along uith iMegration
of several non-rural labor organizations was sufficient Justifica-
tion for a change in affiliations. Thus in 1972 the COCC changed
its name to the Union of Costa Rican ^ ^ ^ ^^
time switched its international affiliations to the Union of Latin
American Workers (CLAT) and the World Confederation of Workers (CMT)
.
As part of this show of independence, the CTC clataed to be
neither Marxist, social democratic, nor Christian. It asserted an
independence from political parties the Churchcn , governments, and
philosophies, and defined its oriental-,'™ =„ untation as humanitarian and demo-
cratic. Inasmuch as the workers were responsible for their own
destiny, the CTC asserted, no one could prescribe methods or goals.
But despite this manifestation of independence CTC statutes betray
a Christian heritage. The confederation still calls for an integral
development of the worker and aspires to be not only a labor organ-
ization, but a society for the promotion of Christian virtue.
Nevertheless, the CTC maintains that the liberation of the workers
will come about only through rapid, and global changes in economic,
social, cultural, and political structures. Proclaiming the indis-
pensability of working class unity, the confederation supports com-
bined action in the struggle to construct a new society. In terms
of concrete policies, the CTC has formulated a seventeen point pro-
gram that includes support for labor liberties, higher levels of
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unionization, the execution of coUecUve contracts>^^
station in publlc and private instiCutlonS; agrarian ^^^^
It also proposes various social policies including the construction
of orphanages and popular llving quarters; unempioyMM^
ance, better working conditlons
, ^ ^
and better assistance for low income families."
The CTC is a heterogeneoos organization that Joins peasants
and industrial workers as well as community and youth organizations.
"*«* only 5,278 members representing only five percent o, tbe union-
ized work force, it is tbe smallest of Costa Rica's four confedera-
tions. Its only real strength is in the San dose region where 3,859
members and 14 of its 29 unions are located." 8
CCTD. The Costa Rican Confederation of Democratic Workers emerged
from the remains of the CCTRN in August, 1966. The change of name
was supposed to signify both a conversion from a Christian social
orientation to a social democratic orientation, and an attempt to
reintegrate affiliates that had been frustrated by Return's Church
affiliations. The constituent acts of the new organization were
'
no different from those of Rerun, Novarum but the severance of Church
affiliations was a need that had been justifiably asserted by CCTRN
affiliates
.
From its creation in 1945, Rerum Novarum had declared an in-
dependence of action. However, ecclesiastical authorities reserved
the right to interpret and dictate ideological positions. In fact,
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union pronouncements in the 1940s and 1950s^^ ^ ^
echoes o f Bishop Sanabria's position. Moreover, an ecdeeiastical
assessor who sat tn the General ^^
insured the correspondence of confederation actions and church
Policy. Rem. Novarum was economically dependent upon the Church
and dependent upon the Church's willingness Co creace a puhiic atti-
tude supportive of unionization, it would he worthwhiie to point
out that the methods used hy the Costa P.lcan Church to controi iahor
activity and poiicy were similar to those that have heen employed by
other Latin African Churches.- The extent of these controls are
vividly described in a memorandum fro. Bishop Sanabria to Benjamin
NuHez. sanabria stated that the confederation was obliged to instruct
affiliates in the principles of Catholic social doctrine; that the
ecclesiastical assessor would guard and striate this objective;
that the assessor should maintain good relations with Catholic youth
and social action groups; that ecclesiastical authority possessed the
right to pressure confederation leadership in matters of ideology;
that the archbishop had final authority on ideological questions;
and that confederation leadership was obliged to inform ecclesiastical
authorities of all matters. 5 " With these requirements it is under-
standable why workers became frustrated during the period of conser-
vative Catholic leadership in the late 1950s and 1960s.
The chief goal of the CCTD is to guard the economic well-being
of the working classes within prevailing institutional arrangements.
Rejecting the inevitability of the class struggle, it seeks to create
a social and economic order that „m promote the dignlty of _ fey
guaranteeing an income sufficient not o„ly f„r basic needs
, ^ ^
the anient of the benefits of culture. In this connectlon ^
state is seen to have the responsibility of climating inanities
between groups, as well as the abuses of public and private power.& C °nfed«" i
-
-«ains the Christian conception that society
must be based upon
.oral values, and that individualism as it ex-
ists in capitalist economic systems, is as unjust as the collective
of socialist systems. Accordingly, its long range objectives are a
reflection of the neo-Thomistic conception of a communitarian order
that combines socialist statism and protection for individual liber-
ties. 51
The CCTD lays great stress on labor Code reforms. The current
code is seen to be a relic that is out of tune with Costa Rican social
reality, what is needed is a legal and institutional transformation
that will facilitate an authentic labor liberty through prohibitions
on anti-labor employer activity and deformed judicial interpretations.
Specific reforms include changes in the court system that would pro-
vide more rapid judgements and more effective protection of labor
organizations. The confederation proposes to make collective conven-
tions obligatory in all centers of work and supports the creation of
Labor Relations Committees that would introduce improvements in
collective conventions. Other proposals include guarantees on sever-
ance pay, profit-sharing, the encouragement of cooperative industries,
and the creation of commissions to investigate labor persecution. 52
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as
in a
Figuring importantly in the confederatlQn progran is
o£ land. As in several older labor organizations end political
Parties, both Catholic and
_ist, private property is vle„ed
a fundamental individual right, but its use must be regulated
»ay that would benefit all meters of society, the confederation
stresses the right of every worker to personal property, and calls
upon the state to reguiate land tenure patterns with a view to elimin-
ating unproductive large farms on the one hand and inordinately small
farms on the other hand. In order for a meaningful reform of this
type to work, it is asserted, the state will be required to organize
dependable and effective mar]<oi- c ^ a6 rket s, and provide technical assistance
on a large level. 5 3
The CCTD has taken a finn position against the activities and
effects of multinational corporations. Nevertheless it is much less
critical of the United States than the CGTC and on the international
level the confederation is affiliated with the International Confeder-
ation of Free Unions (CIOSL)
,
and the Interamerican Organization of
Workers (ORIT)
,
both of which are supported by the United States
government. In fact the CCTD has been accused by other confederations
of being a mouthpiece for American interests. It receives financial
aid from American corporations through the American Institute for
Free Labor Development (IADSL) and has been known to reserve space
for the American Labor Attach! in Junta Directiva meetings. 51*
Despite its Christian origins and orientation, the confedera-
tion since its inception has been critical of Church conservatism.
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It has indicted Catholic social organizationSj such ^ thfi £scueia
Social duan XXIU, for not suPPorting Labor Code ^ ^
Poses that important social problems ^ ignored becauge ^ a
fear of the loss of important private sectQr ^^
has always been
.ore disposed to attack the activities of the state,
it has been argued, than the businessmen who share an ecual burden
'
of responsibility for anti-labor actions. 55
The CCTD, though the largest and most important of Costa
Rica's non-communist labor organizations, has been weakened by
personalistic, tactical, and ideological conflicts, and a lack of
cohesion. One major division in the 1970s led to the creation of
a new confederation: a development that weakened the democratic labor
movement by raising the number of non-communist confederations to
three. Much of the tactical conflict in the CCTD revolves around
its lack of combativeness and heavy subsidization from American sup-
ported international organizations. In 1974 the confederation pos-
sessed a budget of (5184, 225.15 (approximately #18,420.00). Of this,
(234,575 (approximately #3,460.00) was derived from affiliates, but
09,000 (approximately #900.00) was derived from state subsidies while
087,556.15 (approximately #8,760.00) in educational subsidies and
053,124 (approximately #5,310.00) in general subsidies were donated
by the IADSL; and in 1978, quotas from affiliates amounted to
084,979.55 (approximately #8,500.00) while subsidies totaled
0117,439.64 (approximately #11 , 740 . 00)
.
5
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At any rate, with 17,394 members representee 1* L^Fi-cb cing lb
. 4 percent of
the unionized labor £orce the CCTD naintained ics£if m ^^
Important non-_ist labor organlzatlon ^^^ ^ ^
federation shows much greater strength ln the San Jos| raglon than
any other organization where it incorporates 14,412 workers into
thirty unions; however, it is also much weaker in the provinces of
Majneia, Heredia, Carta8 o, and Cuanacaste. Several attests have
been made hy the CCTD, as well as its predecessor the CCTRN, to in-
trude into traditional colonist strongholds in the banana zone;
but in the provinces of Puntarenas and lim6„, CCTD membership is
outnumbered 5 to l. 57
CATD. Personalistic conflicts in rh* rrm i ,c l t e CCTD caused the withdrawal
of several unions in the early 1970s. In 1971 the Authentic Confeder-
ation of Democratic Workers was formed with the participation of
only two federations: the Democratic Federation of Workers and the
Costa Rican Federation of Transport Workers. Confederation leader-
ship has argued that their withdrawal from the CCTD, far from being
the result of personal differences, was caused by an opposition to
the intervention of foreign elements in interest affairs. The
American labor attache and other government officials were able to
exert a strong influence on CCTD decisions. Their participation in
confederation elections, and active support of less combative candi-
dates, was thought to be calculated to serve American business inter-
ests at the expense of the Costa Rican working classes. 58
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In defining itself ac o ~i8 as a classist organization, the CATD is
«uch .ore critical of social and economic structures than its
ent organization, ideologically and programmatically it has more
in common with the communist labor
_nt than the social demo-
cratic movement that it claims to represent. The CATD argues that
the working classes will be able to enjoy the benefits of nature
and culture, only through enormous sacrifice and struggle. The Costa
Rican economy is considered to be underdeveloped, dependent, and
subject to the exploitation of multinational corporations. In
accordance with a Marxian view of appropriation and alienation, the
CATD argues that a small class of capitalists appropriates national
wealth, concentrates it, and produces more wealth through its con-
trol of the means of production. Prevailing economic relations have
impelled society toward ever greater inequalities, to the extent
that the majority of people are unable to acquire the basic necessi-
ties of life. Economic, social, and political development are seen
to be checked internally by large capitalist concerns and externally
by multinational corporations. The CATD asserts that a Just society,
as it is reflected in economic and social structures, as well as the
spiritual development of the individual, will require a transforms-
tion of economic relations. 59
Programmatically, the CATD proposes the defense of labor rights
and the individual rights of the worker, and the improvement of the
socioeconomic environment of the working classes. Specific policies
include the maintenance of independence from political parties,
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establishment of
-just *al a r~t a~ t t.Jus s ies, Labor Code reform, a more efficient
social security svsrpmy y te , the promotion of health and educational pro-
Srams, total lahor Hberty
,
and 8reater worker participation in the
autonomous institutions. Internationally, it has declared Its
solidarity with the workers of the world ™hcn , and supports the full sov-
ereignty of nations. 60
With 11,088 members representing 10.« of the unionized work
force, the CATD is the third largest confederation in Costs Rica
Even more than the CCTD and the CTC, the strength of the confedera-
tion is in San dose where 10,710 members and 7 of its 9 unions are
located. The CATD has no union members i„ h,„e n the provinces of Alajuela,
Cartage, Heredia, or Guanaeaste, and only 378 members In the
provinces of Puntarenas and limon combined. Onlike the CCTD and
tbe CTC, the CATD does not include an appreciable number of indus-
trial or agricultural workers. I n fact, the confederation consists
of little more than the Union of Costa Rican Educators (SEC), a
teachers association that has not always been disposed to cooperate
with other unions of a more working class orientation, while other
organizations have struggled for higher salaries and labor liberties,
the SEC has been more concerned with benefits of a non-essential
nature. This orientation which belies its program and policies,
has caused some doubt about CATD's ability to call itself a labor
organization. Furthermore, CATD's independence has been suspect
inasmuch as £20,000 (approximately #2,000.00) of its (273,492
(approximately #7,350.00) budget in 1979 was derived from non-
specified donations
.
6
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CUT- In January of l, 8l the CGIC dissolved Itself voluntarily In
order to facilitate the Integration of the National Federation of
Public Workers (FENATRAP)
,
and other previously independent unions
The result of this merger was the Central Unltaria de Trabajadores
(Unitary Workers Center), a class oriented organisation that has
yet to be granted juridical personality.
Deriving its antecedents from the struggle against the
United Fruit Company in the 1930s, the CUT contends that the process
of Costa Rican labor development has reached a point that requires
the total unionization, and most importantly, the total unification
of the working classes. For this reason it aspires to include all
unions and federations in its files. 62
The CUT contends that the persecution of labor leaders, limi-
tations of the social rights of workers, and the partisan attitude
of labor judges, are all reflections of the bourgeois nature of Costa
Rican democracy. The state is seen to be controlled by a criollo
oligarchy composed of industrialists and large landowners who sup-
port American policies of political and military intervention as a
way of protecting their own interests. The effects of this alliance
have been deteriorating living conditions, and a divided labor move-
ment. The central asserts that it will struggle for the achievement
of an authentic democracy that will fully acknowledge the economic,
social, and political rights of workers. 63
The long term structural requirements of a just society are
not a subject that has preoccupied CUT leadership. However, the
129
central U certain that this „m^ ,
of *. means of production, but the extent of statizatton hM
left undefined. At any rate the nationallzatlon of multinatlonai
corporations, and . radlcal restructurlng of Undhoiding
are goals that CUT leadershlp
_^^ ^ ^^ ^
the central U primarily concerned^ ^
conditions of the working classes. Toward that end l£ has placed
great emphasis on the firming of durable collective conventlons
_
Also important are changes ln tax laus
_
Labor Code
greater labor liber tiea and guarantees
, controls Qn ^^ rf ^
ing, greater worker representation in the poUUoal system, construc-
tion of low cost housing, lower transportation and electrical costs,
3nd subsidies for campesinos
.
6 *
The CUT has not been indlsposed to cooperate with capitalists
when improvements in worki„g-class economic conditions have been at
stake, but the central establishes the inevitability of conflict
between the factors of promotion as a fundamental principle, and has
usually employed combative tactics in defending worker interests.
This is seen to be the major difference between other confederations
and the CUT, all of which, despite programs and principles, assume the
existence of a harmony between capital and labor. With regard to
tactics, the CUT is correct in asserting that it is the only authentic
class oriented central in Costa Rica. 65
With 20,487 members representing 19.2 percent of the unionized
labor force, the CUT is the largest labor organization in Costa Rica.
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Us s tr e„8 th is much more evenly dispersed than the other ^ ^
federations, both ln terms of the types q£^ ^ ^
ates, and ln the locatlQn Qf
of ^
unions and 5 ; 7i6 members are located in th e San Jose region. XM, ls
substantially less than the CCTD and the CATn- h„a cn law, owever the CUT shows
the same degree of srrpnot-h tl.t engt „ the provinces of Pontarenas and Limon
"here its membership numbers 5,203 and 5,962 workers respectively.
The central is unchallenged in the province of Heredia where it incor-
porates 1,907 workers into three unions, and also shows much greater
strength in the provinces of Alajuela and Guanacaste. Only in the
province of Cartaso dop<? rho rcrrt -•g es t e CCTD incorporate a majority of unionized
workers
.
6 6
In addition to being the largest, the CUT is also the best
organized labor organization. Some members of the directive bodies
of member unions that had been independent prior to the 1981 merger
objected to entering the central, but CUT leadership asserts that
the vast majority of rank and file union members support the unifi-
cation of the labor movement. There has also been some disunity in
the "left" with regard to methods and goals, but these conflicts most
usually occur on the political party level. With regard to labor,
all political tendencies within the CUT are committed to a tactic
of militancy. 6 7
Independent Organizations. CUT leadership is correct in asserting
that the force of the labor movement has yet to be concentrated.
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* addltlon t0 £our con£ederatlons that haye maintained di£fertag ^
fluently contradictory concepUons of ciass reiations
_ ^
the role 0£ lahor in polltlcal
, sociali Md economic deveiopment(
'
a great majority of Coqi-p RiV,„sta R1Can unrons have no federative or confeder-
ative affiliations. One hundred flfi-„ e-H fifty-five unions representing 52 185
workers, or forty-„ine percent of the unionise „ork force fall into
this category. Most of these independent unions are located in the
San lose area, hut in the provinces of Cartage and Heredia the
majority of unionized workers h^, e ™ c „K av no confederative affiliation.
One of the largest independent unions is the National
Educators Association (ANDE)
.
A teachers' union founded in 1942,
the association boasts a membership of 22,000. Other important
unions are the National Union of Public Employers (SNEP) with 13,131
members, the National Union of Social Security Employees with 4,354
members, the National Union of Public Works Workers with 3,058 mem-
bers, and the National Union of Hospital Workers with 2,121 members.
While ANDE and SNEP can claim greater strength than some confedera-
tions, the majority of independent unions are small, and in some
cases membership levels are lower than the requirements of the law.
The significance of this derives from the fact that smaller union
organizations also tend to be weaker. It is difficult to sustain a
strike when it is not supported by conf ederative funds. Smaller
unions are thus much more pressured to accept patronal offers during
collective conflicts. The total unification of the labor movement
has been established as a basic CUT principle for exactly this
reason. 6 8
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Interunion Relations
The Costa Rlcan labor movement was never more unified Chan
in the period before 1948. Owing to the understanding that existed
between Bishop Sanabria and Manuel Mora, and the coordinating activi-
ties of the Comite de Intelligencia, two large confederations with
antagonistic principles and goals, collaborated for the benefit of
the working classes. Organized labor profited greatly from this
alliance. Since that time, relations between union organizations have
most usually been characterized by hostility. Communist-oriented
unions have accused the CCTD of dividing and weakening the labor
movement, and of being an agent of American Imperialism. On the
other hand the CCTD, and In the 19 70s the CATD as well, have accused
communist organizations of subversive activities calculated to under-
mine social peace.
Conflicts occurring in the 1960s underscored the hostility
between democratic and communist labor organizations. In December
of 1960 the CGTC accused Rerum Novarum of being financed by the United
States government through the ORIT. It attacked the Ministry of
Labor for opening an investigation of a CGTC affiliate and complained
that while the same union was affiliated with the CCTRN, no repres-
sive measures of any kind were initiated. 69 For their part, the
CCTD in 1967 asked the Ministry of labor to dissolve the CTGC because
of subversive activities. The action was taken after the CGTC
attempted to organize personnel in the national hospital system.
133
^ CGTC contended that „orkers had ^ rlght ^^ ^
that thls could best be accompllshed through uniQn af£iliatio^
CCTD on the other hand claimed tha£ communiscs^^ ^
tahe advantage of a difficult national economic situation. It COn-
tended that onanist labor organisers were infiltrating the hospi-
tal system and asserted that "We of the Costa Rioan Confederation of
Democratic workers have the responsibility of unr.as.cing false
leaders who pretend to be acting with good intentions."'"
A great deal of attention was given to what appeared to be a
tendency toward cooperation between democratic and colonist labor
organizations after 1968 Tn n,«*L iyoe. I that year, for instance, all three
confederations collaborated in the presentation of a proposed Labor
Code reform intended to protect labor leaders against patronal re-
pressive measures. In 1969 and 1970 the COCC and the CGTC partici-
pated in May Day festivities. The CCTD, which had refused participa-
tion owing to pressures from the American labor attache, joined
other confederations in the May Day parade in the following year. 71
The most serious collaborative effort however, was the crea-
tion in 1976 of the Comite de Unidad Sindical (Union Unity Committee-
CUS), a union of the CCTD, CGTC, CATD, and CTC that was intended to
offer more effective protection of working class interests. Alli-
ances between confederations had existed before, but they had always
been intended to serve short term objectives, and they had always been
temporary. The CUS on the other hand was supposed to be a permanent
organization that would protect not only the short term economic
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interests of the „orking classes ^
as well. The program of the organization chus coyered ^ ^
areas and included such proposals as Labor Code reforms, projects
allowing for broader labor participation in legislative decisions
worker representation in the autonomous institutions, broader labor
liberties, agrarian refom, salary increases and price controls."
Shortly after it was constituted, however, relations between
confederation delegates began to deteriorate. By 1,79 the CUS was
an organization that existed only on oaoar n.."m p pe . One commentary in the
Nacion accurately asserted that the goals of the organization were
not received with equal enthusiasm by all four confederations.
CommUnist and democratic unions were struggling for common objectives,
but a coincidence of short term goals betrayed profound ideological
differences that made any alliance unstable at best. Within the
alliance the democratic organizations were only concerned with the
execution of programmatic objectives. The CGTC on the other hand
considered working class economic gains and the assurance of labor
liberties to be part of a long range plan to alter political, social,
and economic institutions. Inasmuch as the democrats had no such
aspirations, propositions presented by the CGTC were suspect, even
though they served common short term interests. 73
The disintegration of the CUS became the basis for a subsequent
realignment that reflected these ideological divisions. The unifica-
tion of the labor movement had always been a fundamental objective
of the CGTC, and a recognition of the futility of interconfederation
135
alliances encouraged an salification of the CGTC organt2atl<jn
_
The result was the merger between the FENATRAP
, the CGTC
, and
several previously independent unions. For their part, non-
classist organizations, recognizing a threat to the democratic
labor
_nt, established another interconnection alliance con-
sisting of the CCTD, CATD CTC ant>f „ a a .
,
uaiij, Lie, ANDE, and the Association of Secon-
dary School Professors (APSE). The alliance was denominated ^
Frente de Trabajadores Democratic (Democratic Workers Front
—FTD)
.
7k
The creation of the CUT and the FTD has given an organizational
basis to the conflict and competition that existed in the CUS
. The
democrats accuse the CUT of betraying working class interests by
attempting to undermine movements that are undertaken by unions out-
side the CUT organization. In a train strike initiated by the FTD
in 1981, for instance, the CUT discouraged the participation of FTD
affiliates, asserting that the movement would result in a settlement
damaging to working class interest. When it appeared that the Carazo
government was prepared to make significant concessions, the CUT
published its support, in what was regarded by FTD leadership as an
attempt to steal credit for the movement. 75
The negotiating rights to collective conflicts and collective
conventions has been a traditional source of conflict between organ-
izations that has given rise to several internecine and potentially
economically destructive movements. A typical incident occurring in
1975 threatened to paralyze several industries. The conflict involved
CGTC interference in a collective conflict that was being negotiated
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by the CCTD. The communist organization
.
r , supposing that it possessed
a numerical majority petitioned the Ministry of .ux t Labor to remove CCTD
jurisdiction of the collective conflict. The CCTD . K-lxul m LL1 subsequently
threatened t0 paralyze Che reflnlng lndustry and ^^^
The CGTC councer threatened tQ iniuate a^ ^^
result in the certaln destructlon rf ^^^ ^^ ^
Pacific and Atlantic regions. The STAPQ, a CGTC affiliate initiated
a strike, asserting that workers would not return to work until the
union was given a voice in the deliberations. 76
Conflicts between confederations have a variety of sources,
act the least of which is the assertion by democratic organizations
that the CUT'S plan to unify the labor movement amounts to the imposi-
tion of labor totalitarianism and the destruction of democratic
unions.- The CUT on the other hand contends that the democratic
confederations, owing to a variety of factors, have kept the potential
of the labor movement in check. In the first place, they arguo, the
democratic unions are too small to be effective. Their financial and
numerical poverty, which diminishes the capacity to initiate and sus-
tain strike movements, forces them to look for quick solutions that
are frequently inimical to worker interests. 78
137
TABLE 11
DISTRIBUTION OF COLLECTIVE CONFLICTS ACCORDING TO CONFEDERATION: 1976 7
9
Confederation
CCTD
CTC
CGT
Independents
TOTAL
Conflicts
10
25
102
21
158
6.3
15.8
64.5
13.4
100.0
Statistics compiled by the Center of Democratic Studies for
Latin America (CEDAL) demonstrate the willingness and the ability of
the CUT to challenge patronal authority. With 102 conflicts repre-
senting sixty-four percent of all collective conflicts, the communist
organization is far ahead of any democratic confederation. The CUT
attributes its lead in this area partially to ideological orientation,
and partially to the fact that the leaders of the democratic movement
are not really workers. Having never set foot in a factory, they
lack the experience that is needed to defend working class interests
effectively. 80
Further debilitating the democratic movement are ideological
differences among member unions. The CUT asserts that the democratic
confederations have not been able to reconcile the widely differing
attitudes that exist between white collar and blue collar union
138
-bars. Converses the
_ists, „ho also incorporat
range of workers from peasants to public administrators, cent
e a wide
end
that their white collar members have developed a sense of so!idarity1* other occupational categories that has contributed to a mucb
higher level of cohesion. 81
TABLE 12
DISTRIBUTION OF COLLECTIVE CONVENTIONS ACCORDING
TO CONFEDERATION: 1976 8
2
Confederation
CCTD
CTC
CGT
CATD
TOTAL
Conventions
4
3
39
1
47
%
8.5
6.4
83.0
2.1
100.0
Personalistic rivalries, ineffective leadership, lack of cohe-
sion, and an ideological orientation that is seen by the CUT to be
based upon class conciliation, have contributed to the failure of the
democratic movement to win collective contracts. The CUT thus asserts
that the democratic organizations have not defended the economic
interests of the working classes. The lopsided distribution of con.
ventions won by the CGT in 1976 adds considerable weight to this con-
tention; but democratic organizations, on the other hand, assert that
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collective conventions should not be used as the only criterion for
judging the effectiveness of labor organization activities. The
firming of contracts via collective conflicts is a procedural route
that has been used effectively by communist unions; however, the
democratic organizations assert that they have defended worker inter-
ests with equal vigor, although by means of direct negotiation. 8
3
Interunion attacks reflect the perception that each confedera-
tion has of its social role. The CUT views itself as an instrument
of social justice and an engine of radical change. Democrats, for
their part, inasmuch as they view themselves as occupying the middle
ground between the Camaras (Chambers) on one hand, and a revolutionary
movement on the other hand, have a profound belief that they are the
caretakers of social harmony. Armed with these convictions, and
the belief that they both represent the true aspirations of the work-
ing classes, interunion cooperation has been considered by union
leaders to be an impossibility. 81*
Concluding Remarks
Three important developments occurred in the Costa Rican labor
movement in the post-rebellion period. The first was an increase in
union persecution that encouraged a process of deunionization during
which labor unionism practically disappeared. The second was a re-
unionization drive that established the CUT as the most powerful and
combative labor confederation, and which left the democratic movement
divided and weak. The third was the development of an irreconcilable
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h°Stmty between~ -—-t ubor organl2ations
Attending the process Qf reunlonization ^
^
new ca^es o f workers, owlng to ^ ^MpecUlly
, to the growth of the CQsta Mcan state ^
nespite Che potential that „as crMted by economtc grouth ^^
eaucratic expansion, Costa Rican labor unionise is still weak at
least in terms of unity ana the percentage of the work force that
has been unionized.
!n terms of labor relations, the most important characteristic
of the post-rebellion period, has been the combined application of
patronal, legal, and government powers against labor anion activities
Herein lies one of the most important reasons for Costa Rica's rela-
tively low level of unionization. Countless cases of union persecu-
tion have left a clear impression that it would be safer and much
more practical for workers to deal with employers individually rather
than collectively. But what stands out most clearly during collec-
tive conflicts is the coincidence between government and employer
interests, and the utilization of the judicial system to defend those
interests
.
The Costa Rican labor relations system is characterized by a
sequence of action or a process, that employs a different mechanism
of repression at each stage. Before and during the initial stage of
a collective conflict, repressive actions are employed by patrons.
During the conciliation process labor ministry officials pressure
unions to accept patronal offers. In subsequent stages the appeals
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of the Ministry „ f labor are replaced by prohiblUons by thfi ubor
courts and ultlmately by the force q£ ^ ^^
Finally, through the combination of iudicial „„A k • ,j and physical force, and
labor ministry and executive appeal, a settlement is reached which
while fluently representing modest economic gains, most often leaves
labor organizations as vulnerable to anti-union patronal attacks as
they were in the period before the conflict was initiated, still
*ore importantly, the ability of labor organizations to defend socio-
economic interests remains dependent opon the good will o£ the execu-
tlve authority.
The mechanism that puts this process into motion is a Labor
Code which, while specifying the rights of labor, is at once much
more clear in its statements of obligations and prohibitions, much
more subject to deformed interpretations, and much more useful to
patrons, than its authors had intended. How the code protects or
undermines union organization, and how it controls union activity
will be the subject of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER iv
JURIDICAL INTEGRATION
The Labor Code was iMtitutad tuo decades^^^
had begun to make an impact on Costa Rlcan ^^ ^
the 1920s workers in San dose had demonstrated their wiiHngness
-d their ability to acr collectively. A Little more than a decade
later communist labor organizers In t-h a km the banana zones had served
notice Co both policy-makers and employers char production in this
economically lmportant reglon^ ^^ ^ ^^
rights and worker benefits were not forthcoming. Labor Codes that
had been instituted in other Latin American countries under simiLar
circumstances intended to diffuse working ciass radicalism by re-
stricting collective action whiie legitimizing collective association
Where Costa Rica is concerned however, there can be little doubt
that Caldero'n Guardia and Manuel Mora, who were instrumental in both
creating and implementing the Labor Code, were primarily motivated
by a sincere desire to achieve a more equitable balance of power
between the factors of production. Nevertheless, it should be care-
fully noted that there has existed a great difference between the
intentions of the administration that instituted the Labor Code, and
the way in which it was interpreted in the subsequent period of Costa
Rican labor development. On the one hand the code did represent a
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to be of crucial importance in t-v^the protection of those rights. But
along with these libera i a~ il declarations, it cannot be denied that the
same legislation, in sDeMfv-f™p cxfyxng extensive obligations and prohibi-
tions, seemed to cancel out any rights that ity n was supposed to have
conferred upon the working classes in ^^^
Owing to these contradictions it could he argued, with equal
Justification, that the Lahor Code either iiherated the working
dasses through its recognition or hasic rights, or disarmed and
-opted the iahor movement by tying unions to the state and confining
their activities in such a way as to render the. ineffective. What
should he emphasized however, is that in reiation to the guarantees
that had existed previous!,, and in relation to the response it
elicited fro, conservstive events, the Lahor Code was seen to repre-
sent a giant step forward in the development of the Costa Rican lahor
union
_nt. For this reason, September 15, 1943 was called a
second day of independence. Nevertheless this same code, however
radical it may have heen in the pre-rehellion period, was flexible
enough to be used by conservative elements in the subsequent period
to impede unionization and prohibit labor activity. In fact, the
code has been used against labor with such effectiveness that it is
considered to be the lynch pin of anti-labor activity. For this
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reason legal reforms have been a b
tions
asic goal of all four confedera-
Patrimonial Basis
The architects of the Labor Code drew hpavilv fr™uic ue vny t om a variety
of sources including the OTT m,„ n • * j8 I , the Uruted States, Spain, and several
Latin African countries. Particularly influential were the Mexican
Labor Code, which served as a model for provisions regarding collec-
tive conflicts, and the Chilean Labor Code, which served as a basis
for conciliation and arbitration procedures. According to Calderon
Guardia, all of these elements were harm„nized with the social doc-
trine of the Catholic Church, as it had been put forth in Rerum Novar
Quadragesimo Anno, Divine Rede.ptoris, and the Codigo Social de
Malinas
.
From this description it would seem that the Costa Rican
Labor Code fell well within the Catholic, Latin, patrimonial tradi-
tion. It would thus be possible to say that the code was bound to
be much more regulative than its framers had wanted, or intended it
to be. In the Social Guarantees for instance, which served as an
outline for the code, a heavy emphasis was placed upon collective
responsibility. In this connection several provisions show a preoccu-
pation for the maintenance of social peace. Labor organizations
were given the right to function but only for the exclusive purpose
of defending economic and social interests. Any form of political
activity was strictly prohibited, and while workers were given the
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t0
-—™ Urge categor-
WOrkerS
'
inClUdi
- ——yees and agrwtural vork_
cultlvation of delicate eropa< Thiseffgc
cancelled out the right to strike for a vast ma " ,jority of workers in-
asmuch as Costa Rica had, and still h*«as, an agriculturally based
economy that depends significani-1 v nnxfxcantly on revenues from banana and coffee
exports
.
Along with these prohibitions and In -L , m tune with Catholic
-ial doctrine, several artlcles basic^^ ^
P-ector of the „orking classes
, ts charg£d
responsibmty
for regulatin8 salaries, vacatlons> „ork hours> ^^^
indexes. The execution of this responsibmty
the establishment of labor courts
,
„hich ln practice>
responsibility for the resolutlon of ,^ ^^^
flics, both i„dividual and collectiye
. Most usuaUy however>
Judicial authority is applled ln a manner damaging ^ iabor interests
»d while the Labor Code guarantees fundamental rlghts> ££ has ^
used most fluently as an lnst_ „f
The Power of Firing
Employers have used
. wide variety of wespons to discourage
union activity: the most common and most effective of which has
been the power to arbitrarily release troublesome workers.
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-ees against lrresponslHe ^^^^ actions
_ whiie^
antees were seen to present a rh>- -P threat to the patrimonial relationship
that had existed between labor and capita! • ,l, employers have used flex-lbU Ub° r Code provlslons
<° «~—— „ an attempt to
Postpone and ln many cases , prohiMt ^^^^ ^
izations
,
Responsibility for the termlnatlQn as ^ changes ^ ^UX- « labor contracts ,US almost entirely ln the hands Qf the
employe,: the only protectlon^ ^
C" in8 ft0m 3
"* PrOViSl°"—
«
lng the flrlng o£ workers durlng
collective conflicts. The basis of enployer^ ^ ^
work force begins with a legal princIple> Jus ^^
fcrs upon employers, ss the directors of means of production, the
right to change the terms of a labor contract, with or without the
approval of the worker. The only restriction on the use of this
provision is that any changes in the conditions of work must reflect
the needs of the business, and they must not damage the moral or
economic interests of the worker.
^ Nevertheless, countless modifi-
cations in the terms of employment are justified by the needs of
the industry. It U worth 00tlng> in thls connectlon> ^ lafcor
contracts are in the first place bilateral agreements reflecting
the voluntary compliance of both parties. That the contract may,
be changed with the compliance of only one party places in doubt
the equitability of the agreement that both parties had entered into.
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Inasmuch as ius vsr-ia^-;landl Pe™ltS chan«« in the f0rm
, the hours
and the location of work, it has provided employers with ,"F-Luye an important
— -r discourag ing rank and flle partlcipation „^
and for that matter any other form of collective action
in .ore genera! te„s the signiflcance o£ jug ^
the tact that it piaces the employee almost at the compiete
exposal of the employer hy conferri„g discretionai power up0n the
employer and the obl igatio„ to obey opon the worker. Where the
Glance of power hetween worker and employer is concerned, the prin-
ciple thus forms a doohie-edged hiade of suhordination. The employer
-
ahle to deterge the for. in which he win enploy the „orker
»hile it is the responsihiiity of the worker to comply „lth employer
commands. Furthermore, the employer is ahle to take disci pli„ary
action by virtue of the power conferred upon him as the director of
a center of production.
The recognition of the employer, or patron, as the director
of a center of production is critical not onl y i„ terms of its effects
on individual employees, but for the implications it carries for
labor as a collectivity. That is to say, employers are entrusted
with the responsibility of taking whatever action is deemed neces-
aary to insure the survival or increase the efficiency of the center
of production. Countless modifications in labor contracts are thus
justified by the needs of the industry without concern for the impli-
cations this may have for the worker. This of course includes the
termination of labor contracts. While the code stipulates that the
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application of jus variandi must _^ grave^ ^ ^
worker, „orker complaints must ^ submitted ^ ^^ ^
long and expensive proC ess of Utlgatlon
, and the o£ ^
unfavorable judgement, frequently discourages sui rs •t against employers.
At the same time t-h*> Hifp;, i*-, e difficulties that legal action poses for labor
encourages employers to destroy unions in rt..I the process of formation
by firing or transferring labor leaders. 3
What also merits attention, where the application of juS
variandi is concerned, is the method that has been prescribed for
the resolution of disputes. The only response allowed for patronal
actions against individual employees is litigation. Grievances of
this sort are completely removed from the responsibility of the union.
In this connection it is worth pointing out that the Labor Code de-
fines two types of conflicts. Conflicts of an economic and social
nature are concerned with the establishment of new rights or bene-
fits, that is to say improvements or adjustments in salaries or work-
ing conditions. Conflicts of a juridical nature involve interpreta-
tions of labor contracts. Conflicts of this sort, especially in
cases of individual violations, frequently are settled through liti-
gation. Conflicts of an economic and social nature, on the other
hand, are resolved through actions initiated by labor unions. That
is not to say however that conflicts of this nature are the exclu-
sive responsibility of unions; it only means that proceedings for new
collective contracts begin at the level of the labor union, indepen-
dent of judicial authority. In fact the Labor Code specifies not
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cm, the rules by „hlch . may inuiate proceedings ^ a^
«ve convention, it also estabUshes ^ ^^ ^
Ministry of Labor or the Lahor Tr-ii.b Tribunal at various stages of the con-
filet resolution process. These procedures serve to add a second
tension to a patrimonially oriented and reguiatory labor-relations
system that begins with iegai retirements for union for^ion and
operation.
With regard to employer abuses, companies have used the Labor
Code to impede union organization and repress Labor activity at ali
stages of the conflict resolution process, whether the conflict is
of a juridical or socioeconomic nature. The Labor Code does not
prohibit the firing of workers before, during, or after the formation
of a union. Nor does the code prohibit the firing of workers while
a union is in the process of submitting a petition for a collective
convention. Prohibitions on the release of employees begin only after
a list of petitions or grievances has been delivered to the labor
courts. At that moment a collective conflict is initiated and all
firings must be made with Judicial authorization. This however does
not prevent employers from threatening to fire workers once the con-
flict has been terminated.
Outside of the legal status that is given to the collective
conflict, Article 29 of the Labor Code prohibits the firing of a
worker without just cause. This provision however has not been very
effective inasmuch as employers can release workers without just
cause with the payment of indemnizations
. Apart from the fact that
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«.e amount o£ Indemlzation la tt frfiquentiy ^ ^
wrtar .. only alternatlve in instMce is expensivfi ^ ^
consuming legal action.
The power to Elre a „orker has been ^^ ^
of Agricultural Workers of <?-f v*«i .Sixaola dxsxntegrated after all members of
the Junta Directiva were fired Tho n •t . e Union of Banana Workers of Limon
disintegrated after Standard Fruit fired ,11 , iu r all union leaders. The
union was reorganized a year later h,,f a-but disintegrated when the company
once again fired its leadership. A subseouent reorganization attempt
incurred the same response. The Union of Workers of the Northern
Railway Company was dissolved in 1958 after all members of the Junta
Directiva were fired. In the 1960s labor unions formed at the Saprisa
factory were destroyed when their leadership was fired. At the Junay
Finca in Turrialba agricultural workers attempted to organize four
times. On each occasion the union's leadership was fired. On the
fourth occasion, all workers on the farm were fired whether or not
they were associated with the union. 4
The CGTC at that time asserted that constitutional and Labor
Code guarantees protecting the right to unionize were totally ineffec-
tive inasmuch as legal provisions such as Article 28 of the Labor
Code, which permitted employers to fire workers without just cause,
served in the end to cancel out labor rights. The confederation
complained that employers could effectively prohibit union develop-
ment by firing any worker at any time, as long as it was done before
or after a collective conflict. 5
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Company re„reanlMlon has become basis utet om^
has called deunionization by p„. ^^ ^ ^
Ministry or Labor notl£led labor ieaders ^ sev£rai banana^
tacns that a strike that had been ^ ^ ^
Shortly after, the General Sector o£ the CompaSia ^ Costa
Rzca c0»uni=ated the dismissal of 280 wAer^ ^^ ^ ^
criticism of the Ministry of Labor rh 0r , the company stated that its per-
sonnel reductions were made on the basis of »™ •D economxc and not politi-
cal factors. 6
The arbitrary release of workers (despido) as a tactic that
has been used by employers with regularity and effectiveness since
1948. More recent examples of its use include actions taken by the
Coca-Cola Company in 1979 and the Yohan Company in 1980 where fifty
and twenty workers respectively were fired while attempting to organ-
ize unions. Besides these multi-national corporations firings have
been used by national businesses with e„ual vengeance. One of the
most extreme anti-union actions on the part of a national enterprise
occurred in one of Costa Rica's largest department store concerns where
every one associated with an emerging labor movement was fired on the
spot. The company stated that it was restructuring its organization.'
Labor leaders of both communist and non-communist orientation
attribute the low level of Costa Rican unionization to the relentless
persecution of labor leaders and rank and file union members. Like
the CGTC in the 1950s, they have asserted that Labor Code guarantees
supposedly protecting the right to unionize are a mere fiction.
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While employers were opposed to labor legislation
, „x m the 1940s, they
o™ ends; ^ they have conslstentiy their p_ ^ £ire workers
-
weaken the iabor KTCMt and preserve paternaUstic^
employer orga„i zatio ns such as
Nationai
Association of Economlc Development (ANF£)
_
^ ^ ^ ^
-on than labor unions, and are able to use this power to justify
and encourage anti-onion attacks, m a typical indicant against
class oriented unions, ia^cion, Costa Rica's most important periodi
oal, published an article attacking
_ist labor leaders for dis-
figuring the labor movement by converting ,', <„,.^"" it into a movement against
the dignity of the human being. The labor movement, it was stated,
must not fall into the hands of leaders who, having ac quired some
degree of power, lose touch with reality. Distinctions are fre-
quently mode by the Cameras between democratic and non-democratic
unions. Those unions that happen to be the most combative are
usually branded as communistic. The suspicion that a union may be
subversive can unleash a claim of repressive measures on the part of
government from special investigations to the removal of juridical
personality, and on the part of employers from the firing of a junta
directiva to the firing of an entire union. 8
This state of circumstances has prompted the CGTC to declare
on various occasions that employers, as well as the government, were
openly hostile to the labor movement. The government permitted local
158
authorities t0 be sponsored by large business enterprises^ ^
result that labor leaders „ere ^^^^^ ^^^^^ ^
whll. att^pting to carry Mt union-related actlvitles
_ u ^
banana 2one, for instance, labor leaders have been jailed and or
threatened with physical violence for such activities as distribu-
ting union literature, disseminating anti-company propaganda, or
gathering support for a collective convention. Union members have
been threatened for supporting collective conventions or strikes,
while non-unioni Zed workers have at times been required to state,
under the penalty of firing, that they would not Join a union.'
Even more frequently companies will take advantage of the powers
conferred upon them through the principle of jus variandi to disci-
pline troublesome workers by transferring them to less agreeable
duties. A typical example of this method of repression occurred when
one labor leader on property owned by the Compafiia Bananera de Costa
Rica, was transferred to swamp cleaning duties when he was discovered
gathering support for a strike. 10
There are several other more subtle, though no less important
tactics that employers use to repress union activities. Employers
have not hesitated to disqualify from employment anyone having a his-
tory of labor activity, and many authors and labor leaders have con-
tended that businesses frequently circulate lists of the names of
the country's most notable labor organizers. No less importantly,
the Labor Code does not prohibit company management from interfering
in the competition between unions in a factory. Employers frequently
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•
At the moment that „orkers attenpt to
adopt
. more conbatlve posUlonj biii ^
Legal dispositions „hlch leave unlons ^
attacks have prompted Ubor organizations, research institutes, and
Political parties to draft Labor Code reform proposals that have
been designed to prohibit the flring o£^
Judicial authority. Owing to patronal pressures and the disposition
of political forces in the Legislative Assembiy however, no signifi-
cant reforms have been approved.
Collective Conventions
Apart from legal dispositions that place workers at the com-
plete disposal of employers, the Labor Code prescribes a long list
of procedures and regulations for the resolution of labor conflicts
that both involves the heavy participation of the Ministry of Labor
and the Labor Tribunals, and places unions at the mercy of patronal
attacks,
The code states that particular patrons are required to nego-
tiate collective conventions upon the demand of more than one-third
of the workers in a factory or center of production. The require-
ments at this stage of the process are: that the percentage must
be calculated upon the total number of workers in a factory; that
the convention must be negotiated with the largest union in the
factory; and that a term of thirty days must be given to direct labor-
management negotiations. 12 There are several points which should be
!(,()
noted about this procedure. I„ the ,±9at .fi rs place, the code makes refer-
ence to
"particular patrons," by which it iy s meant only employers
to demand collective c„wcntlras „as brough[^ ^^
* -e early 1950s . Ihe Murt judg_ t ^ ^ ^
the object of excluding from sue M,'"" tMS "a3 doneinstitutions, inasmuch as It S^*
8*'*"™* th<? State and l»
would have been sufficient to sav- ' ,?
bee
" Ms tendon, It
stated In the Mexican labor code^" P
a trons,' as it Is
Buttressing these labor Code and judicial dispositions is the Ley de
Administracion Financiera (Pi„a„clal Admlnlstratlo„ Law)^^
constitutional and corx2£rfi»
e
,
"
conf°™ance »Uh
the li.lt of action of b
P
Hfpol r o thPe°SUl0nSH J0""""""state resources.
'
14 s t r use and disposal of
The same law later states that each departmental budget constitutes
a Mxi»u» which can not be exceeded.- Public institutions, both
centralized and autonomous, do negotiate collective conventions, but
the state is under no obligation to deal with unions. Consequently,
as the following table Indicates, the number of conventions negotiated
by atate institutions falls far below the number that Is negotiated
in the private sector.
161
TABLE 13
DISTRXBUTTON OF COUECTXVE CONVENTIONS ACCORDING TO SECTOR: I 976 »
Centralized Public
Autonomous—semi-autonomous
Municipalities
Private Sector
TOTAL
Quantity
1
15
12
68
96
1.0
15.6
12.5
70.8
100.0
A second point that should be noted is that the right to demand
a collective convention requires one-third approval of all workers
in a center of production. The process of collecting signatures is
time consuming and employers frequently use this period to fire either
union leaders or rank and file union members. 17 Movements that would
ordinarily receive the approval of a vast majority of workers, often
never get off the ground. Another difficulty associated with percen-
tage requirements is that workers, owing to patronal intimidation,
will prefer not to be associated with labor organizations. Consequently
the number of unionized workers in many factories falls below the
percentage requirement. This problem was particularly acute in the
1950s and 1960s when the number of unionized workers in Costa Rica
had been significantly reduced. As late as 1968, only 5.3 percent of
the Costa Rican work force was unionized. According to one author,
this made collective conventions practically impossible 1 8
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TABLE 14
DISTENTION OF COLLECTIVE CONVENTIONS BY YEAR 1 '
Year
Quantity
1967
1
1968
1.0
1
1.0
3.1
1969
3
19 70
3
3.1
1971
14
14.6
1972
27
28.1
1973
10
10.4
1974
15
15.6
19 75
22
22.9
As Table 14 indicates, collective conventions after 1968 in-
creased dramatically. This in large part is attributable to tbe
unionization increases that were registered around the same time as
a result of the economic prosperity brought about by the Central
American Common Market. Nevertheless, the level of Costa Rican
unionization, not having risen above ten percent, would indicate
that unions in many factories still lack the numbers required to
initiate proceedings for collective conventions.
A third point that should be noted is that the right to demand
a collective convention is at all times provisional. Should the
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~» of wooers approvlng a convention ^ ^
- »m Percentage, employers can stQp negoUation^ ^
<—* from patrona l a„acks a[ stagfi of ^ ^^^^^ ^
negotiatio„s durlng whlch employers at iiberty to Wm^
" wiU. provided they pay the lndemnlzat ,ons assoclateQ uith
"UnJU3t CaUSe -" 2
° In thls »Ploy.ra are able to abort eoU.c.
tive conventions and reduce the effectiveness of labor actlvlty
.
At the end of the thirty day term> dlrect negotlatlons batween
labor and management come tQ ^ end> just after ^ ^ ^ ^
into effect, even the petition for a collective convention retired
the presence of inspectors from the Ministry of Labor
. Thls ln ^
i. stiil
.
common pra ctice. Current labor practice retires the union
to deliver
.
copy of the convention to the ministry before negotia-
tions hsve hegun. In the event that negotia tions f.U, the union
must send
.
copy of the petition to the appropria te labor court.
At that moment
. collective conflict is considered to hsve heen ini-
tiated end the termination of .U labor contracts t, ^
out Judicial authorization. It then becomes the responsibility of the
oourt to for*
.
condition tribunal that will hold discussions with
representees of both parties. The representatives of the concilia-
tion tribunal theoretically are neutral participants in the tripartite
discussions, but labor leaders have complained that their real func-
tion is to pressure labor leaders to accept employer offers. 21 In
*.—e than one onion Mas lnvolvedln the negotiationsSevern^ representatives have attempt£d ^^^ ^ _
COUeC"Ve C°nfUCt
* -— -* *. less costive
Part"er
"
3 ml0n alU
—-
22
0- «*« public secur!tyforces have been mobilized even before the ,„ •, .n t conciliation process had
begun.
TABLE 15
^™~™XVE CO^ICXS AC00RWNG X0 FORM OF^
business
Conciliation
Arbitration
Strike
Courts
TOTAL
Quantity
25
119
6
12
131
293
8.5
40.7
2.0
4.1
44.6
99.9
A large percentage of conflicts are resolved at the level of
conciliation; however, a larger percentage of conflicts are resolved
at later stages of the resolution process. In the event that both
parties fail to come to an agreement during the course of tripartite
negotiations, the labor organization is left with two alternatives:
submit the matter to arbitration or request permission from the labor
courts to initiate a strike.
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"hen negotiations between labor and
.anient do not iead
to sections, the o„ly elective course of action tot labor is the
tant measure of the balance of power between the factots of produc-
tion. Yet extensive legal regulations on the use of this most impor-
tant power are so prohibitive that it is practically removed from
the domain of labor activity.
One specialist in Costa Rican labor legislation has percep-
tively noted that the strike in Costa Rican history has gone through
three stages: the period of the illegal strike; the coexistence
of the right to strike and the liberty to strike; and a blending of
the first two periods. !„ the first period, legal dispositions pro-
hibited collective action aimed at upsetting the iiberty of supply
and demand. Article 308 of the 1880 Penal Code, for instance,
stated that
Ubor
Ve
m
r
^
y fr
f
UdUl6nt Sh °uld alter *e common price oflabo , aterials or merchandise, stocks, or public or privateincomes, or any other such activity will suffer the penally ofimprisonment or a fine of 100-306 colones.' 25
P^lt
Similarly, the Penal Code of 1924 stated that
'whoever consciously spreads unfounded alarms or false informa-
or L?LT J? associ*<:ed with production and consumption,false dealings, or through concerted action oppresses theliberty of supply and demand or uses any other type of fraudto alter the value of salaries, materials or merchandise or any
?inemen?
r
'^
COnmercial traffic
>
*U suffer the penalty of
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The second hlstorlcal perlod
_ ^ ^^ ^ ^
kOU8ht ab° Ut
^ ^^«ve8 o, the Bloc, of Victoria
The Penal C^e o f 19« did not Include ^^ ^
actions aimed at dlsruptlng
. laissez.£alre capltalistic
system. It only prohlblted labQr organl2atlons £ron forcing uorkers
to go on strike. Article 257 stated, for instance, that
will be applied to- 1 h„ Zu , clones, or both penalties
against anotner partv to ^
Vl°lenCe or
himself or h t f i"" " 2 ' He Wh°' *
to oblige anothe p y
°
0™^!;"™Iei*" -
separated fro, a lega/assocla tion"-
ShUtdOUn
'
0r C
° be
The strike as a right and a liberty corresponds to the period medi-
ately following the implementation of the Social Guarantees and the
Labor Code. 28
The present epoch is characterized by a combination of the
first two periods. The right to strike has not been removed or changed,
but the liberty to go on strike has been greatly reduced. 29
One can begin to find the justification for this interpreta-
tion in Labor Code dispositions regarding the percentage of support
that is needed for a strike petition to even be considered by the
courts. While the requirement for a collective convention is thirty
percent, the code specifies that strikes must have the support of
sixty percent of all workers in a factory or center of production.
This difference points to the conclusion that the resolution of col-
lective conflicts involves progressively increasing regulations at
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each stage of the bargaining process
. fct apart ^ ^ ^ ^
it must be considered to be lnordinately hlghj ^ sixty percMt ^
,UireBent C3JSeS Pr0ble"S »h« " is considered that most facias
-Ploy workers o£ various professlons> most of ^ probabiy^ ^
interest in the conflict in the fi rs t place.- Consider for instance
the broad scope of banana production operations. The Compafiia
Bananera de Costa Rlca not only employs various kinds of agricultural
workers on several separate farms, but engineers, office workers,
personnel officials, iabor relations specialists, public relations
Officials, marketing personnel, janitors, transportation and packing
-rkers, etc. In addition to operations directly associated with
banana production, the Standard Fruit Company even operates box fac-
tories. Each one of these professions is an independent entity that
possesses its own specific interests and problems. Each one must
therefore be treated independently when proceedings have been ini-
tiated for a strike.
It would be worth pointing out that the Labor Code dispositions
on collective conventions take into account these peculiarities.
Article 56 Section C states that
in the case that they [all the syndicates in a factory] can not
reach an agreement, the union corresponding to each profession
or occupation can require the celebration of a collective conven-tion, in order to determine the conditions relative to saidprofession or occupation within the mentioned business or center
of production.
On the other hand, in the event that collective negotiations break-
down, the union representing that same profession is prohibited from
initiating a strike, unless it la able to ^
Closer related to this prohle, is the preference Qf^
WOrk6rS t0 3bStain
— U~us employers frequently
coerce workers into abstaining^^ ^^^^
-hing support for . strike ^ ^ w^^
before the Lab or Trihunals the courts ruled ^ ^ ^
abstaining workers must be respected ag much ^^
The court added that the idea that results should be calculated on
the nu.ber of votes cast, is a principie that applies to eiectoral
Politics and not to matters of a conflicts nature. The number of
abstaining workers was thus added to the nu.oer of anti-strike votes
and the collective conflict was rejected.
TABLE 16
CAUSES OF STRIKE PETITION REJECTIONS 33
Quantity %
Less than 60% of the workers
Patronal pressure
Considerations of the business as a block
Miscellaneous
TOTAL
18
1
13
1
34
52.9
3.0
38.1
3.0
i nn n
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The failure of unions to gain sufficient support has figured
- the principle cause Qf strtke re . ecUons b^ u ^^ wor t
h
noting that a significant percentage of strike reactions, at ieast
m 19 76, were attributable to the court*' < acn s judgement that collective
confiicts must be assessed in individual centers of production
The courts have rejected coiiective confiicts hrought against more
than one factory of a particular genre with the judgement that the
individual peculiarities of each factory call for individual collec-
tive conflicts. The justification for this has been Article 364 of
the Labor Code which states that strikes must be employed for the
exclusive purpose of defending socioeconomic interests.'* Sympathy
strikes do not meet this criterion and are automatically declared
illegal
While prohibitions against sympathy strikes have been criti-
cal from an historical perspective, the most important prohibitions
are those associated with occupational categories. Qualifications
on the use of the strike begin with legal provisions referring to
public employees. Article 61 of the Constitution acknowledges:
The right of patrons to the shutdown and the right of workersto strike except in the public services in accordance with the
r^ tL ^ I'"636 [SerViC6S] C-Stit^e the law and m„ tconfo m to he regulations that the law establishes, those beingthe repudiation of any act of coercion or violence. ?5
Corresponding to this regulation Article 369 Section A states that
strikes will not be permissible for "all those who undertake the
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labors of the state or its institutions T-LLucio . Inasmuch as public
employees do not have the ripht- t-ght to requxre collective conventions,
Article 368 of the Labor rnACode states that all differences between
workers and employers in the public sector win *ll be automatically
submitted to the Labor Tribunals. 37
The regulations presented for the resolution of labor conflicts
in the public sector are more harsh than any other occupational eate-
ry that is precluded from the use of the strike. Underlining the
importance that has been placed upon the dependability of state
workers, Article 33, of the Labor Code ^
-
incite a strike in a public institution with the stiff penalty
of imprisonment or fine. 38
TABLE 17
DISTRIBUTION OF CONFLICTS ACCORDING TO SECTOR 3
9
Centralized Public
Autonomous and semi-autonomous
Municipalities
Private Sector
TOTAL
Quantity %
3.1
16.0
3.8
77.1
100.0
Oespite these controls however> shQuid ^ ^
v-e has lntimidated CQsta Rican adnInistrations co ^ ^
SP6Cial COnCeSSl° nS «"
—
«•— t. bring a labor conmct
t- a speed, end . For ^^^ ^^
Sal3rieS th3n
"
0rke
" - *—— tbe occur-
as iUegal strikes perpetrated ^ any other cMter ^^
"on. 01tlfflately
, the disproportlonately
^ confiicts
™i„g „ the publlc sector would indicate ubor
are maintained in a st^ P r>f „ itate of complacency through the use of carrot
and stick tactics
While the state may at times be a more benevolent employer
It consists pubiic sector unions t0 be part „ f ^ ^
-in and applies all the paternalistic bene fi ts and diaciplinary mea-
sures that attend upon that function. Wis function ts becoming
increasingly important in Costa Rican^
^
bureaucratic growth since „or ld War „ has heen accompanied by propor-
tional decreases in the ability of workers to exercise their consti-
tutional right to strike. Bat besides increases in the number and
size of state institutions, the special conflict resolution proce-
dures prescribed for public employees is critical inasmuch as the
Labor Code includes a broad realm of activities within its definition
of public services.
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m addition t0 Korkers „ho are dlrecay empioyed ^ ^
^ Lab°r °*
- include all those
actl,ities
*
ssociated
"
lth the
—
-
—ation, or recollectlon
Of agricultural or £orest products
, strikes uorters^ ^
these occupations is prohlbUed^ ^^^^ ^ ^
P-duc t .- Thls dlsposltion becomes es?eciaiiy critiMi ^n ^ ta
-ken tato consideration that agricultural production is the comer-
stone of the Costa Rican economy.
Besides the prohibitions on agricultural workers Article 369
Section C disqualifies
those workers associated with rail =oo
those workers involved with loin / ° T *" transP°^ation
,
3nH ^ n ,
L
-Lv ading and unloading on dork*a d those workers involved in any other labor of'transporr.'"'
Perhaps as importantly, Section D of the same article disqualifies
damage to the health or It
CaUSing graVe and ™diate
hospitals or Tr r \ PUbllC economy > s "ch as clinics and
liness? or ll^l" aSS °Ciated WUh public h"> cW-
In expanding the discretion of public authority Section E states that
strikes will be prohibited from workers upon the declaration of the
Executive Power, in all or in part of the territory of the Republic,
once the Legislative Assembly has made use of its constitutional
faculty of suspending certain individual guarantees. 43
These legal dispositions practically cancel out the constitu-
tional and Labor Code provisions permitting strike movements. As one
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-hor noted, who can g0 on strlke la a Qf interprecation that
can be made uberally or conservatively, depending ^ ^
of the legal authority. Prohibi£lons on right ^ strite misht
be confined to the centralised bureaucracies, or extended to the
autonomous institutions end municipalities, dostices may take into
considetation the nature of the industry affected. Practically any
occupation could be considered to he indispensable to the public
good
All judicial determinations are made upon subjective criteria,
and inasmuch as contemporary Costa Rican politics is becoming increas-
ingly concerned with themes that affect the laboring classes, it is
becoming progressively more difficult to establish the boundaries
separating the political from the economic. An expanding state appar-
atus, which is constantly assuming new activities, is increasing this
confusion. For this reason judicial authorities are not compelled
to impose rigorous definitions on their legal judgements. According
to one legal authority, when all the constitutional, Labor Code and
Penal Code dispositions are taken into consideration, as much as
seventy percent of the economically active population is prohibited
from using the strike as a means of defending socioeconomic inter-
ests
.
k 5
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TABLE 18
DISTRIBUTION OF CONFLICTS ACCORDING TO LEGAL JUDGEMENT 14 6
Quantity
Legal
Illegal
No Declaration
TOTAL
%
19.5
70.7
9.8
100.0
An investigation undertaken in 1976 Indicated that less than
one out of flve strikes received judiclal approval. But even in those
few cases that work stoppages are declared legal, a series of Labor
Code procedural regulations are calculated to postpone and discourage
the initiation of strike movements. In certain sectors of production,
once the declaration of legality has been made by the Labor Tribunals,
the Ministry of Labor is given the responsibility of integrating a
special conciliation board composed of state, employer, and worker
representatives, whose function Is to study the points of discord be-
tween labor and business in an attempt to arrive at a settlement.
If negotiations fail once, the board is given another term. Should
the second attempt fail, the strike is permitted, but only after the
unions involved have notified the Ministry of Labor seventy-two hours
before the commencement of the movement." Furthermore the Labor'
Tribunals have the power of suspending the right to strike for a
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period of six months in the event that rtn •this is considered necessary
tor the accomplishment of a lust ,-f-Mj settlement between workers and
employers
.
** 3
The procedural mechanlsms prescribed coiiMt^
re,Ul
"
"me
-
P—
"
y
— ««» „m elapse betBeen the
commencement of collerHvo „ - •lectx e negotxations and the initiation of a
strike during which unions are vulnerahl. *U b e to Patronal attacks. In
one case, ln „hlch
. strlke
_^^ ^^^ ^
of .„ months because the company
_ Mt ^ a pMition ^ ^
port a strike at that momenr n,„t. The company used this time to fire
all workers who supported the strike.- For thls„ many^
Ptefer to initiate strikes directly after collective negotiatio„ s
,
even though the movement will certain! v h= A ,ly be declared iliegai since
the union failed to exhaust the conciliation procesa.
Even once the strike has begun its legality is provisional.
If any violence or coercion is used against people or property Judicial
sanctions are removed automatically, or if the union fails to compiy
with any of the requirements that govern collective conflicts, legal
recognition can be withdrawn. At any time, any one of the parts of
a collective conflict can request the requalification of a strike.
If support for the movement at any time drops below sixty percent,
legal recognition is withdrawn. Similarly if it is determined that
the motives of the union are political rather than socioeconomic,
.
judicial approval can be removed. 50
The decision o£ lllegallty renoves proMbicions ^^
ehe union submltted tta pe£ltion a conectivem^
regain the liberty t0 £lre „orkers at wlll Furthermore> u a^
worker u rehired, the employer u ^ obUgatton ^
precisely with the CenM of the contract that existed previQusiy
-Plo.ers have in SOffle cases been aUe tQ decrease sauries
_^
workday reduce beneflts; „ take other actions ^ ^^
of the business. ln one case lnvolvlng ^^
^ ^
Jose textile factory, the union follo„ed ^ appropriate
guidelines in winning a verdict of 1 eMn.w *r l gality from the Labor Tribunals
But fifteen minutes af£er the strlke had^ _
bv telephone, concluded that the
_nt did not have sufficient
union support, and declared the
_nt to be Illegal. The co„pany
then initiated an anti-union campaign that resulted in the firing
of several workers and the circulation of a black list. The affected
workers were ulti raately forced to abandon textile work because they
could not find employment. 51
Case Studies
Owing to extensive regulations, prohibitions, and broad loop-
holes that facilitate anti-union attacks, the Costa Rican Labor Code
has become more an instrument of domination, than a document intended
to protect labor organizations. The labor laws have permitted the
government to say '"it can't be done, the law doesn't permit it.'" 52
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According to one labor leader t-fco, he workers have lost faith in both
the code and the Labor Tribunals.
"Thev rt-h. ,i y [ he workers] don't believe
and I don't beiieve ln the Uglslatw, 53
rMsons J
- «» can be most vividiy descrlbed ln conMnation ^^dements, patronal actlonSj ^ physicai ^^^^ tha£
*. resolution of iabor-management coafllcts
_ Three ^d
-typical strike movements underscore the con£rol ^
are put into operation by judicial sentences.
1- In July of 1979 the Union of Pozuelo Workers (SITRAPSA)
initiated a strike after the Pozuelo candy factory rejected a peti-
tion that included salary increases, improvements in working condi-
tions, and increased pregnancy benefits
. The basis of iabor discon-
tent was the company's refusal to deal with un.on representatives.
The initiation of the movement was immediately followed by com-
pany accusations aiming to cast doubts on the legality of the work
stoppage. Management claimed that strikers had occupied the factory,
an action that is grounds for the rejection of a strike petition or
the remove! of Judicial authorization. Labor leaders answered the
accusation with the assurance that no such action had occurred. The
company then claimed that no more than twenty-five percent of the
workers supported the strike. On the other hand, labor leaders argued
that 400 out of 525 workers were involved in the movement. The
company further asserted that striking workers were blocking factory
entrances and sabotaging machinery. The penalty for any of these de-
velopments is the removal of Judicial authorization.
in a second attempt to ^ ^Pan, asserted that ln_ as ^^^ ^^ ^
~ » the factory „as aMe to _ froduccton op^_
ations. Despite union accusations that thme company was attempting
to undermine the strike k,r „by spreading false propaganda, the Superior
Labor Tribunal subsequently upheld a verdict of in „a llegality that had
been made by the First Labor Court Th^r
'
ei reasoning was that the
strike lacked the suDnor-t- •pport of sixty percent of the factory work force
and that the union failed to foil™, -v.l ow the proper procedural guidelines
for the resolution of collective conflicts. The union claimed that
they had fulfilled their responsible, hut that the company had
refused to name representatives to the conciliation hoard. The con-
flict they asserted had heen in the lahor courts for over a month and
a half during which the company repeatedly threatened to fire both
union and non-union work-P-rc Tn jrkers. In order to demonstrate their strength
of support, the union staged a sit-in at the Ministry of lahor. Legal
judgements were nevertheless upheld. The frustration with the conduct
of the courts in this case prompted the bitter comment that '"it
appeared that the thesiq of m 0 un s the business coincided with that of the
labor courts.'" 54
The initiation of the strike was accompanied by the presence
of forty civil guards who had been sent to the cite upon company
request. Subsequent confrontations produced several injuries and the
arrest of forty strikers. Company officials attributed the violence
to the union's refusal to allow the entrance of non-striking workers.
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The union, on the othpr honj ^ ,hand, clawed that striking uorkers „efe
^versing with factory employe£s pubuc^^ ^
the occasion to inlt*te gratuitous acts of vlolence
. &t any ^
fifteen people were hospitalized.
Shortly
.fter the strike had been decurtd iuegai> ^^
took advantage of lts legal pouers by^ ^ ^
factory positions were rilled by new personnel on the basis of what
iSjiacion called "a careful seiection process,- At the _ ^
strike leaders complained that management was offeri„g "loyalty
prizes" for any worker who refused to go on strike."
The intransigence of the company position prompted SITRAPSA
to solioit state mediation. However a revest for a meeting with
the Minister of Labor was rebuked when it was stated that iabor lead-
ers involved in illegal strikes do not represent the workers. SITRAPSA
then petitioned for presidential assistance, but a demonstration before
the presidential residence was answered by the refusal of executive
authority to require the reinstallation of fired workers. President
Carazo stated that inasmuch as Costa Rica was a nation of laws,
and each individual was obliged to conform to legal principles, the
judgement of the Labor Tribunals could not be overturned. By their
part, the Ministry of Labor offered only to help fired workers find
new employment. 5
7
With legal judgements having served as the basis for anti-union
patronal attacks, and with executive authority supporting company
labor policy the SITRAPSA organized a desperation hunger strike.
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When this failed to budge either8 COmpa^ or government, the strike
was called off.
^ Pozuelo case possesses several lmportant charact£rlstics
- ». o f which u the utlUzatlon of cMpanyis
'
C
°
emPl0ye
" Wh»' ^ *• declaration o f 1U.gaUty
Labor Code dispositions protecting union workers
_ ^^
Secondly what should be noted is the coinoidence between the company's
estimation of strike support and the Judgement of the iahor court
The company on this occasion ieveied several accusations a8ai„st
SITXAPSA aii of „hlch are punlshaMe by ^ ^^^^
Without question they were made in order to prejudice Judicial opin-
ion. Third!,, one must take note of the fact that once the court
had rendered its Judgement, puhlic security forces were placed at the
disposal of the Pozuelo factory, and put into action when the company
014*1 that striking workers were prohibiting the entrance of fac-
tory workers. No less important^, one should take note of the com-
pany's attitude toward the labor unions. Wei! before the strike had
begun the Pozuelo management refused to deal with union representa-
tives. Equally significant was the company's policy concerning newly
hired employees. Workers were hired with the promise that they would
not become involved in union activities. This promise was enforced
by the conference of loyalty prizes on the one hand, and threats of
firing on the other hand.
What obtains in the Pozuelo case is a fairly complete demonstra-
tion of the combination of forces, both institutionalized and informal,
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^ can be brought against obstinate ubor oiianizano^ ^pii_cation 0£ thls mechanlsm u uncMmM ^ Costa^^^
and „ the Po2uelo strlke u atypicai
_
^ ts oniy^ ^
«*- I- of direct executive involvement
. ^
studies
demonstrate how executive pressures can be applied, ln grearer or
lesser degrees, to the termination of coliective conflicts.
2- In 1978 the Union of Pococi Agricultural Workers (STAP)
Initiated a strike on several f,™,arms managed by the National Banana
Association (ASBANA) in protest of low series and union persecution
Workers claimed that the company had violated the terms of their col-
lective convention. They also demanded Both the rehiring of workers
that had been fired and the reiease of a company administrator who,
in their opinion, was the perpetrator of several anti-union attacks
The matter was brought before the labor Court of LimSn
. A subsequent
judgement of iliegality was upheld in the Superior labor Tribunal.-
The court's decision in this case is typical of iegal decisions in
matters associated with the banana industry. The most_ legal
dispositions brought against these unions are the prohibitions on
strikes in agricultural industries (Article 369, Section b), and the
failure to exhaust the conciliation process (Article 366, Section
b).
Upon the submission of the court's judgement seven hundred
troops of the Guardia Rural (Rural Guard) were sent to the area in.
order to maintain order. As in the Pozuelo strike, public security
forces placed themselves at the disposal of the company and waited
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for orders to disperse the movement l n tM. I hxs case, however, the com-pany behaved with considerably greater tmY olerance than the Pozuelo
— Security forces matntained a state ^ readiness
_
One week after the* qtad •e STAP initiated its movement against the
ASBANA, the strike expanded to several nrt, *other farms belonging to the
Banana Development Company (BANDECA)
. Once again th.UL e company re-
frained from the imp „c cof force; however, they refused to negotiate
with workers while the strike was in progress.
By paralyzing a significant portion of the h,^ UD t banana industry
the strike gave sufficient cause for direct executive involvement
President Carazo visited the zone and factored workers on their patri-
otic duty to insure the weii-heing of the country by resting banana
Production. The attitude of executive authority in this case was
epical in the sense that presidential audiences intended to encour-
age feelings of national pride, at the same tlme giving workers rea-
son to helieve that work stoppages were not in the hest interests of
the country. On the other hand President Carazo in this case demon-
strated an unusual restraint in the sense that he did not apply phy-
sical violence, even though the strike had the potential of being
severely damaging to the national economy.
This attitude did not escape the criticism of conservative ele-
ments, which, through their control over the means of communication
initiated a sustained attack against the labor movement. The
National Chamber of Banana Growers expressed its dissatisfaction with
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the conduct of the Executive Power an H> d
'
ending the President that* strike had been decfared iUe^i
, asked that ^^ ^ ^
PUt into effect. One week later
, the ASBANA Publlshed an article
stating that labor leaders „„„ ..were not rnterested in the defense of the
socioeconomic interests of rank and file onion members, hot that in
acoordance with their politioal motivations, were only interested in^ ^ SttemPt " ln"rfe» «- company's right to decide its
adml„istrative affairs. The next day , the Chamber of Coerce ex-
panded open the suggestion of political!, motivated union activity by
launching a severe attack against the labor union movement that in-
cluded assertions that amll groups of_lsts^
the national economy, the social peace, and the well-being of the
Costa Rican people. Labor leaders, it was argued, far from being
interested in solving worker-related problems, were coated to prov-
ocation, the paralyzation of business, the perpetuation of class strug-
gles, and the destruction of industry and democracy.
This indictment was shortly followed by an announcement from
the ASBANA reminding workers that the strike had been declared illegal,
and threatening that legal provisions, giving business wide discre-
tional powers, would be applied if production was not shortly resumed.
Four days later production was resumed. The company promised to
establish a bi-partisan committee that would study the problems that
led to the strike. It also promised to respect the collective conven-
tion in operation and to refrain from punitive action against labor
leaders involved in the strike; however, workers were to return to
an
on
their posts under the 8amP6 eCOnMlC C°ndltl
- ««« h.d existed beforethe strike. But Just before thi. agreement uas algned „ .w,iS "U'.n , workers asso-
ciated with another company declarer! „V lared common cause wUh th« STAP and
^ —-—u Rural were aent to
- 1» or,„. ^ te ptrnlt productlon a{ewwi p^ tte
after fourteen labor leaders were fireH f„ u ,d or having participated in
illegal strike and several oLhers were arrested for the destructi
<>f private property. 59
in addition to the personal appeals of the President, four
factors merit attention in the ASBANA strike, rim, as in the
Pozuelo strike, public security forces were placed at the disposal
of the company, and although no[ m ln£o action __an atyptMi^
rence, especially In extended strikes !„,„,,,, , ,111
* Industry— it can be
concluded that the threat of violence contributed heavily to the for-
mation of the movement. Ibis beco.es especially clear in Ught o,
the fact that tbe strike ended shortly after the ASIJANA pubHshed Us
ultimatum, secondly the use of the meana of communication by the
Cameras and the company, a usual tactic during strikes, can be seen to
be an important means by which conservative elements not only Justify,
but generate support for the application of force against labor organi-
zations. It might be added that denunciations of union activities were
accompanied by reports of vast destruction o, banana crops and huge
financial loss. Thirdly, antl-unlon pstronal actions taken at the
end of the strike cannot be ignored. While the ASSAM had promised
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not to take punitive ant--.*™V ctlon against labor leader* th a . ,r s, the strike involved
workers from several f aT-m „
company. These companies ^ ^
u use c«e discretional
powers conferred upon them by the Labor PnH „y Code. Fourthly, one should
take careful note of the fart- +uct that the courts did not hesitate to
withhold legal approval of a strike in th. ,m e agricultural sector. This
is crucial inasmuch as agricultural nr^8 i production occupies a significant
portion of the economically active population.
At any rate, the ASBANA strike, while demonstrating a series
of tactics and measures common to Costa Rican labor relations, was
atypical in the sense that prolonged strikes in the banana sector
usually provoke stronger responses from public security forces. How-
ever, as the following case study demonstrates, the aPPlication of
violence is a measure that is applied not only against agricultural
and factory workers, but against the managerial classes that occupy
posts in the autonomous institutions.
3- In Juiy of i976, seven hundred workers from the Costa Rican
Electrical institute (ICE) initiated a strike in protest against PLN
President Daniel Oduber's decision to withhold salary increases that
had been approved by the ICE administration. The Association of
Communication and Electrical Industry Employees (ASDEICE), an affili-
ate of the FENATRAP, issued a list of petitions that included above
all, the suspension of the executive order freezing salary increases,
but also; the termination of union persecution; the rehiring of labor
leaders that had been fired; and the termination of actions prohibi-
ting union meetings. After the propositions were considered by the
Minister of DeveloDme^ n,«opment, the announcement was made that the freeze
on salaries would not be lifted.
increase, to Cuo thousan, ^ ^^^
»as not acceded by
. suspenslon Qf ^
th.less the Superior Labor TribuMl upheld a judgMent Q£ iuegaiity
** the resolution that the strtke involved puMlc uorkers> ^
con«ltutlonal la„ (Artlcle d) Md Labor provisions
369, section a) are prohibited from utill2lng ^^ ^ ^
determination, units of the r<-.,n rCivil Guard armed with tear gas, batons,
and machine guns, occupied ICE installations.
Lawyers attached to the executive office announced that if the
strike continued, they would have no alternative hut to put lnt0 oper.
ation the measures prescribed by the Penal Code for public employees
involved in illicit union activities. Similarly President Oduber,
in an attack against leftist labor organizations reminded workers
that strikes in the public sector were illegal and that this particu-
iar strike was the result of adventurers who merely aimed to prove
that they could organize a strike in the public sector. These labor
leaders belonged to political groups, he asserted, that having failed
to gain electoral success were merely out to gain some form of notor-
iety. The strike was seen to be the responsibility of radical groups
aiming to paralyze the country. He insisted that the smooth function-
ing of the public services was an obligation. Work stoppages in a
vital service he stated '"will not be permitted, and if we have to
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aPPly the law we will "' "»Tf • •it is necessary to take measures they
will be taken."' 60
With the conviction that the =tnun strike was not the work of ICE
»p!eyees, public securlty o££icials ^ ^ ^ ^
picket Unes t„ the purpose Q£ identifying poi;Ucai
The discovery of thls developnent
^
that touched off violent confrontations leading to the hospital^-
tion of several ICE employees anH t-^Payees, d the arrest of several labor lead-
ers. Shortly after the incident the ASDFTPF ™n b EICE convened a general meet-
ing doting which it issued a list of grievances that repeated the
demands of the original petition, and called upon the administration
to recognize that the problem in 1CE was caused hy the lack of any
norms governing union activity in the puhlic sector. For this reason
the ASDEICE demanded a collective convention, in conformance with
the rights conferred by Article 62 of the Constitution. The petition
also included the demands that ICE refrain from any disciplinary ac-
tion among either labor leaders or workers who had participated in
the strike; that firings be prohibited without proof of just cause;
and that fuero sindical be provided for labor leaders up to one year
after having served as a labor representative.
The petition was answered by a denunciation of extremist groups
which were seen to have taken advantage of labor problems by infiltra-
ting picket lines and perpetrating acts of violence. Oduber refused
to adjust salaries and claimed that violence was the responsibility
of political subversives who left police with no alternative. The
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oppo-
strike was seen b£ a ^
not a labor struggle
Oduber further stated that t-fcohe workers must understand that the reso-lutxon of the courts had to be supported The ,. interpretations of
^ admlnlS"a«°"
— -Parted by leaders o£ the pollUcal
^o, after havlng studied _nt
_ jssued a
sorting that Bhlle thfi governnent shouid n<)t ^
of radical eleMtts by applylng foMe crudeiy
_ aimg
with the acts of violence wPT-o #.».ere the responsibility of professional
agitators attempting to spread chaos.
The ICE board of directors 3nH rt. aa d the administration refused to
accept the union's petitionq rw i ,s. One week after it began the strike
was called off. The ASDEICE stated its opposition to the administra-WS POUCy di«-ces should be settled in a more
responsible manner. 61
In addition to the violence employed by public security forces
two points stand out in the ICE strike. The fl rst is the decision
of the labor courts to interpret public services to mean autonomous
institutions as well as .t.-j.^, tstanding bureaucracies. In this connection
It should be remembered that state institutions employ over eighty
thousand members of a 550,000 member work force. Constitutional and
Labor Code dispositions concerning public employees consequently pre-
clude almost fifteen percent of the Costa Rican work force from the
right to strike. The second is the accusation made by the Executive
Power as well as the political opposition that the participation of
subversive elements had converted the strike from a labor matter into
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a political struggle. T n thi
a
56x i s connection if- <;hn,,i a v.t s ould be remembered that
labor conizations that pursue
^^ ^
«- Pena lty of forced dissolution,^ ^ ^ ^
P-ved t0 have subversive ob . ectives sub . ect ^ ^^^
^ place inasmuch as constitutional relations prohihited union
Politic.! activity. No Ugl8latlve action „as taRen against AsDEic£ ^
accusations were made. It should be ^^
tions and force, dissolutions of labor conizations had occurred in
the pest, end there is no reason to expect that a prolong work
stoppage in a vital sector would not evoke the same response.
Concluding Remark
Juridical provisions are structured in such a way as to pro-
hibit Costa Rican labor organizations from any form of independent
activity. While labor's rights are guaranteed in a series of consti-
tutional and Labor Code provisions, those same documents establish a
body of regulations so confining that union activity, at least where
strikes are concerned, has become an illegal affair. While unions
are free to organize, they are not free to act. But apart from pro-
hibitions on strikes, loopholes in Labor Code regulations regarding
the discretional powers that employers enjoy before, after, and even
during collective conflicts, impinge upon labor liberty.
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BesWes collective conventiM
conectiTO^
guidelines that bind labor organUations ^ bureaucrauc^l«es, a „t important> though sometimes subue characterisuc o£
Costa Ktan labor reUUonSj ls a nutuany supportive
control that involves bureaucratio executive • „• •
' J UUJ-ciai, and private
StltUUmS
-
m—
-
- P-* Nation via Labo r Code
diSPOSltlOI,S UaVe^ vulnerable to patronal
attacks. attacks encQurage iabor to tnitiate ^
fUcts; however
, once agaln> LabQr reguiatiQns ^
J-ICUI Judgements an but prohibit the use of important
in this connection it should be recalled ^
fluently coincide with the accusations made by businesses that ace
being affected by strikes.
The declaration of illeealii-v <c , • „ • ,gal ty is a critical stage in the con-
flict resolution mechanism, for it is xt H-Hc
,
u a this point that public secur-
ity forces are placed at the disposal of employers. As the previous
case studies showed, physical force may he applied or threatened; in
either case, it serves to discourage unions from continuing work stop-
pages. The prolongation of strikes, especially in critical sectors,
frequently gives sufficient cause for direct executive involvement.
This involvement may he calculated to appease labor or it may be in-
tended to threaten labor with the possibility of forced dissolution.
But whether or not executive authority is applied, illegal strike
movements present employees with the opportunity to continue anti-
union attacks. Inasmuch as Labor Code guarantees do not apply i„
these cases, unions become defenseless.
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™icting labor actlvlty are frequenuy Mt^ ^ ^
case, in „hich judicial and^ ^ ^
brought t0 bear a8ainst Ubor organlzations dM£er_
ent from the Pozuelo and ICE strikes c, »,^ . Strikes may be declared
illegal, workers Will be flred>^ ^ ^^ ^
the disposal of husiness, buc ln the end^^^ ^ ^
hired, lahor leaders „in be relMsed prison
_ ^
reprisals win be glven
, and slgnIficant materlai ^ ^
won. Nevertheless, while unions „ln as much as they^ ^
actions ere closely regulated by a Labor and Penal Code ^^
the. t0 higher authority. The Juridical integration of Costs Riean
labor thus prohibits independent activity during the conflict resolu-
tion process. But apart from the association between labor organiza-
tions and state institutions duri„ 8 collective conflicts, labor mln.
tains points of contact with several bureaucratic agencies. How those
contacts either encourage or confine labor activity, and whether or
not they constitute foru.s for an effective alternative expression of
labor interests will be the following subject of discussion.
192
%tes__to_Cha£te^IV
Bernardo Van Der Laat, La Huelta Y Fl p '»PP ' and 17; andCosta Rlca
, V^-jsgSgtffftfi^Sffito ™-
Costa ^1^^^^ «-uaa cstatal A Distancia, 1979), p. 114.
Ibid., pp. 109 and 111.
5
Ibid., p. 58.
Costa M^^S^A^^*- (Sa" Jos-
PP. 228 and 230.
te"° de Mucacl°" Publica, 1977),
Secr.tary^«Al1hrc^!lunl
le
r^
th^ S°lan°'
Rlcan laboAelations aysterc "
n°rmal Pa" ° f the Cos»
Jose, Colta^Rica
3
,
5
!
0
,^) ^if"^ 1^?11?^^"'^. < S-
with Carloa Vargas fciko'"^, ^81. " ^ °" a" late" le"
Miniatrv
9
^
1
?^'
1 '70
™?'1101
' " °erlVed fror" a CCTC -emorandum to the
on the CGtC. '
f °Und in the °" icial M1^«y Epedientes
°
Libertad
, December 19, 1970 L-fhei-faH c
on this t^~oT7atronal actioi.
GS frequent r6p° rtS
M
Munoz, op. cit., p. 60; and Juan Rafael Espinoza, Tareas
(Heredia
p
Cos
/ilg*
Universidad Nacional, 19/9), pp. 32 and 33. .
12
Administraci6n R. A. Calderon Guardia, Codigo de Trabaio-
26 Agosto De 1943, (San Jose, Costa Rica, Secretlria De Trabaio YPrevision Social), pp. 24 and 25.
193
1 3Rafael Angel Rojas Jimenez J a
"ibid., p. A7.
Li_Kica, aa Catalina7l976T7TT~l7
niversity of Costa R^c771^5l)777^00~Tf
.
18Rojas Jimenez, op. cit., p . 54>
1
9
CEDAL
,
op. cit., p. 15.
cit., P .
20
52f°
nSO^ cit '> P- 20 ff; and Espinoza, op.
1981; see^olsXlarop? ^the kind of pressures that are brought to h' ^ thattions during conciliation proceed^ dene lab ° r 0r8aniz-the attitude of the administration th^ P °"^ faCt° rS inc^dingNation, the sector of production that k ^ ° f the labor
of bananas, etc
P is being affected, the price
22
J
2 3r
2 5,
Recall the strikes of the 1950s discussed in Chapter II.
3This occurred in Limon in April, 1981.
*CEDAL, op. cit., p. 12.
5Van Der Laat, op. cit., p. 38.
26 Ibid., p. 38.
27 Ibid., p. 39.
28 Ibid., p. 39.
29 Ibid., p. 39.
31 Codigo pe Traba-jo
. p. 25.
194
3 2,;Van Der Laat, op. cit., pp. 54 and 55.
3 3CEDAL
,
op. cit., p. 13.
31VanDer Laat, op. cit., Pp . 96 and 97.
35
Constitucion
. p. 17.
36Codigo De Trah.in
, p . 112 .
,
^osta Rica, ImprentaToWTl9T5Trpr49:
8
Espinoza, op. cit., p. 24.
3
9
CEDAL, op. cit., p. 7.
^
"Codigo De Trabaio
. p. n 2
.
^Ibid., p. 112.
" 2Ibid., p. 112.
3Ibid., pp. 112 and 113.
"Van Der Laat, op. cit., p. 71.
'Ibid.
, pp. 76, 84, and 99.
'CEDAL, op. cit., p. 13.
" 7Codi£o De Traba-jo
. p. m.
" 8 Ibid., p. 115.
1979), pp.' 22 and
R?^°^^^
l* -
H 5-
4 6/
5 0,
5 1-
Van Der Laat, op. cit., pp. n 8 and 119.
24.
llMd
-' PP
'
143 and 149; and Gutierrez, op. cit., pp. 23 and
(1977).
5 2GUid
°
N^eZ R°man
'
" Interview," Idear^Co^tar^ic^ no. 9
53Gutierrez, op. cit., pp. 22 and 23.
195
5 k-,La Nacion
. July 21, 1979.
'Ibid.
,
July 26, 1979.
'Ibid.
, August 1, 1979.
Ibid., August 7, 1979.
'ibid., June 10 and 14, 1978.
fromh^£^£^*£«* precedt„8 paragraphs^
'ibid., July 20, 1976.
July 20-2^
e
i976
f
!
rmatl° n CMe Stud? «— fco. La Nacion,
5 5-
5 6-
5 7-
5 8-
5 9,
. N,
6 0
6 1,
CHAPTER V
BUREAUCRATIC INTEGRATION
The establishment of the Social rGuarantees was a landmark inthe development of Costa R->^„ i uican labor unionism. Until 1943 workers
and labor leaders could not be sure of th*e response that union activ-ity would elicit from public authorities Em»1Ue
" ployers for their part,
were not obliged to deal «rt *hwit workers as a collectivity. No less
importantly, there were no rules tn h»i • • ,o delimit the boundaries of fair-
Play in labor management conflicts Hav-f™ n ,Sl ing no legal guarantees,
»orkers „ere at the complete dtsposai Qf their ^^
Guarantees supposediy attempted to change ^
snip between „orker and employer by recognizing ^^ rf^
to ace collectively in defense of its socioeconomic interests. Sot
»hile these constitutional amendments helped to balance power between
the factors of production, they have been most successful in replaci„g
the patrimonialism of private employers with the patrimonialism of the
state. This has significantly reduced both the ability of labor organ-
izations to act independently, and defend the socioeconomic interests
of the working classes.
The Social Guarantees, in addition to establishing a regulative
legal system that bound labor organizations to the Judgements of the
judicial branch of government, also created a Ministry of Labor that
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was given the responsibility not only of „y providing a variety of tech-
nical functions surh ac is legal advice and une.ploy.ent assistance, but
of overseeing all labor activities for rtcx , the ostensible purpose of en-
couraging labor organization. All thecp fse functions, while perhaps
aiding the working clasqpc: „8 sses m a material way, remove a vide variety
of worker related activities from the responsibility of labor unions,
and encourage workers to seek protection in tbe state system.
Like the Ministry of labor, the autonomous institutions that
-rged during and especially after World War „ „e re supposed to
Protect worki„g class lnterests fcy ^ ^
a degree of participation in a process bv whnVh *.Fiu y ic the state assumed ever
neater responsibility for directing the course of national develop-
ment. Nevertheless tbe functions of these bureaucratic mechanisms have
been disappointing to lahnr tt,-,-^ •g bo . This is as true in the Ministry of Labor
where labor organizations are more regulated than represented, as it
1= In the autonomous institutions where cooptation is mora common
than participation.
.The Ministry of jgbor_and_thg_Labor Organizat ions
The Ministry of Labor at once serves as the basic point of
integration for labor organizations, and the principle mechanism of
a patrimonial labor relations system. As an expression of the patri-
monial concept that labor's interests should be protected by the state,
the ministry's broad responsibilities include the protection of the
cultural, moral, and economic interests of the workers; establishing
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and maintaining a een P ra i ™, •g e l policy that will protect th ae worker and his
*. consciences 0£ unfQrtunate ^^^^ ^ ^
-
. natlonal pollcy ln ^ _ Qf ^^
- «<. of guaranteeing effective pubuc assistance; organi2ing ^
administering public servlces; coordinating
activtties ^^
welfare smices; and guaranteelng ^ ^^
lation. 1
Corresponding Co ics responsibllities the mlnlstry ^ divided
i«0 SU depertments. Three o f these depnrtments affect virtueiiy
every aspect of uw-^ent confiicts, most usuaUy> ^^
argue, tn a uay that is damaglng ^^ ^ ^^
of Labor Reiations is divided into two departments one of which pro-
cesses labor conflicts by receiving complaints and establishin8 con-
ciliation boards, the other of which accepts requests for Juridical
Personam and monitors the activities of previous!, existing
It is in this office that punitive action is taken against unions fail-
ing to complv with labor statutes, and in which iegal recognition can
be either delayed or refused.
Secondly, an Office of Inspection, divided into three depart-
ments, one for industry, coerce, and agricuiture, is responsible
for investigating working conditions and complaints of patron.l Labor
Code violations. Labor conflicts originating in this department
automatically follow a juridical route but labor leaders have argued
that complaints filed with the Office of Inspection rareiy reach the
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co-s.
„sually lnspectlons ar£ deUyed ^ inordtnateiy
P^ods of time that the matter u eventuauy ^
complaints, for instanr^ vce
,
have been concerned with patronal action
against labor leaders a t-*-Qm~«--attemptxng to form unions. All workers known
"^ j ° lned 3 Unl°n in «» of formation wiU be flred
- inspection will be undertaken fcy ^ ^^ ^^
any determination has heen made, the workers in qnestion „m have
found new employment, reducing the necessity o £ further ministry
action. I» other instances, workers will he allowed to keep their
employment with the stipulation that legal action win not he taken
against the company. At any rate, the fine that employers must pay
should a conflict actuaily reach the courts, is well worth the long
term benefits that can be derived by avoiding the establishment of
unions in a factory. Similarly, the same penalty does not prohibit
employers from violating the terms of individual worker contracts.
In this way, empioyers are able to bypass minimum salary
Thirdly, the Office of legal Assistance has the responsibility
of providing legal advice to workers dissatisfied with patronal con-
duct. While undoubtedly a valuable service, this free assistance has
had the effect of marginalizing unions from conflicts with employers.
At the same time labor leaders have criticized the legal office for
emphasizing the difficulty involved in carrying through successful
suits against employers accused of violating either the code or indi-
vidual worker contracts.' Its long range function has thus been to
encourage workers to look for protection in the state apparatus rather
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than in worker organizations. Its short term fxc n function has been to
discourage leeal art-i™8 " 10n a831nSt
e„c„„aglne acceptance
of what employers have to offer.
In addition to thpco ^^-p-?ese offices the ministry also maintains de-
partments that have such responsibilities as relntegrating
union activities, prot£ctlng ^^^ ^^^ ^
minors, ana providing assistance in the construction of worker recre-
ation facilities.
What is carious about the organization of the ministry is that
it is designed both to provide individual assistance, and to punish
or at feast discourage, collective action, while lt provides^
advice to individual workers through its Office of Legal Assistance,
it discourages collective action through its slow moving Office of
Inspection. While these delays encourage anti-union patronal action,
an Office of Planning and Employment assists workers in their search
for new employment. At the same time the Office of Labor Relations
can put into effect its punitive powers at any time. Recent examples
of this have been the difficulty that the CATD and CUT have had in
gaining juridical personality. When the CATD submitted its request
for legal recognition, the Office of Labor Relations forced several
changes in confederation statutes and electoral procedures. Similarly
the CUT, after having approved its statutes in its first general
assembly, was forced to change electoral procedures, and organizational
form. Despite several subsequent statutory changes, the ministry has
yet to grant the confederation legal status.
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I" addltlon to the af£ects Qf these forMi tiea>
Has also been accuse. o £ managing che lafcor ^ ^
special status on certain i,ux labor movents or by playing one confeoera.
tion against another. The rrTn ^CC D, for instance, has been considered
by the CUT to be the off-fr-fai „fxcx l government labor movement, owing to a
heavy government subsidv m,^ ^y that seems to increase when PLN Ministers
are appointed to office. The tatf. 1n ,CATD, as well, has accepted substantial
financial subsidies from the Center of Democratic Studies for Latin
— ica, a PLN subsidized training^ ^ Centrai ^
leaders. Through direct ministry assistance and CEDAL contributions
as well as contributions from other institutions such as the Episcopal
Church and international organizations, the democratic labor movement
has had a history of heavy financial dependence. Confederation leaders
assert that there is nothing unethical about receiving assistance from
organizations that support the principles and goals of the democratic
labor union movement,* but CUT officials on the other hand argue that
any type of financial assistance creates a bond of obligation that
cannot but affect union activities. The disproportionately low number
of collective conventions that have been signed by the democratic
organizations seems to add weight to the argument that labor-party
relations have not generally served the interests of the working
classes. The terms of this relationship will be discussed in a later
chapter. What deserves attention at this point, at least where the
democratic organizations are concerned, is a financial dependence that
is maintained both through direct party assistance and by party assis-
tance that proceeds via the Ministry of Labor.
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Apart from £inancial subsldles> thfi ministry ^ ^ ^
-o d-» t0 certain labor organl2atlons through a poacy ^ discrin_
inatio- that l8 put lnt0 effect during labor.manag£ment dtsputes
»p of Labor has the responsibllity o£ determintng uhich iabor
°r8aniZati°n Wl11 *™ *»
- ^tiate collective contracts
^ the event that two or more^ _ ^ ^ ^^
of production. On more than a f», „„few occasions, conflicts have arisen
between confederations regarding the negotiating rights to collective
conventions. fte CUT complains that whenever situations of thls tyPe
have arisen, the title has usually heen given to the democratic organ-
izations. On the other hand, there have heen several occasions in
which the ministry decided to include the COT in negotiations that
were claimed by the CCTD to fall strictly within its jurisdiction.'
inasmuch as the stability and effectiveness of a labor organization
greatly depends on its ability to defend the interests of its affili-
ates, the importance of ministry decisions in the realm of negotiating
rights should by no means be minimized. On more than one occasion,
confederations have lost important affiliates when collective conflicts
failed to produce results.
Beyond the conciliation process, the ministry also finds itself
in a critical position once strike movements have been initiated.
It should be noted that ministry officials are actively involved in a
vast majority of strike settlements, most particularly those occurring
in the banana zones. In its capacity as mediator between labor and
management, the ministry proposes its own solution to work stoppages;
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~ - - - «"ctly i inked to che Executlve po„er>
—3 « 0f£en lmpQsed Mntending^
* I*. dilutes during „hich competing uniQns teve ^_^
-— has on fluent occasions enCQUraged dlvision ^
'
to negotiate with one of the parties in the „inP c m alliance. The struggles
b""
€e
" *~> ^ —a Rica and the FOBA-FETRABA alli-
ance ln the 1950s serve as
.f ^^ ^^
-
carefully noted that ministry behavlor on these Qccasions ms jaMg_
lng to labor not only because it undermined coilective union action
at the bargaining table> but because the strlke
insufficient guarantees against subsequent anti-anion patronal activity.
Most labor leaders, both colonist and democratic, agree that
the activitias of the ministry hava baan damaging to labor's intarasts
Ona of tha raasons for this has bean tha anti-anion attitude of succes-
sive Ministers of Labor, whose appointments have been .ana not only
without the consent of lahn>- u. *bor, but upon recommendations submitted by
the Chambers of Commerce, Agriculture, and Industry. New administra-
tions, labor leaders contend
, consult with employer organizations be-
fore a Minister of Labor is appointed. For this reason both colon-
ists and democrats have argued that a conservative and bourgeois char-
acter has been bailt into the ministry. But perhaps mora fundamental
than this, as we shall see, are Labor Code provisions that tie labor
organizations to the state in a way that has been described by most
labor leaders as excessively regulatory, prohibitive, and patrimonial.'
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Nothing more clearly illustrate *,strates the patrimonial relationship
between labor and the ministry than the r.n iY n requirements that are placed
upon unions in the proce«?Q n f fcess of formation. A<? a j
'
s a Prelude to these re-
quirements the code dlvWes labor organ±2ations intQ
CuiUs are rhose worker organlzations formed ^ individuais ^ ^
•
— Pro.ess.on. Business unions are chose organl2atlons^ ^
individuals invoived in varlous professlons fa ^^ ^
area of production. Industrial „nlons _^ ^ ^
volved ta various professlons ln tM m factories ^^ ^
production of the same type
. Mixed unions are organizations of
individual who are involved in various professions in a variety of
industries
.
8
After establishing these categories, the code recogni.es the
right of employees as well as patrons to for. unions without previous
authorization, hut establishes a term of thirty days curing which
the organization must submit a request to the ministry for Juridical
personality. In order fnro iegai recognrtion to be granted the union
-»t .eet various requirements. First the union must submit a written
request to the Department of Labor Relations that contains such infor-
mation as a copy of the constituent acts of the organization, the
nu*er of members, the type of union, the na.es and identification
"bCrS
°
f 311 the rf the Junta Directive and how they were
elected. The request is then examined by the Director of the Office
of Syndicates and Cooperatives, who within the next fifteen days,
either recommends the inscrin^^ c Lmscrrptron of the union or reCurns £he request
t0 JUnta Dlre"1Va^ *~~ - electoral
or ^logical changes that must ^ before juridtcai
can be granted. 9
The statutes that each union is required to send to the , •n lu >ena ministry
must contain a wide ranw r>f cnge of information inciuding its objectives,
the obligations and riehts of If. „. tg its members, and the margin by which
the dunta Directive was erected. A11 unlon members mus£ be^
Ricans by birth or marriage with at least a five year residence in
Costa Rica. All Junta members must also be Costa Rican bv birth.
Other requirements include the conditions by which new members are
admitted to the union, and causes and proceedings established for
the expulsion of members. With regard to the latter point, the coda
requires at least a two-thirds majority for the expulsion of any mem-
ber, rhe union is also required to hold meetings regularly with the
participation of at least two-thirds of the organization. Further-
more the ministry is to be informed of the dates of all assembly meet-
ings. Information must be provided concerning the form of union dues
payment, the amount, the names of the union members responsible for
the collection of quotas, destination of expenditures, and a state-
ment of union financial accounts. The statutes must also describe the
causes and form of self-dissolution. Extensive requirements are placed
even upon the attributes of the General Assembly. Responsibilities
include the election of the Junta Directive, approval of statutory
reforms, approval of collective conventions, approval of quotas,
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declaration of st-T-Mr««,strikes, approval 0£ union mergers> ^^^^ ^
budgets and the authorizatinn en tatio of investments. What's more, the union
must submit reports of all these proceedings to the Office of Syndi-
cates and Cooperatives every six months, or upon request."
The Ministry of Uhor can withhold recognition or order the
dissolution of the union in the event that it inv 1 •lL Ln c lt: olves itself in
Political affairs or religious struggles, if it expresses or adopts
a position contrary to democratic principles, or if it involves it-
self in any activity that is not strictly associated with its socio-
economic interests: n fu Q>.rests. Other causes for withholding recognition or order-
ing an involuntary dissolution include- t-h* c k • •. he submission of false data
to the Department of Syndicates rs and Cooperatives; the use of union
funds for purposes that are not directly related to the improvement
of the economic well-being of union members; the personal use of
union money; the use of violence as a means of forcing entrance into
a union; and the encouragement of violence against people or property.
The Ministry of Labor also reserves the right to dissolve unions if
the members of the Junta Directive fail to comply with residency re-
quirements, if union membership dips below twenty, or if the union
does not comply with any of the regulations covering General Assembly
actions and responsibilities. 11
The overwhelming concensus in the labor community is that code
regulations tying labor organizations to the Ministry of Labor have
been used to delay and even prevent union organization. 12 Without
juridical personality employers are not bound by the force of law to
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negotiate with unions rn^r, what s more, workers belQngtng tQ„
unions are not protectPH M, , - •
^ 3ntl— P-ronal activity during collec _txve conflicts. If for inst fl non inscribed union asked the
C0U"S PermlSSi0n t0 *— ^—
•
«~ negotiations had been
legaX action. Juridlcal personaUty u ^ ^
ments for union formation other than a q^i J, ,nn simple declaration to the
Ministry of Labor.
The process that labor organizations must follow in uniting
Juridical personality Is complicated and difficult. The problems
-re sent to the ministry only to be returned with lists of organiza-
tional and procedural changes. A conservative Minister of Labor has
the capacity to delay legal recognition indefinitely if the ideologi-
cal orientation of the union, the Junta Directive, or the Secretary
General is considered to be questionable.- In another not untypical
case, the Union of Costa Rican Educators asked for recognition as a
business union, inasmuch as it grouped various occupations in the
field of education. The Ministry of Labor required the organization
to change its statutes to a guild association. Recognition was de-
layed several months. The problem that delays may cause for a union
in formation are serious Inasmuch as the protective provisions of
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the Labor Coda do not go Into operation until j urldlca]Ui J i i l personality
granted. Employers can u^ ^^^ , and have on reop3fpHpeated occasions, taken
An exaction o f the requirements that are placed upon union
formation and operation in Costa Rica and other countries in the
region prompted the Confederation of Centra! African Workers (CTCA)
to issue a puhiication stating that the Labor Codes of the Centra!
African nations, while containing a series of derations that
guarantee the liberal ri»l r r-„ght to organrze, also establish a series of
Proceedings for the recognition of those rights that imply controls
which contradict the principles of labor liberty. tte CTCA contended
that these proceedings discourage union organization when it is con-
sidered that the length of tl» that is retired to complete these
transactions, gives people of bad faith the opportunity to obstruct
the creation of labor unions. 1 *
The difficulties accompanying union organization have been
noted in a preceding chapter. But it might be worth noting that a
comparison of the requirements and guarantees that are applied to
unions information shows that, at least in theory, Costa Rican unions
are not as well protected as unions elsewhere in Central America,
The strongest criticism of these requirements is that labor leaders
are not protected by fuero sindical. The Guatemalan Labor Code for
instance, establishes that all members of a provisional executive
committee of a forming union cannot be fired. Article 198 of the
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Venezuelan Ley de Trabajo states that once a suffic ,ficient number of
"orkers have submitted a request for union recognition, all workersSW°8 P"iUOn «~ * - state from anti-unionH~ actions. From the date of ootlflcaMon „ £ ^
-worker can be fired or transferred. Neither can employers change
-king conditions without Just cause and the certification of aI*-
—to. Similarly, article 333 of the Panamanian labor Code
criers fuero aindical upon all „orkers lnvolved ^ ^ ^
a labor organization, accordingly, no „orker can be fired without
mat cause and authorization from the labor Tribunals. Once the
union has been inscribed, all union members enjoy fuero sindical for
the next three months. I n the cac P ftfse of delays in inscription, fuero
sindical is extended for the length of ntime required to correct
objections
.
Regarding labor leaders, article 223 of the Guatemalan labor
Code states that up to five members of a Junta direotiva enjoy fuero
sindical. Article 212 of the El Salvadorean labor Code indicates
that labor leaders that have complied with labor Code regulations
cannot he fired or transferred. Neither can employers alter working
conditions for up to one year after the term of leadership has
expired, except in the case of Just cause. Similarly article 516
of the Honduran labor Code states that members of a Junta direotiva
cannot be fired without sufficient notice for up to six months after
the term of office has expired. Article 198 of the Venezuelan labor
Code stipulates that members of a Junta directive cannot be fired
until three months after the term of office has expired.' 5
210
w- u not t0 say that the Ubor reiatims^ to
-«^ or South ^^^^ cQuntries
nor does it indicate that Labor Codes in th*6S l ese countries provide
blanket protection f^>-for unions in the process of fornatlon
. But what
it does indicate is that- -:at require.ents on onion organization in Costa
Rica provide employers urf i-n mwith many more legal opportunU . es £o initiate
anti-union campaigns. This state o£ clrc„ceSj „ ^^
Xeaders assert,- Has served to impede the normai development of the
labor movement.
As objectionable to onion readers as onion formation retire-
ments are tbe relations covering tbe activities of onions in oper-
ation. Two- thirds of the rank anrf f,i„n d frle union membership are required
to attend Cenera! Assembly meetings. Ministry of Labor fonctionaries
»ke occasional appearances at meetings to insure compliance with
isolation. This is seen to be an unnecessary control that serves
only to encourage anti-union patronal activity. It la extremely dlffi .
celt, labor ieaders have asserted, to convoke a general assembly even
"hen employers are not disposed to taking anti-onion actions; fre-
quently however, employers will find ways of diverting workers from
union responsibilities. Failure to fn™ Bf orm a quorum at assembly meetings
is punishable bv fines anH *e „»y t , d if occurring regularly, by the involuntary
dissolution of the union. With or without anti-onion patronal
activity the two-thirds regulation has generated interest at several
labor conferences where recordations have been made for an amend-
ment that would allow the participation of delegates rather than the
regular presence of rank and file members. 17
eve. six months, and provIsiMs pernitung speciai^S-ons of union fundlng; organization> ^ ^
the most objectionable restriction on unxon activity has been the
prohibition on political activity Herein 1 ,=7. lies a contradiction with
individual political rights On th* u ,. e one hand the constitution confers
upon each individual the r-foh*. cright of political discussion and activity
On the other hand union activity is strictlv ,y y confined by the Labor
Code to socioeconomic mtters . But lt u m ^ ^^ ^ ^
^ possihie at all, to divorce polltlcal actiQn interests that
accrue from experiences in the factorv t a-n t y. Individuals participate in
Politics in order to solve prohlems of a sociai and economic nature
If factor, and Uving conditions are to be considered sociai prohlems
if low salaries are to be considered economic prohiems, and if patrona!
persecution of labor leaders k f« Knis to be considered a political problem,
then to prohibit political activity is to deprive workers of their
democratic rights.
While failure to comply wlth thls prohlbitlon lncurs ^^
penalty of forced dissolution, all unions and federations have found
ways of maintaining at least a minimum degree of political activity.
The links between colonist labor organizations and the Popular Vanguard
Party, for instance, have heen well known ever since the party was
^instituted after the revolution, although the PVP does not advertise
the specific nature of this relationship in its publications. Simi-
larly the CCTD and its parent organization the CCTRN have had a long
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standing association with the PLN au, uAlth° U
^h the relationship has not
until recently been formalized, the partv h* ,y as integrated several unionleaders into its organizational apparatus TheHHd c . appointment of
BenJamIn Nu„e 2 as Mlnlscer Qf Labor ^ first p^
-n in the 1950s u . case , poInt
_ However> ^ accepting
Positions, labor leaders must rellnqulsh their posts ^ ubor
~„t. nis requlrement an important M
=al influence of labor. At thts polnt however> ^^ ^^
.hat the prohibition on polulcal acUvity been lnterpreted so
broadly that labor organl2atlons scarcely bother ^ veii their ^^^^
cal connections. Never thelec-o nT, mss, on more than one occasion, unions
in maintaining a cavalier attitude, have had to pay the prlce of^
dissolution. Per this reason the possibility of stricter enforcement
by the Ministry of Leber should under no circumstances be discounted.
The involuntery dissolution of the CTCR after the 1948 rebellion,
and the dissolution of the FUTRA after special investigations in the
1960s by the Ministry of Labor, are illustrations of this point.
Tripartite Ministry Organs
^^Jaci^^ Article 57 of the Constitution states:
To7/ T?
rk
!
r h3Ve right t0 a ml™ salary, fixed per-iodically by normal workday, that will insure well-b i2 a ddignified existence. Everything related to the fixing ofsaLr-
ia
6
: Irishes.1!™"^ °* * technical organistt'ST
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This provision became the basis for- ^x r the creation of the National
Salary Council in 1949
.
a technicai^
- the Ministry of Labor
, that ±s ^ ^
private sector minimum salaries.
^ Consejo fi xes salaries once . ^ ^
according t0 occupatiQnal categories ^ basis ^^
economic and social studies. ordfir £q ^ _ ^
-~ of working class socloecononIc condiUonSj Conse . o Mtes
-
of the Office of Salaries in the Ministry o£ Labor „^
^formation from private and^ ^ ^^
studies of yearly economic performance.
The collection of information, which forms the first stage o,
the salary fixing procass
, begins ^ ^
technical dependencies and representatives from the Cameras and cer-
tain state institutions. Wlth regard to state institutions, the or-
Sans of greatest interest to the Conse.o are the Central Ban, of Costa
Rica, the Office of Planning, the National Production Counsel, the
Ministry of Economy, Industry, and Commerce, the Ministry of
Agriculture, and the Ministry of Labor. This is undertaken in order
to obtain opinions on monetary, credit, and fiscal matters. The
technical office of the Consejo then effects visits to private bus-
inesses to obtain information on salaries that are paid and impor-
tantly to obtain information on the distribution of occupational cate-
gories in each factory. In addition to economic activity the technical
office collects information on population growth, increases in the
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economically active population, prlce lndfixes taxes, unemployment
rates, and cost of l iving increases
. special benefits, such as com-pany provided living accommodations food p.l, allowances, and general
services, are calculated along with salaries."
Of particular importance t-fc 0P is the prrce of minimum daily nutri-
tional requirements. Prices , ro ^ ,C6S deterffllned ^ accordance with the
nutritional needs of an urhan family of f ive members. The ministry
bases its calculations on the average price of basic commodities ^
commercial centers in both the q 3 n t -San Jose region and the provinces.
AH of this information is applied to salary scales in<*j-ciLy m seven sectors
of sconce activity: agriculture, mining, industry
, ^
Portion, storage and communicacion, ana services and general.
The i^rtance of the Information gathering stage of the salary
"Xing process shoold not he underestimated, statistics, polls, and
Personal interviews, constitute Che frame of reference on which Che
Consejo hases its decisions. In this connection, Che Consejos acui-
ties, chough perhaps exhaustive, possess important flaws that are as-
sociated with the fart ch^t- i^uc that labor representatives have no control over
the flow of information. I, mighc he unfair Co expect labor organiza-
tions, as impoverished as they are, Co establish independent infor-
mation gathering structures. On the other hand, the CUT has from
time to time issued publications explaining yearly inflation races
and price indexes as a way of pointing out the errors of the Consols
decerminations. These statistics are never taken into consideration.
The Consejo is thus largely dependent on the one hand, on information
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- by government agencies attachfid tQ executive branch
- « «- other hand, on the persMal testimony ^ ^
- - might be expected Co sutait Hased infom^ ^ ^
*- sources 0£ i„formation correspond ^ governmeM Md
P3tr0nal S6Ct0rS
" "» °"»«"— comittee> ghould not
be overlooked. Government representatives ^ ^ Conse . o
appose. hy the Executive po„er; so ^ directors ^ ^
tries whose consultations are a requlred part Qf ^
Coring process
. Slmllarly> patroMi ^^^^^^^ appointad
by the c™. ^ consejo soUclts a significant^ ^^
fflati0n
°
nly fr°m
"» ~* b« individual businessmen
Tbe structure of thls part rf th£ Conse . o , s Qperations ^
effects which have been crlUclzed by ubor representatives
_
20
wrst
Price indexes and lnflatlon rates are ^
the ectuel ievel. secondly, inasmuch as minlmum salaries ^
for each profession, employers will frequently lnflate ^^
of employees Involved in low paying occasions while deflating the
number of employees Involved in higher paying occupations. In this
way, patrons have been sMe ,n abl to pay large numhers of employees at a
rate that is below the actual value of their services.
After analyzing the information that has been pieced at Its
disposal, each sector of the tripartite Junta Directive submits a
salary proposal. Final decisions are sent to the Ministry of Labor
"here they are either accepted or returned with recommendations for
corrections. If the Consejo chooses not to amend its decision, the
proposal is sent back to the ministry, where it must be approved.
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The structure that is employed in rendering these decisions
Possesses certain attributes that create an i.pression of effective
sectoral or corporate representation. The Junta Directiva of the
Consejo is formed by nine members named by the Executive Power. The
state, business, and labor are represented by three members each, along
with one substitute for each sector. The members of the junta are
chosen by the Ministry of Labor fro, a list of ten candidates sub-
mitted by patronal associations and labor organizations. Fro, this
list the ministry can choose any three. If nominees are not submitted,
the ministry enjoys the prerogative of freely choosing patronal and
labor representatives. Each delegate remains in office for a period
of four years and can be reelected indefinitely. Importantly any
member from either the patronal or labor sectors can be removed from
the Consejo if the association or union that is being represented
submits a statement of no-confidence. The same policy applies to the
representatives of the state. Replacements are made on the same basis
as appointments to the original junta. 21
With respect to the appointment of the Junta Directiva, the
policy of recall would seem to insure effective labor representation.
In fact, unlike other tripartite organs, this power might be seen to
have effectively cancelled out the possibility of cooptation. How-
ever, there are two points associated with the selection process that
should not be overlooked. The first is that labor organizations do
not have complete control over the nomination process. Representa-
tives are selected from a list of ten candidates. When it is
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considered that each confederation, and £or that^^^
independent unions and federations, submit lists of candidates, the
Pool from which che mlnistry selects representatives Mn reach into
the hundreds. No less importantly, the ministry is not required to
distribute its selections among the major labor groupings. If the
ministry was so disposed, the entire labor sector of the Consols
directive body could be selected from one or two confederations. In
this way the possibility of nominating troublesome representatives
from the more combative labor groupings can be avoided. Or even more
likely, discriminatory nominations might be used as a form of payment
for political support. Similarly, regulations covering the replace-
ment of labor representatives, in the case of recall, multiply the
ministries discretional powers inasmuch as hundreds of names, from
a variety of labor groupings, would be submitted for one vacancy.
This problem has not escaped the criticism of Consejo labor
representatives who claim that nomination regulations are calculated
to give the executive office wide discretional powers. Nevertheless,
the distribution of Consejo labor representation, at least in the last
ten years, has been well balanced. Even so, all labor representatives,
regardless of union affiliation, have been equally critical of Consejo
policy
.
Without doubt the greatest impediment to effective labor repre-
sentation in salary determinations is the distribution of forces in
the Junta Directiva. At least since 1974 the Consejo Nacional de
'
Salarios has essentially been a bipartite institution composed of
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government and patronal sectors. Every decision has been the result
of a convergence of government and patronal opinions, in which labor
has been outnumbered by a vote of 6 to 3.
In November of 1974 the Consejo fixed minimum salary increases
for 1975 at ten percent. Prices for 1974 had increased over seven-
teen percent. In response to this determination Rodrigo Paniagua
Paniagua of the CGT, Luis Guillermo Oreamuno, Oreamuno of the CCTD,
Alsimiro Herrera Torres of the CTC
, and Juan Rafael Espinoza Esquivel
of the ANEP, withheld their votes.- The explanation of their absten-
tion was made in the following terms:
We wish to present to you, in a formal manner, and in order tocomply with legal requirements, our dissatisfaction with thesalary settings established by a majority of the patronal andstate representatives in the organ of which we form a part. 2
3
Labor representatives that year had proposed a salary increase of be-
tween thirty percent, for low income workers, and ten percent for
higher paid workers.
In 19 75, Paniagua, Oreamuno, Herrara, and Espinoza abstained
once again, complaining that for all intents and purposes, salaries
were established by the majority formed by patronal and government
representatives. Again in 1976 Oreamuno, speaking for the entire
worker delegation, cast a negative vote. The labor delegation that
year proposed an increase of between 20 and 40 percent; however, the
Consejo approved a salary increase of between 8 and 13 percent. 21*
Oreamuno contended that it was the feeling of the delegation that
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mini™ series Bere being fixed exciusiveiy ^ government ^^
al representees. The consistent coincidence of opinion between
these two sectors, Oreamuno argued, had Mde a Joke of „„rter partlcl .
pation. Similarly ln 1977 the „orker
^
of a govern^ent-patronal al li ance. Their action „as explsined in
the following terms:
goods and services-especially those of primary necessity!-
Repeating their dissatisfaction with the distribution of forces in
the Consejo, the labor delegation stated that:
existeHetweS
°Ut
^ coincide— opinion that haveisted be een the representatives of the state and the patronalsector in every aspect of our labor in the Consejo de Salaries andin the general settings in which we have participated; it is forthis reason that our proposals, as representatives of the workershave crystalrzed only minimally, and the immense majority ™ thesedecrsrons have been rejected without justifiable motives! 26
For the 1978 term, labor representatives had proposed a salary increase
ranging from thirty percent for low income workers, to fifteen per-
cent for higher income workers. The Consejo approved an increase of
between 8 and 14 percent.
Frequently, when government and patronal opinions do not corre-
spond, each sector submits a different salary proposal. In these cases,
government representatives find themselves in a key decision-
making position. Labor representatives have complained that government
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representatives, aftet heating patronal and labor^
"ill present a figure somewhere between that win USUally be approved
by the patronal sector. A typical decision would involve a labor
proposal of eighteen percent. Business will record ten percent.
The government delegation will suggest twelve percent. Forced to
choose between the lesser of two evils, labor representatives will
support the government proposal. After salaries had been fixed for
1979, for instance, labor representative Alsimiro Herrera Torres made
the following statement of labor's position:
In light of the fact that the propositions of the workers didnot count on the support of the other represented sectors inthe Consejo and upon having all our proposals instantly re-jected, not with the idea of solving in full the whole problemof low working class incomes, but with a view to par tl/solvingthe existing high cost of living, that has a tendency to increase^ 7 «-* u^uutiiv. y lu l r p
the
S
Fxr
r
• p
POSiti°n
°
f ^ MlniSt6r ° f Labor
'
-presentingE ecutive Power, not precisely because it would solve theproblem of low worker incomes, but so that salaries would not
remain frozen for 1979. 2
7
The 1980 and 1981 Consejo decisions evoked the same response
from labor representatives. After the 1980 salaries had been fixed
Juan Rafael Soils Barboza of the CGT, the director of the labor dele-
gation, stated that the cost of living was rising faster than salar-
ies. Despite salary increases, workers were becoming increasingly
impoverished. Inasmuch as patronal proposals were seen to be more
ridiculous than state proposals, the labor delegation was compelled
to accept the lesser of two evils and accept the proposal submitted
by the Minister of Labor. The inflation rate for that year was mea-
sured at eighteen percent, but the Consejo decreed a salary increase
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of between 10 and 12 Derrpnt- tu„p cent. The next year Herrera Torres abstained
when the labor proposal of a 30 to 40 percent salary increase was
rejected. The labor delegation once again issued a potest of the
govern.ent-patronal recordation, which in this case a.ounted to a
salary increase of between 11.5 and 12.5 percent. 28
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TABLE 19
REAL MINIMUM SALARIES FOR A SELECT GROUP OF ACTIVITIESACCORDING TO ANNUAL GEOMETRIC RATES OF INCREASE
1954-1964
Activity 9^
UP
-°
f Salaries Geometric RateSalaries in Colones of Increase
1954 1964 1954-1964
Newspaper printing low 7 .08 8 .58 1 .94
Agriculture - coffee low 7 .37 7 .96 0 .78
Mining low 7 .87 10 .61 3 .03
Sawmilling low 8 .26 9 .36 1 .26
Construction low 8 65 9 .99 1 .45
Agriculture - coffee high 9 83 10 61 0 .77
Mining high 11. 01 14 67 2 .91
Agriculture - bananas all 13. 37 12. 48 -0 69
Sawmilling high 13. 77 13. 73 -0 03
Construction high 14. 16 17. 17 1. 95
Newspaper printing high 26. 75 28. 09 0. 49
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TABLE 20
REAL MINIMUM SALARIES FOR A SELECT GROUP OF ACTIVITIESACCORDING TO ANNUAL GEOMETRIC RATE OF INCREASE 30
1964-1974
flc l iv i ty
Group of
Salaries
Real Salaries
in Colones
Geometric Rate
of Increase
1964 1972 1974 1964 -1972 1964-1974
Textile industry low 9 .44 11.91 12 .48 2 .94 2.83
Agriculture - coffee low xu 10.78 11 . 30 0 .64 1.00
Newspaper printing low 11 .05 13.08 13 .10 ?fa 1 7 0
Sawmilling low 12 .05 13.84 13 .87 1 .75 1.42
Textile industry high 12 .05 14.42 14 46 2 .27 1.84
Construction low 12 86 14.92 14 40 1 .88 1.14
Mining low 13 66 15.88 15 33 1 .90 1.16
Agriculture - coffee high 13 66 14.38 15 05 0 .64 0.97
Agriculture - banana all 16. 07 17.39 16. 14 0 .99 0.04
Sawmilling high 17. 68 19.48 18. 06 1 22 0.21
Mining high 18. 88 20.23 18. 78 0 87 -0.05
Construction high 22. 10 23.83 23. 34 0. 95 0.55
Newspaper printing high 36. 16 35.45 28. 96 -0. 25 -2.20
224
CO
w
h-J
i—
1
O
CM
w
a
o
z
s
o
QW
s
o
CO
PS
H
CO2O
u
O
X
wQ
z
w
cj
(—
I
OS
o
o
rH
II
•<r
NO
ON
CO
pq
ON
co
ON
CN
ON
on
O
ON
ON
SO
ON
00
NO
ON
NO
ON
vO
NO
ON
NO
ON
ON
no
m
rH
NO
ON
00
oo
00
ON
en
CN
CN
oo
o
NO
co x
u a)
CU T3
C (3
CU MO
1
—
t
CN
o 00 CO
oo I—
1
CN rH NO
CN CN rH
CN 00 CN
CO CN
•O On oo
<?\ NO
i
—
1
i—
1
rH
CN ON
*<T en 00
r*H ^3" ON
CN rH
<H r— rH
rH
CN NO
^3" U0
CN rH o
t-H rH rH
o CNO NO O
o CO
CN rH o
rH rH rH
NO o
ON
00 rH
rH o O
rH 1
—
1
rH
O CN rH
rH 00
O rHH o O
rH rH rH
1
—
1
en CN
en i—
1
CO rH
o o O
rH pH rH
ON CO <t
ON rH
ON rH
ON O ON
rH
NO CN
ro rH '
ON O NO
ON O ON
rH
O NO o
NO CN
00
ON
o
o
oo
ON
CN
NO
m
rH
CN
ON
ON
oo
NO
o
co
CN
NO
ON
00
00
CO
oo
o
o
oo
NO
o
NO
CO
o
ON
ON
o
o
o
CO
o
o
o o o o
o o o o
o o o Oo o o o
rH rH rH rH
00
00 c 1 CO
c •H rH
•H X. QJ o
TJ co +J u
O 3 o CO -
O o rH •H CO
Pm a CJ s rH
225
226
TABLE 23
MINIMUM SALARIES 1952-1980 3
3
Period 52-54
10% or less increase
Period 54-56
10% or less increase
Period 56-57
Salary freeze
Period 57-58
10% or less increase
Period 58-60
Over 16% increase
Period 60-62
Salary freeze
Period 62-64
11% to 15% increase
Period 64-66
11% to 15% increase
Period 66-68
Salary freeze
Period 68-70
10% or less increase
Period 70-72
10% or less
Period 72-74
7 1/2% to 15% increa:
Ap. 74 a Dec. 74 10% to 41% increase
Period 1975 9% to 11% increase
Period 1976 8% to 18% increase
Period 1977 8% to 13% increase
Period 1978 8% to 14%
Period 1979 5.8% to 12% increase
Period 1980 10% to 12% increase
Ap. 80 a Dec. 80 8%, 9% and 10%
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Despite labor delegation assertions of progressively increas-
ing worker impoverishment, salary increases approved by the Consejo
have generally corresponded to increases in the price of basic com-
modities. Real salaries for the ten year period between 1954 and
1964 increased 1.2 percent. Between 1964 and 1967 the cost of basic
comities such as food, clothing, and housing had decreased slightly.
Roughly during the same time period, the Consejo maintained a freeze
on salaries. An inflationary trend thereafter was accompanied by
corresponding salary increases Tn rh* -y , i the ten year period between 1964
and 1974 real salaries had increased 0.8 percent.
The period between 1976 and 1980 showed progressively decreas-
ing gains in purchasing power. Cost of living increases between the
end of 1976 and the end of 1977 were registered at 4.2 percent and
6.0 percent respectively. Salaries during that time were increased
by between 8 and 13 percent, and 8 percent and 14 percent. However
this increase, despite a mid year Consejo readjustment in 1980, was
partially offset by a nine percent cost of living increase in 1979
and an eighteen percent cost of living increase in 1980. 3
4
While it would seem that the Consejo Nacional de Salaries has
fulfilled its responsibility of providing the working classes with
the means for acquiring at least basic necessities, its decisions
clearly do not count on worker approval. In order to facilitate a
more effective labor representation, several suggestions have been
recommended. Most importantly, fundamental changes are needed in the
organization of the Junta Directiva. Inasmuch as there has been a
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Pronounced coincidence between phonal and government representatives,
labor delegates have expressed the view that government and patronal
representation ought to be reduced to two, or government officials
should be allowed to participate without vote, in an advisory capacity.
Secondly, changes should be made in methods of appointment
that would give labor organizations complete freedom to name delegates.
Similarly the Ministry of Labor should be required to appoint pre-
ferred labor organization candidates in the event that a Consejo mem-
ber resigns, or is recalled. At the same time the Ministry should be
required to distribute nominations among the largest labor organiza-
tions. This applies also to the appointment of substitutes. Labor
leaders have complained that in the event of a recall or resignation,
there is no guarantee that the ministry will fill the vacancy with a
labor representative from the same organization.
Thirdly, the Consejo should be more independent of Executive
Power. Besides exerting influence over the appointment of labor repre-
sentatives, technical staffs responsible for directing polls, soliciting
information, and conducting interviews, are all dependencies of the
Ministry of Labor. It might be pointed out that every institution
that conducts statistical research, whether public or private, seems
to produce different data. How inflation rates are calculated has an
important effect on Consejo determinations.
Fourthly, labor delegates have complained that the Consejo
lacks adequate technical machinery. They argue that regional offices
should be established for collecting data and implementing salary
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regulations. The first- f„„„*.-!st function is important inasmuch as^
ties are more expansive outside of the San Jose region, „hlle the
second function is important inasmuch as a large number of employer,
ignore ninimum salary regulations. With regard to this point, labor
delegates have expressed an interest in increasing the penalty for
minimum salarv offpnrioro t>y ende s. Present penalties make violations well
worthwhile. Furthprmnro t-u„ re o e, the Consejo, it has been argued, should be
given the power to recommend legal action. 35
Although perhaps not as critical to
working class interests as the Consejo Nacional de Salaries the im-
portance of the Security and Health Council should not be underesti-
mated. Article 66 of the Costa Rican Constitution states that
"all employers must adopt in their businesses the necessary means
for insuring safe, and hygienic working conditions ." 3 « In accordance
with this disposition the Consejo de Seguridad e Higiene was estab-
lished in 1957, like the Consejo Nacional de Salaries, as a dependency
of the Ministry of Labor.
The Consejo's function is to insure the highest possible degree
of physical, mental and social well-being of workers. In general
terms this involves reviewing cases of job-related injuries, protect-
ing laborers from risks resulting from poor working conditions, and
placing and maintaining workers in occupations that correspond to
their physical and psychological capacities. The specific activities
of the Consejo cover several areas including: 1) the promotion of
better occupational conditions, 2) the direction of studies and
230
speci.l investigations o£ uorker problems
_
3) ^^^^ rf^
lations guaranteeing occupational Health, 4) the tralnlng of^
cal personnel speciali7i no i n „x lzl g ln occupational health, 5) the diffusion
of methods of occupational safefv M m,i ty, 6) the preparation of machinery
guides indicating proDer w f0 H,8 P p sa ety equipment, 7) the proposition of laws
to the Ministry of Labor, 8) the proposition, to the Executive Power
of the duty-free importation of safety equipment, 9) the organic
tion of safety commissions in each centPr of an e production and 10) the
direction of studies concerning occupational safety.
To help fulfill these functlons the Conse . o somet . mes Mpioys
security commissions, composed of an equa l number of workers and em-
ployers, to conduct personel interviews end inspections of occupational
conditions, in order to uncover the causes of occupational injuries.
The Consejo also uses the Office of Health in the Ministry of Leber
to obtein additional infection on questions of occupational safety
and heelth. In feet, all the Consejo's operetions end finences ere
dependent on the Ministry of Leber, elthough opinions ere frequently
requested from outside sources such es the College of Doctors, or
engineering associations. 37
The most serious impediment to effective labor representation
on the Consejo has been the composition of its directive body.
Decisions are essentially made by state authorities, appointed either
directly by the Executive Power or by the directors of the autonomous
institutions, who owe their appointments to the Executive Power.
In the law that created the Consejo, the Junta Directiva was formed
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by eight Mbers. Two members „ere appolnced fcy ^^
"ve Power and included one representative from the Ministry of Laoor
and one representative from the Ministry of Health. Two other repre-
sentatives were appointed by the Institute Nacional de Seguros
(Nationai Security Institute) and the Caja Costarricense de Seguro
Social. The other four representatives included two employers and
two workers
.
38
Essentially, this distribution conferred upon the state a repre-
sentation of four. Each institution in the state sector certainly has
some for, of interest in questions of occupational safety. The autono-
mous institutions, for instance, are responsible for distributing pay-
ments to incapacitated workers. The interest of the Ministry of Labor
stems from regulations covering occupational risks that appear in the
Labor Code. At the same time, the Ministry of Public Health is respon-
sible for elaborating hygienic conditions that are considered to be
inuurious. Nevertheless, questions associated with occupational safety
and hygiene most properly fall within the responsibility of workers,
employers, medical, and technical officials. Outside institutions
of the latter type, such as the College of Doctors and engineering
organizations, or for that matter the Ministry of Health ought to be
used only in an advisory capacity.
Despite this state of circumstances the structure of the Junta
Directiva was subsequently reformed in a way that conferred even
greater representation upon state institutions. The Consejo's direc-
tive body is currently formed by seven members. Two representatives
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Including one from the Minisfrv „ft y of Ubor-who presides over the junta-
and one from the Ministry of Health, are appointed by the Executive
Power. The autonomous institutions are represented by one delegate
from the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, and one delegate from
the Instituto Nacional de Seguros 39 FmT,i~s . Employers are represented by
two delegates but labor's representation has been cut to one.
discretional authority of the Executive Power in this struc-
ture is enhanced by regulations covering the appointment of delegates.
As in the Consejo Nacional oe Salaries, patronal and labor representa-
tives are selected by the Executive Power on the basis of a list of
nominees, reaching into the thousands, that are submitted by labor
organizations at the end of each term of office. Appointments can
be made liberally without regard to union size or ideological orienta-
tion. With regard to the latter point, the CUT has never been repre-
sented on the Consejo, even though it is the largest labor organiza-
tion in the country. In addition to these regulations, union organiza-
tions that are represented in the Consejo, do not have the preroga-
tive of recall, as they do in the Consejo Nacional de Salaries.
In the present Consejo Junta Directiva the distribution of
sectoral power has not worked against labor interests. All members
are protection-oriented; however the most usual state of circumstances,
is a confluence of interests between government and patronal represen-
tatives. Employers, labor delegates have claimed, are not usually
interested in buying machinery with expensive protective devices. At
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the same time government
, which coUects taxes ^ importatiQn
of this machinery, has no strong desirg fcQ
The structure of participation and the method of selecting
sector delegates place the Consejo well within the domain of the execu-
tive authority. Even so
, these connections ^
by the organs which are used to enforce safety regulations. All ot-
ters of this type are the responsibility of the Departs of Inspec-
tions division of the Ministry of Labor. This circumstance has
the effect of conferring upon the ministry a function which ought to
be the responsibility of labor organizations. Problems associated
with occupational conditions, rather than enjoining labor organiza-
tions, are taken directly to the ministry. Matters that ought to
involve employers and labor organizations then become part of tri-
partite discussions that involve a heavy government participation.
The function of the Department of Inspections has been criti-
cized by labor organizations not only because of the dependence it
establishes between workers and the Ministry of Labor, but because of
the procedural guidelines that must be followed in bringing suits
against employers. It was mentioned in an earlier chapter that vio-
lations of the Labor Code usually follow a juridical route. Inasmuch
as Consejo determinations become part of labor legislation, violations
of safety regulations are brought before the labor courts. Apart
from the fact that this involves lengthy legal procedures, complaints
against employers are often lost in the maze of special investigations
that attend worker complaints. Furthermore, employers can use various
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-sure* such as threats of flrlng t „ dlssuade^ ^^
action. 0„a labor leader complained that violations of the code
never reach the courts. h0
A no less serious problem with the structure of the Consejo
is its heavy dependence on the Ministry of labor. All proposals must
be approved by the ministry and the executive authority. Many tlmes
the dunta Directiva has submitted propositions only to have them dras-
tically reformed after examination by the Executive Power. The recent
restructuring of the Consejo's directive body, having been made despite
Consejo disapproval, shows that what Is sent into the decision-maKing
machinery and what comes out are two different things.
Even with regard to regulations that have already been approved,
the likelihood of enforcement depends on the disposition of the Minis-
ter of Labor. Labor inspectors, for instance, may submit a report to
the Minister Indicating that a business ought to be penalized for not
having complied with safety regulations. During the subsequent appeal,
the Minister may decide that the factory was in fact conforming to
safety code regulations.
Neither is there any guarantee that the Ministry will accept
the testimony of the Department of Inspections. In a typical case
that occurred in 1981, inspectors attached to the Consejo visited the
construction site of a branch office of one of the state banks. A
report was submitted to the Junta Directiva stating that several
safety regulations were being violated. The Consejo recommended a
stop in construction. The proposal was sent to the Ministry of Labor
and promptly rejected. 1* 1
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The relationship between labor organizations and autonomous in-
stitutions can be viewed as an important measure by which labor has
been allowed to i„f lue„ce the of^ inas _
-oh as the dramatic inorease in the size o f the Costa Pican state
sinoe World War 1! has corresponded to a dramatic increase in state
responsibility for developmental programs, labor representation in
Public institutions has come to be no !ess important than representa-
tion in political institutions. Several of these institutions do or
have established a greater or lesser degree of labor representation.
^^^E^iL^Desarr^ ne Popular Bank ^
Development is an autonomous institution that was created in 1969.
Us objectives have been to protect the economic well-being of workers
and small scale producers, through the encouragement of savings and
the satisfaction of credit needs. In specific terms this involves
providing loans that would be used to: liberate the worker from debt;
purchase tools and other working equipment; buy or repair popular
housing facilities; finance educational costs, finance cooperative
operations; solve emergency social problems; finance community develop-
ment programs; and permit the purchase of basic consumer products."
Funds are formed by tripartite contributions. Employers, as well as
state institutions contribute one-half percent of their profits or
renumerations, while workers contribute one percent of their monthly
salary
.
236
Inasmuch as it U an organ ^ ^ ^^ ^
economic interests of small stale producers and workers the , , ,u u K , original
contituent acts o f the Banco Popular placed the responslbiUty
„f
direction largely in the hands of the working classes. The original
Junta Directive was formed by nine meters. Two delegates, represen-
ting the national banking system were chosen hy the Banco Central and
the Banking Coordination Commission. One delegate represented the
municipalities. delegates represented ^ Association
for Community Develooment- a^ e , ,iopment, and four delegates represented labor.
Beneath the national Junta Directiva, five regional Juntas Directives
were formed hy one representative from the state hanking system, one
representative from the municipalities, one representative from the
regional Association for Community Development, and two worker repre-
sentatives, m addition to regional directive Bodies, local conm,ittees
were formed by three worker representatives, one representative from
the Association for Local Development, and one representative named
by the regional Junta Directiva. 4 '*
In this structural scheme, the directive bodies of the regional
offices were given the responsibility of designating representatives
to both the national Junta Directiva and the local directive bodies.
The two worker delegates at the regional level as well as the dele-
gates of the Association for Community Development, and the delegates
of the municipalities were selected directly by the represented labor
organization or association. Delegates at the local level were
selected from lists of nominees submitted by the corresponding local
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orations or association. Wlth regard to the interna! organiza-U~ and functioning of the national dunta Directive, an Executive
Director was elected by a majority of six votes, two of „hlch „ere
reared to be from the labor sectoc. m addition, five members formed
a ouorum, two of which were required to he labor representatives.-
The original organization of the Banco Popular conferred upon
labor a much higher degree of representation than other tripartite
organise. Almost half of the national dunta Directive was composed
of labor representatives. Furthers the appoints of the Executive
Director as well as the approval of all bank decisions insured at
least a minimum degree of labor support for hank policy. Most im-
portantly however, labor delegates, unlike other tripartite organisms,
were named independently of the Executive Power. Owing to this form
of appointment, labor delegates were directly dependent on the organ-
ization they represented. This liberty insured a much more authentic
form of participation. Along with this disposition though, the original
constitutive law confined labor participation to those organizations
of a democratic orientation. Labor delegates had to be represented
either by the CCTD and the COCC. A whole sector of the labor move-
ment was thus prohibited from participation.
Apart from this restriction, the power of labor to affect deci-
sions in the Banco Popular was substantial, at least in the period
directly following its creation. Since 1969, however, several reforms
which will be discussed later in the chapter, changed both the struc-
ture and the methods of appointment to the Junta Directlva and have
reduced both the degree and quality of labor representation.
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The Caja was established in
early 1940s as part of the Christian-oriented reform package of
Dr. Calder6n Cuardia. The institute provideg ^
Pregnancy, invalidity, old age
, and involuntary unemployment
_ ft ^
shares some of the responsibility for problems associated^
age, the death of breadwinners, and funerals. Contributions, which
are derived from workers, employers, and the state, are regulated by
a directive body which, supposedly, functions independently of the
Executive Power. Upon establishment the Caja was directed by a tri-
partite junta composed of five members, along with four substitutes.
Three of these members, named directly by the Executive Power, repre-
sented the state sector. One member represented the patronal sector
and one member represented the labor sector. In all three sectors,
candidates were approved by the executive authority. 46
The problems associated with the original structure of the
Junta Directiva are clear. The executive authority, for all intents
and purposes, was given complete control of the selection process.
Furthermore, labor organizations had no control over the activities of
representatives that were chosen to participate in the junta. Never-
theless, two points should be kept in mind. First, and most impor-
tantly, the participation of labor prescribed by the Caja statutes,
minimal though it was, represented a considerable breakthrough in the
ability of labor to affect the activities of a major state institution,
when it is taken into consideration that labor organizations prior to
that time not only had no decision-making input, but no firm legal
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guarantees of their riohi- #-« *ght to function or even exist. Secondly, it
should be carefully noted, that the executive authority during^a
period of Costa Rican political development was used to support labor
interests. The appointment of nominees representing the Popular
Vanguard Party, and in an indirect way, the Confederation of Costa
Rican Workers, was sufficiently alarming to business interests to
cause an erosion in Calderon's conservative support." It might be
assumed therefore, from the political repercussions of communist in-
fluence in the Caja, that a confluence of interests had developed
between those delegates representing the state, and the one delegate
representing labor. This situation terminated in 1948 as a result
of the revolution.
After 1948 labor representation on the Caja was substantially
diminished owing to a combination of the removal of PVP state repre-
sentatives, who might be considered to be surrogate labor representa-
tives, and to structural changes in the institute's governing body.
In 1963, reforms in the Caja's statutes raised the number of members
on the Junta Directiva to seven. The state sector was composed of
two members, one of which had to be a Minister of Government, who
would preside over the Junta Directiva. The other five members in-
cluded a doctor, two representatives from the patronal sector, one
representative from the academic community, and one labor representa-
tive. 48 Another reform, instituted two years later, made the Minister
of Labor the President of the Junta Directiva. 4
9
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Consejo Nacional de Prodnminn tu„ m •a^roduccio . The National Production Council (COT)
was originally formed in 1944 in order to promote agricultural produc-
tion, and make basic foodstuffs such as beans, corn, and potatoes
available to the public at cheap pri ces . Owing to an overlapping of
functions between the Consejo, the Ministry of Agriculture, and the
Ministry of Economy, the CNP, by 1948, had proved to be a failure.
After the revolution the Consejo was reconstituted as the National
Production and Credit Council.
One of the responsibilities of the Consejo during this time
was to provide credit to small producers but because of its failure
to fulfill this function, the institution was reconstituted as the
Consejo Nacional de Produccion. In general terms the function of the
CNP was to encourage agricultural and fishing production, stabilize
the prices of basic foods, and establish a just equilibrium in the
relations between producers and consumers. In specific terms this
involved the purchase of basic foodstuffs and primary materials at
prices that were considered to be reasonable to the producer; the
acquisition of fertilizers and insecticides; the purchase of agricul-
tural machinery; the purchase or production of animal foodstuffs; and
the coordination of agricultural and fishing projects. The Consejo
has continued to fulfill these functions; but in 1977 the responsi-
bility of providing credit to small scale producers was resumed. 50
The participation of labor in the Consejo directive body dur-
ing this time was either non-existent or negligible. The power of
appointment was placed well within the domain of the Executive Power,
and there were no requirements on the participation of labor
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organizations. For much of its history, the Consejo could not have
been considered to be a tripartite organization. The Junta Directive
between 1948 and 1957, for instance, was formed by the Minister of
Economy, the Minister of Agriculture, the Minister of Labor, and the
President of the National Bank. Substitutes were named by the direc-
tive bodies of each ministry. 51
A legislative reform in 1956 officially established the Consejo
as an autonomous institution. In accordance with this reform, the
Junta Directiva was restructured to include five members. The repre-
sentative of the state was required to be a minister of government
while the rest of the directive body was formed by four persons who
possessed agricultural or economic experience and an ample understand-
ing of the functions that the Consejo was called upon to perform.
All of these representatives were named by the executive authority. 52
During much of this time labor representatives were appointed to the
Consejo's directive body, but importantly there were no legal disposi-
tions requiring tripartite representation.
Instituto Nacional De Aprendiz^P. The National Apprenticeship Insti-
tute (INA) was created in May 1955 as a decentralized, semi-autonomous
institution. Its function in general terms has been to contribute
to economic development and improved living conditions through the
creation of apprenticeship programs in factories and places of busi-
ness, the direction of studies concerning the scientific organization
of the work force, and the economic subsidization of technical
schools
.
5 3
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Upon its creation the INA was governed by a tripartite Junta
Directiva composed of seven members. Two members included the
Minister of Labor and the Minister of Education. Substitutes in both
cases were designated by the respective ministries. One delegate
represented the Office of Planning. One delegate represented one of
the autonomous institutions that financed the institute. One dele-
gate represented the National Technical School. Two other delegates
represented patronal and labor organizations. 54
The distribution of representation in this scheme did not in-
volve a high degree of labor participation inasmuch as state institu-
tions, either centralized or decentralized, were given a high degree
of representation. Furthermore the executive authority, as in all
other tripartite organs, was at liberty to choose labor delegates
from lists submitted by legally inscribed labor organizations. Apart
from this, however, the balance of sectoral representation would indi-
cate that state institutions controlled INA decision-making, and policy.
The structural characteristics of the INA's directive body
bear great similarity to all other tripartite organisms: a high degree
of state representation accompanied by state control over labor appoint-
ments. With regard to sectoral distribution, what ought to be empha-
sized is the frequency of Ministry of Labor participation. The Consejo
Nacional de Salarios and the Consejo de Seguridad e Higiene are adjuncts
of the Ministry of Labor. In the first case, the appointment of labor
delegates falls within the ministry's responsibilities. In the second
case, in addition to its power over the selection of labor delegates,
the ministry is responsible fQr bQth ^ ^^^^ ^ ^^^^^ ^
Consejo decisions. Where autonomous ins ti tutions are concerned
, ^
Ministry is given representation in the di rective body of all tripar-
tite organise except the Banco Popular. It would thus seem ^
the Ministry of Lahor has an important involvement, not only in those
questions concerning collective conflicts and labor organization,
but in almost all forms of activity that affect the working classes.
The importance of this state of circumstances derives fro, the fact
that the ministry is a dependency of the president. Inasmuch as the
executive personnel of the ministry are appointed by the president,
without the approval of labor organizations, its relationship with
labor is largely a reflection of the ideas and opinions of the presi-
dential administration. What also should be pointed out is the influ-
ence that the camaras have on the selection of ministers of govern-
ment. Patronal approval of presidential appointments to the Ministry
of Labor in fact has been a long standing source of criticism for
several labor organizations, both social democratic and marxist. 55
Tendency Toward Centralization
. While dozens of autonomous and semi-
autonomous institutions have been created since World War II, labor
participation has been confined to only the few that have been men-
tioned. And while the quality of this participation has never been
effective, the organizational and coordination problems caused by
the expansion of the state apparatus prompted several reforms result-
ing in a further dimunition of labor representation in each institu-
tion.
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°
£ theSe l^isiative reforms was Instituted in 1970.
Law no. 4646, commonly callad the 4-3 act, intended to solve the
problem of poor coordination among the autonomous institutions by
granting the majority political party the right to name three represen-
tatives to the Central Bank. The minority party was also given the
right to name three representatives, while the Executive Power was
responsible for appointing the director. The 4-3 law not only changed
the decision-making structure of the Central Bank, but eleven other
autonomous institutions as well, including the Consejo Nacional de
Produccion, the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, and the Institute
Nacional de Aprendizaje. Where these institutions were concerned,
directive bodies were reformed to include seven members. One delegate
was required to be a Minister of Government. Six other delegates were
required only to have an ample understanding of the activities of the
corresponding institution. In both cases, delegates were chosen by
the Executive Power. 55
The promulgation of the 4-3 law had an important effect on
labor representation. From that point the Executive Power was no
longer required to appoint labor delegates to the autonomous institu-
tions. The immediate effect on labor representation on the Consejo
Nacional de Produce!™ was not significant inasmuch as a previous
reform had accomplished the same objectives as the 4-3 law. However,
labor representation was removed in the Instituto Nacional de
Aprendizaje and the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social. Where INA
was concerned, and for that matter, all other institutions affected
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by the lav, law delegates »„„U Jrom tlme t0 ^ be
but importantly, this representation was net required t0 be constant
,
and in all cases, the pxph.h™ o *.ue ecutxve authorxty was in charge of authorizing
all appointments
.
in Practical terms, the 4. 3 law drastically affected the orien-
tation ef the directive bodies in the autonomous institutions. After
1970, there was a tremendous competition for leadership posts. In
1970, for instance, ninety-one appointments were made: fifty-two
from the PLN
,
and thirty-nine fro. the Unification Party. One month
before selections were made, over two thousand applications had been
submitted. This state of circumstances led to the criticism that the
autonomous institutions had become a mechanism for political patronage.
In addition to being an impractical and ad hoc solution to the problem
of bureaucratic waste, the system was accused of being a manifestation
of the commitment of Costa Rican statesmen to political corruption."
The centralization of the Central Bank and several autonomous
institutions began a process which was followed by an organizational
reform that profoundly affected the structure of participation and
method of delegate selection in the Banco Popular. In 1973 labor
representation was cut to three. Even more crucially, labor organi-
zations were deprived of their liberty to name delegates directly to
the Junta Directiva. From that point, all labor delegates were
selected by the executive authority from a list of five nominees.
Quorums were still set at five for banking policy and six for the
election of the Executive Director, but requirements governing mlni-
mun labor support for junta decisions were removed. 58
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In an equally profound reform, the Central Bank and twelve
autonomous Institution, were further centralized one year later hy
the Ley de Presidencies Ejecutivas (Executive Chairmanship Law).
Professionals at the Central Bank communicated their opposition to
the reform by stating that it exposed the country to the danger of
a unification of political and economic power. Autonomous institutions,
It was argued, had a technical, not a political function. The struc-
tural reform threatened the operations characteristic of autonomous
institutions by submitting each entity to the discretion of an Execu-
tive Power which might be more Interested in political matters than
technical matters. Furthermore, the Imposition of the ideas of a
small group of people was doubly dangerous when the high level of
public sector Involvement in developmental programs was taken into
consideration. 59
Where autonomous institutions were concerned, the Ley de
Presidencias Ejecutivas did not affect structures of participation
as much as it did independence of decision-making. The Executive
Directors of the affected institutions were still appointed by the
Council of Government while the other six members, also appointed by
the Consejo, were required only to have ample understanding of the
activities of the corresponding institution. However, the Executive
Directors of any of the affected institutions could be removed liber-
ally by the Council of Government. 60
This process of centralization provided occasion for several
criticisms. Alsimiro Herrera of the CTC stated that the Banco
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Popular had been placed in the hands nf M«n n o big economic interests. Luis
Agendo Gutierrez of the CCTB stated that the legislature was convert-
ing itself into a generator of Internal agitators, inasmuch as its
decisions were hased on the needs of powerful groups rather than the
working classes. In resnnnc^ t-« ji po se to the reduction of labor representa-
tion in the Banco Popular he stated:
I call to attention all Costa Rican labor leaders and rank and
urldicT
S
°
that We may remain attentive to this
naMon i ™Z
a8ai
V
St the juSt and human interests of the
Political^
The
-e?
nk t0day is a simP^ reflection ofp litical demagogue ry .
'
To say the very least, the autonomous institutions do not pro-
vide effective labor participation. Apart from the fact that there
are dozens of institutions that have never incorporated labor inter-
ests, the small level of representation that labor has had in the
public sector, has been reduced owing to a process of centralization
that was undertaken in 1970. In addition to the Consejo Nacional de
Salarios, and the Consejo de Seguridad e Higiene, labor organizations
have representatives in three tripartite organs: the Banco Popular,
the Consejo Nacional de Production, and the Instituto Nacional de
Aprendizaje. Where the INA and the CNP are concerned, this represen-
tation is not guaranteed. Furthermore, labor delegates in the CNP
have complained that the Junta Directiva is composed of large agricul-
tural producers who serve either as representatives of the state or
representatives of the patronal sector. 62 At the same time, decision-
making in all the autonomous institutions has been politicized through
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executive control over appointments. Owing to this control, labor
leaders have attested that there is no labor representation even in
those institutions that incorporate labor delegates inasmuch as labor
leaders who gain appoints are expected to represent the interests
of those who appoint them, not the union that recommended them. For
this reason labor delegates become divorced from the interests of the
working classes. If the decisions of the autonomous institutions have
had a positive affect on the working classes, it is clearly not be-
cause of direct working class pressure. 63
Nevertheless the lack of effective labor participation has
given labor leaders cause to assert that the autonomous institutions,
as well as the tripartite organs attached to the Ministry of Labor,
have developed a commercial orientation. In institutions such as the
Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social and the Institute Nacional de
Seguros this implies a reluctance to make distributive payments.
In the Consejo Nacional de Salarios this implies the constriction
of inflationary tendencies, and in the Consejo de Seguridad E Higiene
it implies the importation of cheap machinery that lacks safety
devices. Where the Consejo Nacional de Production is concerned it
involves private sector control over the price of basic foods, and
where the Instituto Nacional de Aprendizaje is concerned it means
state control over the character and the organization of the factors
of production. One labor leader who had participated on the direc-
tive bodies of several tripartite organs lamented that the autonomous
institutions, as well as the tripartite organs attached to the
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Ministry 0£ Labor
, are commercial organisns> ^^^^ ^ comBerctaiiy_
Winded people, „ho ap00lnt„cially_mlnded^ ^
making posts. 614
Concluding RpinarVc
There are several points o£ contact betKeen^ organlzations
and bureaucratic organs. First, and most importantly, Costa Klcan
labor legislation requires an intimate relatlonsblp between labor and
the Ministry of Labor. This relationship Is characterized by regula-
tion, control, and interference. Secondly the decisionmaking apparatus
in the Consejo Nacional de Salaries and the Consejo de Seguridad e
Higiene possesses structural properties precluding iabor from forcing
and effective counterweight to patronal and state representatives
"hose interests are most usually confluent. Furthermore, where the
Consejo de Seguridad e Higiene is concerned, policy formation, imple-
mentation, and enforcement are under the jurisdiction of the Ministry
of Labor.
The autonomous institutions on the other hand function without
effective labor representation. In those institutions that have inte-
grated labor representation, participation has been so confined as to
be ineffective. Furthermore, inasmuch as labor delegates are hand
picked by the Executive Power, participation on the autonomous insti-
tutions has been a means by which labor leaders have been divorced from
the labor movement and coopted by a government apparatus whose actions
are most usually governed by commercial interests.
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The failure of labor organisations to achieve an effective
representation in tripartite orga„i 2atio„s as Well as labor's inability
*> accomplish Labor Code reform that would provide both greater
liberty and .ore effective guarantees are attributable to a lack of
Political influence. This win be the subject of the next chapter
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CHAPTER VI
POLITICAL INTEGRATION
The structure of the Costa Rican labor relations system has
had several effects, It has impeded normal lahor development through
retirements on union formation that leave labor organizations vulner-
able to patronal attacks. It has placed labor organizations at a
tactical disadvantage through restrictions on union activity; and,
owing to these restrictions, it has subjected labor union leaders and
rank and file
.embers to physical violence. All these characteris-
tics come together in the process of collective conflict resolution
during which Labor Code dispositions first invoke the participation
of the Ministry of Labor and then activate the prohibitive mechanism
of judicial and public security authority. Each stage is accompanied
by an application of the power corresponding to the state agency that
is drawn into the conflict.
Inasmuch as this conflict resolution process is dictated by
the Labor Code, legal reform has been a basic goal of all Costa Rican
labor groups, ideological and tactical orientation notwithstanding.
Labor Code reforms have been recognized as a basic and necessary first
step in the execution of all labor organization functions intending
to protect the socioeconomic well-being of the working classes.
Several attempts have been made, through legislative action, to change
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the structure of iuridir^l inh0j ca integration; however, owing to a lack of
strong and sustained political influence, all these attests have
failed. The reasons for these legislative failures can he found hoth
in constitutional articles rPM rn inn ^x x ega d g the proper function of labor
organizations and the struct-.,™ n f * • •cture of participation in Costa Rica's major
political parties.
Prohibitions on Pol itical Activity
Owing to legal regulations, direct labor involvement in politi-
cal matters has always been a risky affair. Article 61 of the Consti-
tution states that:
patrons as well as workers may unionize liberally, for theT^^T^^^ -—ving economic/social
This disposition prohibits labor organizations from involvement in any
form of political action. Buttressing the prohibition, article 280
section a of the Labor Code states that:
At the request of the Ministry of Labor the Labor Tribunals willalways order the dissolution of unions, when it can be proved
tntv
^^ning in politico-electoral affairs, whenhey initiate religious struggles, or when they maintain
activities contrary to the democratic principles that are
established by the Constitution. 2
Owing to these dispositions, labor organizations have been
forced to cloak their contacts with political parties and risk the
possibility of involuntary dissolution, or remain on the sidelines
of political party determinations through the maintenance of informal
-tacts. The constriction of labor ^
affairs has placed labor at a ^^^^ dlsadvanta^
Code refers unions cannot effectively defend the interests of the
working classes; yet, the political influence that the accomplishment
of these reforms retires, ob liges unions to run the risk of involun-
tary dissolution. This contradiction has invoked a heavy criticise,
from various lahor leaders who view parties and unions as complimen-
tary structures. Eduardo Nunez Carro, President of the Costa Rican
Educators Union, expressed the prevailing opinion of labor leaders
when he stated that it is impossible to separate economic and politi-
cal activities. In a capitalistic system in which employers partici-
pate actively in politics, there is no reason why workers should be
marginalized. The relationship between the two has been seen to be
fundamental inasmuch as unions cannot achieve important social reforms
affecting the working classes, except through political activity.
With regard to this point Alvaro Jimenez Zavaleta, former Secretary
General of the National Railroad Union, stated that:
to deny the right of unions to analyse the platforms and pro-grams that are proposed by the diverse political parties thatparticipate in the electoral process in search of popular sup-port, and to make collective pronouncements that condition their
support or justify their repudiation, is to deny organized workersthe possibility of learning, becoming educated, and participatingin a subject of great importance in the development of Costa Ricandemocracy, that is necessarily one of the legitimate rights and
needs of social organizations."
What has confused and frustrated these and other labor leaders
is the prevailing expectation that labor organizations should remain
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ind^t of either^ or organi.tions, be they parues
or churches, that have dedicated Selves Co the same ends. Wlth.
out strong and constant contact, and without the authentic participa-
tion of popular organUations such as iahor unions, the political part,
that puts itself forth as a representative organ of popular needs and
desires, cannot hut fail to fulfill lta function
. „uh regard ^
this point Guido Nunez Roman, Secretary General of the Union of Elec-
trical and Telecommunication Workers, asserted that prohihitions on
political activity are an audacious attest to confine labor activi-
ties. An authentic participation however, would take the form of a
workers party or a party with real social democratic postulates.
All too frequently, Nunez contended, those who called themselves social
democrats, have had no genuine interest in the problems of the popu-
lar classes
.
5
The most steadfast supporter of labor's legislative objectives
has been the National Vanguard Party, Costa Rica's communist party.
The PVP had its origins in the labor struggles against the United
Fruit Company in the 1930s. Contacts between the party and labor
organizations have always been close, although after the revolution
the PVP was involuntarily dissolved by the military junta for having
formed the Block of Victoria with Calderotl Guardia's National Republi-
can Party. The renovated PVP scarcely hides its association with the
CUT, and for that reason, both run the constant risk of being pro-
scribed by the Legislative Assembly or the Labor Tribunals. But apart
from this danger, the PVP bears a form of hierarchical organization
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that is calculated to stiffloe dissension emanating from its base or-
ganizations. This state of circumstances has caused aiam among
several labor leaders, esPecially of social democratic and Christian
orientations, „ho assert that the integration of labor organizations
into the party apparatus has been characterized more by control than
representation.
Labor and the PVP Structure
The PVP is divided into five ascending structures: Cells;
Assemblies, and Zone Committees; Assemblies and Regional Committees;
Central Committee anH pn ii(-!„.i nd Political Commission; and the National Congress.
As the basic structural organ, the party Cell is organized
primarily in factories and is formed by a minimum of three people.
Regional Committees determine where they will be created, how they
will be divided, when they will have their meetings, and what their
principal tasks should be. The chief function of the Cell is to or-
ganize, mobilize, and orient the masses-or more concretely, the
factory workers-according to the political party line. Specifically
this involves keeping workers informed about problems that affect
them; recruiting militants and affiliates; directing the activities
of the party militants, and the labor organizations within their
radius in accordance with the directions of superior party organisms;
and maintaining an ideological struggle against opportunists and reac-
tionaries. 6 According to this description of functions, it may be
supposed that the purpose of the Cell is to organize unions in
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_loni2ed factorles
, ln£iltrate and capture iabor organi2ations
that have already been formed, and to direct activlties ^
with Instructions from higher authorities.
The second organizational structure, the Zonal organizations,
encompass all the hase Cells according t0 geographic or institutional
sector. Zonal Assemblies are formed either by all the party militants,
or by delegates, according to the Judgement of higher authorities.
The Assemblies have the responsibility of naming a Zonal Committee
composed of between five and eleven members, whose function is to dir-
ect party activities within its Jurisdiction, in accordance with the
Plans and orientations of the Regional Committee. The committee also
decides which militants are to be assigned to which areas, and analyses
the activities of each militant. 7
The third organizational structure, the Regional Assembly, is
formed by delegates from the Zonal Committees. Its functions are
to elaborate the general lines of regional work; approve or disapprove
the reports of the regional committee; elect the Regional Committee
every two years; fill vacant posts or remove members from posts when
they have failed to fulfill their obligations; name candidates to
elective offices within its jurisdiction; and to insure the correct
application of policies in lower levels of the party organization.
Above the Regional Assembly is the Regional Committee, an organ com-
posed of fifteen or less members whose principal responsibility is
to name an Executive Commission which includes an Executive Secretary
and officers in charge of education and union organization. Other
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functions include: exercising control over the fulfilment of party
Policy and insuring the correct application of policy that is fixed
by higher organs; directing the Zonal Committees and Cells within their
jurisdiction; controlling the functions of lower party organs; direct-
ing the organizational work of lower organs; and combatting common
ideologies foreign to Marxism-Leninism. The Secretary General of the
Executive Commission has the responsibility of insuring the smooth
functioning of the Regional Committee and the coordination of differ-
ent auxiliary commissions. 8 It would be worthwhile to note at this
point that an important function of the Zonal and Regional organiza-
tions is to direct and discipline local party militants. The mili-
tants, by their part, constitute the basic point of contact between
the PVP and its client labor organizations.
The highest organ of the PVP is the National Congress, a deliber-
ative body composed of members of the Central Committee, and dele-
gates who are elected by the Regional Committees and Assemblies.
The National Congress has four functions: to understand and discuss
the reports of the Central Committee; to approve and modify the pro-
gram and statutes of the party; to establish the general political line
of the party; and to elect the Central Committee and name Control
Commissions
.
The directive body of the Congress is the Central Committee.
In addition to electing a Secretary General, the Committee elects a
Political Commission whose principal task is ensuring the correct
application of the party line. In order to accomplish this, the
262
ng
Political Commission is rpsnnnQ^u *espo sible for appointing Auxiliary and
Policy Control Commissions. 9
The combination of the Secretaries of the Central Committee,
and Secretary and Sub-Secretary General constitute the Executive
Secretariat whose principal responsibilities include: executing the
resolutions of the Political Commission; controlling and coordinati
the Auxiliary Commissions; approving or disapproving appointments made
by the Regional and Zonal Committees; and coordinating and controlling
the operations of the Regional Committees. 10
What exists in this organizational scheme is a hierarchical
structure that concentrates power in the higher levels of party organ-
ization. The lower organs in the party, such as the Cells and Zonal
Committees, are given the task of organizing and controlling base
organizations, or more concretely, labor organizations. The Regional
Committees in turn have the responsibility of coordinating and con-
trolling the functions of the Zonal Committees and the individual
Cells. Furthermore the regional organs have the power to initiate
disciplinary action against anyone thought to be spreading or even
supporting "common ideologies foreign to Marxism-Leninism." In prac-
tical terms this removes from the local units, and ultimately labor
unions as well, any independence of action and places them under the
authority of superior party organs. Furthermore, party procedural
regulations cannot be seen to follow the strictest principals of
democratic organization. That is to say, the selection of represen-
tatives, in addition to having an electoral basis, requires the
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Regional Committees
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—unions
Fig. 1. Essential PVP Structure
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approval of higher party oreanc, T«P gans. In the case of the regional units,
the approval of the Executive Secretariat las is required for all appoint-
ments
.
In addition to its regular organization, it should also be
emphasized that PVP commissions and committees also function to coor-
dinate and control activities in the lower party organs. The Policy
Control Commission, for instance, is an organ appointed by the Central
Committee that Stains a constant vigilance not only over the oper-
ations of the party militants, but over the operations, it might be
argued, of client labor organizations. Some of the functions of these
commissions include: proposing the installation of new cells to the
Executive Secretariat; guarding the unity and discipline of the party;
submitting reports on disciplinary problems to the Central Committee
and proposing disciplinary actions; observing, criticizing, and sub-
mitting reports on the conduct of local functionaries; and naming
special Policy Control Auxiliary Commissions. 11
The functions of standing organs such as the Zonal and Regional
Committees and the Central Committee and Executive Secretariat, in
combination with the functions of special organs such as the Policy
Control Committees, serve to emphasize the authoritarian nature of
the PVP. This system of multiple controls cannot but reduce indepen-
dent union action inasmuch as directions that proceed from the regional
units to the individual cells are eventually communicated to client
labor organizations.
:ions
the
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Beyond this, the party establishes Coordination Committees
composed of party miiUants, who along with the Zonal Committees and
Cells, share the responsibility for insuring a oorrect application
of party policy in mass-or more specifically-labor organizat
These structural characteristics and the frequency with which
terms "control, coordinate, and appoint," appear in descriptions of
party organization, provide further insurance that messages will
flow down the party organization where they will ultimately be received
by client labor unions. Where these labor organizations are concerned,
there can be little doubt that multiple control coordination mechan-
isms are calculated largely to insure the rapid and correct applica-
tion of party directions.
It should also be carefully noted that party militants as well
as functionaries all along the party hierarchy, are not necessarily
labor union people. The party includes individuals from various occu-
pations and socioeconomic situations.
The union affiliates of the CUT and the PVP are separate organ-
izations, but, as a party dedicated to popular interests, the PVP is
bound to maintain close relations with labor organizations in order
to effectively represent their interests. All too often however, the
militant who is given the responsibility of recruiting party supporters,
or organizing a labor organization, or directing strike activities,
has had absolutely no connection with the affected workers, or labor
organization. While the PVP is supposed to be the arm of the working
classes, it may be more appropriate to say that labor organizations
are the electoral arm of the PVP.
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This relationship has been the source of both criticism and
threats. industrial leaders ^ accused ^ ^ ^ ^
cal objectives, while political leaders have accused the PVP of author
itarian tendencies and have threatened CUT affiliates with involun-
tary dissolution; at the same time, social democratic, Christian
democratic, and independent labor leaders have accused the PVP of
betraying the interests of the working classes by setting political
objectives above socioeconomic interests. Political, industrial,
and democratic labor leaders have all contended that the interests of
the PVP and the interests of the working classes do not correspond.
The party has been accused of encouraging strikes at times when they
have little opportunity for success merely in order to demonstrate a
power capability in a particular sector of production, or even more
commonly, simply t0 emphasize the principle of class conflict by re-
minding the workers of who their enemies are. In this connection,
PVP militants will direct strike movements and in many cases incite
brawls with police simply for purposes of publicity.
Be that as it may, PVP legislative representatives have consis-
tently proposed or supported propositions for Labor Code reforms.
These reforms have been recognized by all labor organizations as basic
to the effective defense of working class interests. However, PVP
representation in the Legislative Assembly is limited to three depu-
ties; consequently, reform failures have been as common as reform
proposals. The reason for this has been the inability of labor organ-
izations to gain sufficient influence in the majority parties.
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Labor and the Majority v*^.
.es
The vast majority of legislative seats in the National Assembly
belong either to the National Liberation Party or the opposition.
The coalition of opposition forces has changed names several times
since 1948. Its most recent ^^^
opposition forces have been consistent in their failure to include
labor representation. The reason for this probably derives from the
fact that the opposition is little more than a coalition of person-
alistic followings that lack any kind of permanent organizational
infrastructure. Outside of the PVP the PLN has been the only politi-
cal party that has made an attempt to build labor representation into
its organizational infrastructure. The PLN has always maintained con-
tacts with the democratic labor movement; however, the relationship,
until very recently, has been largely informal. This is due in part
to the prohibition of union political activity; but it is also attri-
butable, as the following section will show, to a bourgeois orienta-
tion that became increasingly apparent in PLN policy through the 1960s
and 1970s.
Labor and the Original PLN Structure
Until 1979 the PLN possessed a geopgraphic form of organiza-
tion that was conspicuous for its lack of any formal labor representa-
tion. District Assemblies were formed simply by the electors in an
administrative district who belonged to the party. These assemblies
were responsible for electing seven member Cantonal Executive
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Coatees along „lth flve delegates tQ ^ provinciai
whose principal functlo „ lncluded designating candtdates
Posts, electing ten member Provlnclal Executiye ^^
ing ten delegates for the National Assembly. The ma™ authority
of the party was the National Assembly, a representative body conposed
of seventy menbers, whose responsibility was to elect a three Mber
Executive Committee that inrl„H 0 H o dcn c uded a President, Secretary and Treasurer.
In addition to this regional representative structure, the party
possessed a Political Action Organization that was responsible for
stimulating party organization on the regional level. Its lower or-
gans consisted of a District Electoral Committee, an Administrative
District Committee, and a Cantonal Committee. The functionaries of
these posts were named by the Secretary General upon the approval of
the National Department of Organizations. The principal activity of
the regional committees was to organize auxiliary neighborhood
offices-especially during election periods; but despite the fact that
it functioned on a grass roots level to stimulate enthusiasm for party
policy, program, and candidates, the Political Action Organization did
not formally incorporate labor representatives.
Neither did the National Political Committee, the party's high-
est decision-making body, incorporate formal labor representation.
The members of this organ consisted of a representative of the Execu-
tive Power, a representative of the PLN delegation in the Legislative
Assembly, one representative of the National Assembly, three members
of the National Executive Committee, the Presidential Candidate and
former Presidents of the Republic.
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Besides these deliberative bodies, the patty possessed severaldeparts responsible fot performing administrative ot organiza-
tional functions. A Department o £ Ednoation was tesponsibie fot dir-
ecting studies and encouraging activities designed to promote social-
democratic doctrine. A Department of Municipai Affairs coordinated
policy on the local level. Other departments included Treasury, Popu-
lar Finance, and Accounting. Besides these however, two departments
were responsible for organizing sectoral support. These two depart-
ments included the Professional Sectors and Production and Guild
Affairs. The responsibility of the latter department was to promote
social-democratic ideology in labor and peasant organizations.
This department constituted the only formalized point of contact be-
tween labor as a group, and the party structure. The only other avenue
that could be used by labor people to voice worker interests was the
assembly system. These organs however might be seen to have dispersed
rather than encouraged effective labor participation inasmuch as the
majority of assembly seats belonged to non-labor people. In fact the
testimony of the progressive elements within the PLN suggested that
working class representation declined at each stage of the party hier-
archy. The highest party organs were occupied by capitalists, techo-
orats, professionals and a few intellectuals. Mid-level posts belonged
to bourgeois interests, while only the base organs were occupied by
people with popular orientations. 13
Apart from the fact that the party structure contained no space
for formal labor representation, it should be noted that the PLN,
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especially ln the early years
_ dominated ^ a^^ ^
PoXitical leaders, lncluding Jose ^ ^
Daniel Oduber, who „ere inst_al ^ ^ ^ ^^
This cli que has had an important in£luence ^ only ^ ^
tlon o £ the party program
, but ln the determtnaUon o( party candidates
as well. WhiXe all functionaries ln an ^ party , s deUberative
bodies were elected by inferior party organs, the PLN was largely a
eoalition of personalistic forces. Anyone who wished to rise in the
Party hierarchy had to conform to the guidelines set by one of the
controlling party leaders. On several occasions, new leaders, who
attempted to rise through the party's ranks in the hope of becoming
presidential or legislative candidates, were forced to leave the
party, after realizing that thelr future prQgress^ be ^
the old elite. For this reason it would not be inaccurate to argue
that while the party's structure corresponded to democratic principles
of organization, power in the PLN essentially flowed down. Owing to
these two factors, authentic labor participation in the PLN was mini-
mal. Essentially, as many authors and labor leaders have asserted,
the party siphoned off labor leadership by opening up low level lead-
ership posts. At the same time, while it was declared to be a social
democratic movement, the party never provided any form of sectoral
representation, nor did it encourage union organization. 1 *
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For the most part, the relationships between the party and
labor have been maintained through personal associations. On this
informal level, the ties between the PLN and labor, or at least PLN
leadership and labor leadership, were first made in the period between
1945 and 1948. During that period Rerum Novarum became associated
with the opposition. When hostilities broke out Benjamin Nunez com-
mitted the support of the Catholic unions to the revolutionary forces,
and took an active part in front line activity. Relations between
Rerum Novarum and the subsequently created PLN remained close until
1968. Between the early 1950s and the late 1960s the PLN demon-
strated its appreciation of labor support by appointing Ministers of
Labor who had occupied leadership posts in Rerum Novarum. Benjamin
Nunez, for instance, was Jose Figueres ' Minister of Labor during the
first PLN administration. Several other former labor leaders such as
Armando Aranz, Alfonso Carro, Otto Fallas
, and Jorge Rossi, were also
given leadership posts during PLN administrations. In addition, PLN
Presidents, such as Jose Figueres, made at least an appearance of en-
couraging labor activity by making occasional visits to Rerum Novarum
headquarters during general assembly meetings.
For several reasons these informal relationships did not offer
labor an effective means for influencing party policy. In the first
place, labor leaders were forced to renounce their union offices be-
fore accepting ministerial positions. This had the effect of divor-
cing labor personnel from their base organizations. Secondly, labor
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leaders were expected to represent the opinions o£ those
figures who appointed them. ttls had the effect of^^
leaders to place party interests over onion interests. A concrete,
and not untypical expression of this phenomenon occurred during
Benjamin Nunes's term as Minister o £ lahor. Mne z
, as the ministry's
representative on the dunta Directiva of the Consejo Nacionai de
Salarios, proposed to fix two minimum salarloo- , i*™ ies, a low minimum salary
that would apply tG national producers> and a higher m . nimum
that would apply to the foreign-owned banana companies. The reason
for this was that the banana companies were in a much better position
to sustain the effects of a higher minimum salary. The proposition
was accepted by the Consejo Nacionai de Salarios; but Nunez was sub-
sequently summoned to the presidential residence where President
Figueres explained that such a policy would incur a strong response
from the United States government, a consequence that Costa Rica could
ill afford. After the meeting with Figueres, Nunez withdrew his sup-
port for the separate salary scale. Inasmuch as national producers
could not sustain the higher minimum salary, the Consejo was com-
pelled to approve the lower salary. 16
Apart from cooptation, political appointments had the effect
of absorbing all the time and energy of labor leaders. The inability
to attend to pressing matters in represented labor organizations had
a disastrous effect on Catholic unionism. It was during the years
of close party-labor relations that Rerum Novarum practically
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disappeared. This was partial* attrlbutable t0 the ^ Qf^
est of critical iahor ieaders who had accepted hlgh ran.ins poHtica!
appointments
.
Informal associations between the PLN and Rerum Novarum came
to be used as an avenue of advancement for labor leaders with ambi-
tion. One labor leader noted that union activity was a sure way of
gaining the notoriety that was necessary for political advancement.
Labor organizations were, in the fi rst place, training grounds for
individuals with aspirations of political careers. 17
Between the early 1950s and the late 1960s Rerum Novarum con-
tacts in the PLN produced little in terms of concrete legislation.
Several Labor Code reform proposals made during this time were
enthusiastically received by several PLN deputies; however support
for code reform, a basic need and desire of all labor organizations,
was largely isolated and certainly not strong enough to push through
legislation that would undoubtedly alienate conservative support,
upon which PLN electoral success greatly depended. In 1958, for in-
stance, Guillermo Villalobos Arce introduced legislation intending to
reform article 28 of the Labor Code. The reform would have pro-
hibited employers from firing labor leaders at any time without proof
of just cause. The project was approved by the Committee on Labor
and Social Affairs, in which PLN deputy Daniel Oduber presided. How-
ever, the reform was rejected by the Legislative Assembly. 18
In 1959, PLN deputy McRae Grant sponsored a CCTRN legislative
proposal to reform article 366 of the Labor Code. The reform would
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have reduced regulations on strikes; however, after floundering in
the legislature for two years, it was finally filed away.- In 1961
PLN deputy Con.alo Fernandez Mora reintroduced legislation intending'
to protect labor leaders fro, anti-union attack; however, once again
after floundering in the Legislative Assembly for two years, the
Project was filed away.- 0ne y£ar^ ^
Bulgarelli reopened the debate on protection for labor leaders with
the same result.- The matter was reconsidered in 1967 when Jorge
Luis Villanueva Badilla introduced a legislative proposal entitled
"Accion Sindical de Reenganche . » The proposal, in reforming
article 29 of the Labor Code, would have accomplished the same objec-
tives as legislation introduced earlier by Villalobos Arce. The
project received the approval of the Committee on Social Affairs, but
died in the legislature two years later. 22
Several reform proposals had been supported by PLN deputies;
however, the failure of the CCTRN to affect legislative decision-
making was attributed by labor leaders and progressive party members
to the combination of opposition from the conservative coalition,
which occupied at least one-third of the congressional seats in the
Assembly, and the lack of adequate support from conservative PLN
deputies. A frustration with their legislative failures, combined
with what was seen to be a growing conservative trend in the PLN,
caused a deterioration in labor-party relations. This process was
accelerated between 1962 and 1966 during the administration of PLN
conservative Francisco Orlich. The Executive Power, through the
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Ministry of Public Security, was used extensively during Orlich's
ten, of office to persecute unions. Several special investigations
were justified by the claim that communist elements were subverting
the labor union movement. The CCTRN sustained the brunt of this
persecution, and in 1965 submltted
. ^ ^
Organization of Workers (OIT)
.
2
3
The left-wing of the PLN, and the most important labor allies
in the party system, were former union leaders Benjamin Nunez, and
Alfonso Carro, Fernando Volio and Daniel Oduber. Supporters of this
group managed to win the presidential nomination of Daniel Oduber
in 1966. In the subsequent election, however, Oduber was defeated
by opposition candidate Jose Joachim Fernandez Trejos. The failure
of the progressives to win the presidency was attributed to the reluc-
tance of conservative elements to commit their full support to the
Oduber campaign. 24 Even so, Oduber declared his intentions to run
for office in the next elections. The PLN left-wing and the CCTRN
were encouraged by a proposed labor policy that included six basic
points: the passage of a fuero sindical; the intensification of
worker education programs and government aid to labor unions; effec-
tive labor representation on all government economic planning boards;
legal reforms facilitating collective bargaining; support for the
labor unity movement; and the politicizat ion of the labor movement. 25
However, during the Fernandez Trejos administration between 1966 and
1970, PLN conservatives under the leadership of Francisco Orlich,
announced that they would not tolerate an Oduber candidacy in the
1970 elections. The subsequent declaratlon Qf ^ ^ ^
for a second term of office, having been repudiated by the party left-
wing, caused a reaction that threatened to split the party in two.-
Disaffection o f Labor Allies
The concrete effects of labor's disappointment with PLN policy
was an attempt, on the part of the democratic unions, to constitute
a stronger, larger, and more independent labor union organization.
To accomplish this, CCTRN unions merged with independent unions in
1966 to form the CCTD. At the same time, the dissatisfaction of the
left-wing with the failure of the PLN to live up to its social demo-
cratic principals caused an open split which was expressed in a declar-
ation that intended both to remind the public of PLN principals and
goals, and warn the party leadership of the consequences of conserva-
tism.
In 1968, the PLN progressive-wing convoked a meeting for the
purpose of discussing the contradictions between party principals and
goals, and party organization and policy. The result was a document,
designated the "Patio de Agua" declaration, that expressed the extent
of these contradictions. The progressives declared that the goal of
political action must be the realization of the common good. The prin-
cipals of justice that had formed the basis of the PLN program could
not be achieved unless the people were free of the spiritual, cultural,
and economic privations that reduced the possibility and capacity for
enjoying the superior values of life. Patio de Agua called attention
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* the fact that whlle a majority of Costa Ricans suffered from these
Private, a saall minority of people retained a maximum amount of
Privileges. The causes of this circumstance_ ^ ^ ^ &^
ation of low economic and human development, an unjust social organiza-
tion, and a political process dominated by a privileged caste.
The transformation of Costa Rican society, that the PLN had
originally hoped to accomplish, had not come about because political
situations in the parties had effectively checked the participation of
Progressive movements. Democracy was asserted to be the most just
form of political organization; however, to succeed the system must
Place power in the hands of the people through a party system that
authentically represented the interests of the majority of people.
The Costa Rican political system was accused of lacking this capacity
both because the political party leadership was seen to represent the
interests of powerful economic sectors, and government had acceded to
the pressures of conservative interests. Furthermore, the progressives
contended that those who had risen to power in the name of social
reform, all too frequently adopted the ideological motivations, the
lifestyle, and the interests of the dominant class.
The Patio de Agua group proposed several recommendations, cover-
ing several areas, that were viewed to be critical to the transforma-
tion of Costa Rican society. Private property was considered to be
a fundamental right; however, reforms should be instituted that would
effectively impede the concentration of property. At the same time,
all natural resources must be used to satisfy the needs of the people.
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In accordance with these views, agr icul tural production should be
organized in a way that would facilitate increased production while
Providing for a just distribution of wealth. While new types of land
tenure systems were heing developed, the existing pattern of private
ownership must be subjected to reforms that would involve the redis-
tribution of accessible land rather than the parceling out of unculti-
vated land. P r ivate ownership should be combined with cooperative
ownership in putting agricultural production in the hands of the
campesino. Toward this end land redistribution should be accompanied
by legislation fixing maximum limits on land ownership.
In prefacing their labor organization proposals, the progres-
sives asserted that work was one of the most important sources of
human dignity and individual liberty. It was a right that should be
made available to everyone and a duty that should be rewarded by a
just form of renumeration
.
Just renumeration, according to the pro-
gressives, in general terms should permit a maximum access to the bene-
fits of culture. In specific terms, this involved the combination of
higher salaries and the establishment of profit-sharing programs.
The idea of the inevitability of class conflict was rejected,
although it was recognized that class antagonisms had become enflamed
in Costa Rica because of the existence of a social and economic organ-
ization that encouraged division rather than solidarity. A more just
economic and social system required the existence of a strong and
dynamic labor union movement; however, this was not seen to be possi-
ble, given the capacities of existing Costa Rican legal structures.
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ins classes to effectively defend their socioeconomic interests, m
accordance with thesp Hor« .-ue vxews, the progressives proposed the establish-
ment of effective labor liberties. This imp lied several specific
-for™. Most importantly it imp lied the passage of the long sought-
after fuero sindical. Secondly, it involved the establishment of
authentic and effective worker representation in all state institu-
tions. Thirdly, it involved initiating legislation that would pro-
mote collective conventions and facilitate an active worker partici-
pation in the direction and administration of businesses. Fourthly,
it involved passing legislation that would guarantee employer compli-
ance with social legislation and the principals of labor liberty.
Apart from these reforms, the progressives proposed greater economic,
legal, and technical assistance to unions, and the promotion of labor
organizations in sectors of the economy where workers had still to
develop a sufficient consciousness of union action.
The Patio de Agua group concluded its manifesto with a state-
ment expressing its frustration with the structure and operation of
the PLN. In an obvious reference to the power that the old guard
exercised over the party machinery, they contended that the PLN in
the past had constricted the liberal play of ideas on all organiza-
tional levels. In conformance with its principals, a social democratic
party must be organized in a way that would permit the unrestricted
confrontation of personalities and ideas. The party must respect
the right of all affiliates to present nominations to the appropriate
organs while party members should be ^
pressure in the selection of competent nominees. Any attest to
underline the voluntary choices of party members for the purpose of
maintaining the power of a^ elite, was contrary to sociai demo-
cratic principals and must he repudiated. Suggesting that this
state of affairs was being perpetrated by powerful economic interests,
the progressives indicted party leadership for its conservative atti^
tude and argued that no member of the party, fulfilling
. ieadership
position should be permitted at the same time to be the representa-
tives of persons, businesses, or interests that were in conflict with
popular aspirations. 27
The Patio de Agua declaration drew a variety of responses from
the PLN leadership. Conservatives emphasized similarities between
the attitudes of the Patio de Agua group and communist ideology.
The progressives were accused of promoting ideas leading to the liqui-
dation of the political party system and the democratic alternation of
power. They proposed prohibitions on the inheritance of private
property, it was stated, and in general, supported a position that
violated Constitutional provisions making private property inviolable.
In an even more critical statement, the conservatives asserted that
the Patio de Agua group would place control of the factories, like
countries behind the iron curtain, in the hands of the workers. 28
On the other hand, some political leaders approached the mani-
festo with careful approval. Fernando Volio Jimenez, PLN President
of the Legislative Assembly, argued that while the document was
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divorced fro. reality, U possessed a series o f goais that shooid
serve to guide decisionals. Officially however, the PLN divorced
itself from Patio de Aom cu„ _igua. Shortly after the manifesto was issued
the party published
.^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
reflected the thinking of the PLN and that it should not he consid-
ered to be an official party document. Suggesting subversive inten-
tions among party radicals, the letter went on to reassert the oppo-
sition of the PLN to communist attempts to infiltrate and deform par-
ties and political situations in developing countries. 29
Enthusiasm for party reform gradually subsided after the Patio
de Agua declaration. A few radicals renounced their party membership,
but the majority of people in the PLN felt that the further pursuit
of fundamental reforms would do more harm than good in the long run.
As bourgeois as the PLN might have been, it was the only viable politi-
cal party in Costa Rica that was committed, at least in principle, to
the task of social renovation. A party split would severely weaken
the PLN, but the possibility of creating another social democratic
party, perhaps more committed in a practical sense to social reform,
was seen to be remote. Rather than wreck the party's chances of suc-
cess in the 1970 elections, PLN progressives preferred to maintain
their posts and let the Patio de Agua manifesto stand as a critique
of party organization and policy that might be used as a guide for
reform at some time in the future. 30
The Patio de Agua declaration nevertheless had several impor-
tant indirect effects. Most importantly, it pointed out a widespread
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interna! discontent that possessed ,t^ g ^^ ^
serious spllt ln the M> Qr^
_ ^ ^
labor support. Secondly, tt kept allve the social ^
ations opon which the PLN was based. Thirdly, lt exposed the
alistio nature of party organization. The PLN was still basically an
electoral vehicle that serve, only a few old guard political leaders,
"hich for the most part functioned only around election periods.
This latter point was extremely Important Inasmuch as personalistic
politics was diametrically opposed to the spirit that gave birth to
the party.
Nevertheless, owing to the combination of a lack of effective
representation within the PLN, the numerical weakness of the PVP in
the Legislative Assembly, the existence of a powerful opposition that
had little interest in labor problems, and the application of pressure
from conservative institutions, organized labor suffered a series of
legislative defeats which left intact an ineffective legal mechanism
that formed the foundation of union control and persecution.
Labor Code Reform Failures
In 1971 the CGTC, through its PVP deputies, submitted legisla-
tion intended both to protect union members from anti-union patronal
action, and liberalize regulations covering strike procedures. Arti-
cle 29 of the code would be reformed to say that in every case that
a contract is ended either by patronal or employee responsibility,
the patron must provide severance pay. Article 263 would have stated
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asso-
a-«
-cial orations Kould not Qnly right to
their socioeconomic interests, out the right t0 express opinions
crated „i th natlonal Md lnternational proMem^ Arucie 2^^
have stated that Korkars who . Qined^^ ^ ^^^
one vear after the date of joinlng
. ^ ^^ ^^
required strike support to f-fft-,, ™«PP i ty-one percent, while article 371 would
have stated that emp l oyers muSt pay lost salaries in cases of legal
strikes. Article 502 would have prohibited anti-union patronal ac-
tions fro, the moment that a list of petitions had been submitted;
and article 518 would have been refold to state that in the case that
a settlement could not be reached through the conciliation process,
labor organizations had the right to declare a strike within twenty
days without a previous declaration of legality and without having to
repeat the voting process. Furthermore, once this time period had
expired, collective negotiations could be reinitiated without having
to repeat the entire collective conflict process.- The CGTC proposal
took only four months to work its way through the legislature before
being rejected in the general assembly.
This and other legislative proposals, were usually accompanied
by immediate and critical responses from industrial groups and the
national press that were calculated to pressure legislators by dimin-
ishing public support for labor reform. One year after the CGTC
failure, the Costa Rican Socialist Movement submitted a reform pro-
posal intending to liberalize strike regulations. The Camara de
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( Chamber of lndustry) lmedlat£ly ^
s ta ting that lt dld not correspond ^ ^^^^ reaiityj ^^
dramaticallv inrrpaao i_
.
c e se the number of strikes; and that it would pro-
duce disastrous economic effects. Shortly after the Camara declara-
tion, La_Nacion published an editorial warning legislators that inas-
much as the reform strongly affected employers, they should listen
carefully to employer criticism before taking action. - The proposal
was subsequently defeated in the general assembly.
Between 1975 and 1976 two more important reform projects were
defeated in the Legislative Assembly. Concerning the first proposal,
-
La Naci °n Polished an editorial stating that
the concept of social justice is so broad and elastic that itembraces, apart from labor relations, juridical security andthe economics of the means of production, and a concern forthe importance of not discouraging the initiatives of privatebusiness. Justice must be equal for everyone. 33
One year later the Comite de Unidad Sindical submitted a reform pro-
posal that would have given unions the right to declare strikes with-
out exhausting the conciliation process. La Nacion responded with a
series of articles stating that the reform would serve only to in-
crease needlessly the "violent fact" of the strike. All strikes,
whether just or unjust, were seen to be damaging to private interests
and the public good. Inasmuch as the state had the responsibility
of maintaining social peace, it must involve itself thoroughly in
conflicts between labor and capital. 34
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In 1977, a law project intending to reform several Labor Code
articles received heavy criticism from the Union Costarricense de
Claras (Union of Costa Rican Chafers). Changes in article 366 which
would have reduced retired union support for strike
_nts from
sixty percent to fifty-one percent were seen to have the potential
fur underlining the Costa Rican economy by increasing the possibmty
of strikes in the agricultural sector. According to the Camaras, pas-
sage of the refer, would place the economic well-being of the country
in the hands of irresponsible labor leaders, who at a moment's notice
could initiate a strike and destroy an entire crop.
The same reform package also intended to change legal disposi-
tions on temporary work contracts, the right of public sector unions
to demand collective conventions, and patronal responsibility for fired
workers. With regard to the temporary employment question, the
Camaras stated that firm contractual agreements would be severely
damaging to the private sector. In the construction industry it was
extremely difficult to contract persons for specific jobs. At the
same time, several agricultural industries required only temporary
personnel increases. The Camaras pointed out that most industries
were required to make personnel adjustments in order to meet demand
levels that fluctuated seasonally. Concerning union rights in the
public sector, the Camaras stated that a collective convention policy
would serve to undermine the efficiency and correct management of the
autonomous and semi-autonomous institutions. Furthermore it would
undermine legislative control over the budget inasmuch as unions
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would be able to nepnt-i =, t- Qgot a e and renegotiate salaries several times
a year
.
3 5
The Camaras claimed that the proposal intending to increase
patronal responsibility for fired workers violated constitutional
law. It was the only portion of the project to have received the
approval of the Legislative Assembly. Subsequently however, it was
vetoed by PLN President Daniel Ocuber. Both the Camaras and La
Nacion applauded the presidential initiative. 36
There is no doubt that labor organizations have maintained
several dependable contacts not only among PLN deputies but opposi-
tion deputies as well. These contacts had either sponsored or sup-
ported legislation emanating from labor confederations or alliances
of confederations such as the CUS
. Nevertheless, each legal project
has elicited the outspoken and detailed criticism of conservative
institutions such as the Camaras and La Nacion
. Subsequent legisla-
tive decisions would point to the conclusion that in the contest for
legislative recognition accompanying each reform project, Costa Rican
legislators have been more prone to respond to conservative publics
than to labor organizations.
Of particular importance where labor influence in the PLN is
concerned is the labor policy of Daniel Oduber. Radical party ele-
ments had devoted great energy to Oduber* s presidential campaign in
the 1960s. His 1966 electoral defeat, having been attributed to the
indifference of PLN conservatives, along with the unwillingness of
conservatives to accept another Oduber candidacy in 19 70, touched
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off the Patio de Agua rebellion
. men Qduber finauy reached
Presidency in 1974
, he brought^ ^^ ^ ^
the PLN progressive wing. Nevertheless, the Oduber administration
was distinguished by the conspicuous abgence Qf ,^^ ^
had won the applause of labor organizations in the 1960s. Oduber
neither supported the Labor Code reform presented by the CUS in
1976, which corresponded to the spirit of the labor policy he had
earlier formulated, nor did he support the judgement of the Legisla-
tive Assembly in 1978 concerning patronal responsibility for fired
workers. Neither was Oduber indisposed to using existing Labor and
Penal Code dispositions to threaten or arrest labor leaders, or to
using public security forces to break up strike movements.
In fact the trend in government labor policy in the last
twenty years ironically indicates that government anti-labor activity
increased dramatically during the Oduber administration. Presidential
conduct, not only in the ICE strike in 1978, but in other strike
movements occurring during the same period, prompted democratic labor
leader Guido Nunez to state in 1977 that
it is my belief that labor repression has been accentuated
recently, owing to the fact that in this government, unions
cannot count on any protection. This is a fact that patronshave well noted and, as a result, have effected repressive
measures without fear. 37
Similarly, former CGT labor leader Juan Rafael Solfs Barboza argued
that beginning in 1974, executive, legislative, and judicial author-
ity had been increasingly used to persecute the labor union movement.
The Oduber government, much more than past governments supported
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employer interests. The exernH™ecutive office issued threats; Labor Code
reforms were reiected- anri n,Q • j- •j , and the judiciary interpreted labor legisla-
tion in a way that was damaging to labor interests. 38
Despite this criticism, Daniel Oduber's labor policy should
not be construed to mean that opposition forces have been more respon-
sive to labor interests. Shortly after taking office in 1978, Unidad
President Rodrigo Carazo announced that his government would not nego-
tiate collective conventions with unions functioning in the autono-
mous institutions." He supported the use of public security forces
to break up the Pozuelo strike of 1979 and turned a deaf ear on
labor's requests for executive mediation. Hardly had the Pozuelo
movement ended when a dock workers' strike in Lim6n, probably the
bloodiest in Costa Rican history, resulted in hundreds of injuries
and one death. Furthermore, opposition legislative deputies have,
on more than one occasion, introduced Labor Code reform proposals in-
tending to extend prohibitions on union activities and stiffen penal-
ties for illegal strike movements. On the other hand the PLN, as a
social democratic party, was instituted for the purpose of giving con-
crete and clear expression to popular interests. It professed a
concern for labor problems, but maintained only a pretense of labor
representation in its organizational structure. More was expected
of the party, yet several PLN presidents and PLN controlled Legisla-
tive Assemblies, had produced no more for labor than the opposition.
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Structural Reform
The contradiction between party structure, operation, and
Policy, and party principles and goals was thought to be the major
reason for the PLN electoral defeat of 1978. Even before then how-
ever, progressive party elements had begun a process of self-
criticism that took form in seminars, study groups, and research
projects, all of which intended to point out the deficiencies of PLN
organization, and suggest ways by which party structure could be made
to correspond to party principles. In 1976 Luis Alberto Monge com-
pared the PLN to the structure and operation of other social democrat!
parties, such as Venezuela's Democratic Action Party, and complained
that the PLN had still to incorporate labor interests in a way that
could be considered adequate for a social democratic party. Monge
noted that the party was structured purely for electoral purposes.
The reasoning behind this form of organization was that it seemed to
be the most effective way of competing with large supposedly conserva-
tive electoral vehicles that confronted the PLN at each election.
However, while this structure facilitated electoral success, it did
not leave the party in a position by which it could compete on an
ideological level with parties of the extreme left. Ideological com-
petence was viewed to be an urgent necessity, as well as an objective
requiring a structural reorganization that redistributed party repre-
sentation according to professional sector. 1+0
After the PLN electoral defeat in 1978, during a typical ser-
ies of PLN seminars, Enrique Obregon Valverde suggested the necessity
gon
parties were
of a close party-labor associate by asserting that nothing „ould
be .ore agreeab!e to the traditional owners of the means of produc-
tion than tc perpetuate the separation of labor and politics. This
would leave conservative invests alone to manage party operations
and, while maintaining rhe « n*j«„ cr t f lc tion of popular representation, to
Place their own representatives in positions of power. Obre
Valverde contended that Latin American social democratic
created by oligarchical and Intellectual groups that were, In one
«ay or another committed tc conservative Interests and that as long
as labor organizations remained at the margin of political activity,
these parties were dominated by powerful economic groups. It must be
affirmed, Obregon Valverde added, that as long as the working classes,
as organizations, as unions, were not thoroughly integrated into social
democratic parties, they would continue to be instruments of the
oligarchy
.
4 1
During one PLN labor conference, Benjamin Nunez took the
occasion to level a more direct criticism by arguing that the party
had at many times been dominated by anti-labor forces whose plans and
actions had frequently had disastrous effects on labor. This situa-
tion prevailed despite the fact that the PLN, at least in its early
stages, professed a commitment to labor interests. In Costa Rica, as
well as other Latin American countries, social democratic parties con-
tained anti-popular elements that manipulated popular bases while
placing themselves in strategic government posts. 1* 2
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Conservative interests within the PLN had always opposed labor
integration; however, after the defeat of 1978 it was largely accepted
as an electoral necessity,- and in 1979 several i.portant structural
changes were finally instituted that dramatically altered the relation-
ship between party and labor organizations.
Labor and the New PLN Structure
Since 1979 the PLN has maintained a geographic organizational
form that was adapted to include sectoral representatives. The struc-
ture is divided into Cantonal, Regional, Provincial, and Nacional
Assemblies. Regional Assemblies are composed of two delegates from
each canton, regional PLN public functionaries, and one representative
from labor, business, professional, youth, and feminine action sectors.
Provincial Assemblies are formed by five delegates from each canton
as well as sectoral delegates. The most important representative
function of the Provincial Assemblies is to name delegates to the
Plenary Assembly.
The Plenary Assembly is composed of ten provincial delegates,
the National Political Directorate, eight delegates from each of the
five sectors, five delegates from the Parliamentary Fraction and ten
Cantonal delegates. The Assembly's most important functions include
nominating candidates for the Legislative Assembly, analysing previous
political events, approving the decisions of the National Political
Directorate, electing the members of the Executive Committee, electing
the members of the Political Directorate, and ratifying the presiden-
tial candidate.
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The National Political Directorate is co.posed of the Executive
Committee, former presidential candidates, eleven members of the
Plenary Assemb ly
,
the representative of the Parliamentary Fraction,
and one representative from the youth and feminine action sectors.
Its most important functions include executing the decisions of the
Plenary Assembly and the National Congress, directing the operations
of the party, defining political action tactics, expressing the
party's position on national and international political events, and
approving the organizational structure and methods of the party.
The National Congress is composed of the members of the Plenary
Assembly, the members of the Ethical and Disciplinary Tribunal, the
members of nine Secretariats, the members of debating forums, the
members of the Election Tribunal, the members of study commissions,
members from student and feminine actions organs, the Parliamentary
Fraction, and three delegates from Cantonal Political Committees.
The principal function of the Congress is to define the party's ide-
ological norms, to reform the party's Carta Fundamental, and to modify
and or approve the program of government upon which the Carta
Fundamental is based.
In addition to these bodies a National Convention, which meets
only before elections is composed of representatives from the regional
bodies, the sectoral representatives, Parliamentary Fraction represen-
tatives from the Municipalities and the Legislative Assembly, as well
as ex-party public functionaries. The only function of the Convention
is to nominate the presidential candidate.
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Apart from this organization the party created a series of
functionally oriented departments that include a Secretariat of Sindi-
cal Affairs that functions in conjunction with a Secretariat of Sec-
toral Organization in developing labor organizations and recruiting
party support. The members of these Secretariats are elected by
the National Political Directorate and are given representational
status in the National Congress .
^
The advantages of the new party structure, although clear,
have been accompanied by several disadvantages that have produced a
guarded optimism among democratic labor leaders. On the one hand,
the party now guarantees some form of labor representation in most of
its structures. Labor organizations are not only represented in the
Regional Assemblies, they are also guaranteed representation in the
Plenary Assembly. The Plenary Assembly is a critically important
body inasmuch as it has the responsibility of nominating legislative
candidates, ratifying the presidential candidate and electing the
National Political Directorate. Besides the Plenary Assembly, repre-
sentatives in the Secretariat of Sindical Affairs have representa-
tional status in the National Cogress
. The Congress is an equally
critical body inasmuch as it is responsible for forming the party's
ideological guidelines and the program of government.
On the other hand democratic labor leaders have criticized
the lack of representation in the National Political Directorate.
Since this body is responsible for approving or modifying the internal
structure of the party, its importance should not be underestimated.
Furthermore, the National Political Directorate ^ aiso respongibie
for electing the labor representatives who sit in the Secretariat of
Sindical Affairs. Secretariat representatives are thus chosen by
Party functionaries who may not be associated with labor organiza-
tions. The function of the Secretariat is much the same as the
Coordinator of Sindical Affairs in the PVP. In fact the PVP struc-
ture was used as a model. The members of the body are responsible for
creating nuclei in centers of work, organizing unions, recruiting
supporters in already existing unions, and in general, transiting
party doctrine and policy. Nevertheless, party interference in the
internal affairs of labor organizations gives cause to expect that
one of the Secretariat's functions will be to transmit party directives
Internal interference in union affairs is a critical drawback in the
party's new relationship with labor. Like the PVP, the PLN intends
to penetrate union organizational structures with teams of militants
who will be directed by superior party organs. Furthermore, the man-
ner in which party militants relate to labor leaders as well as the
statutes governing the relations between the unions and the party, can
only be changed with the approval of the National Political Director-
ate, a body which lacks labor representation. 1* 5
Most importantly, the distribution of sectoral representation
in the most critical party organs places labor at a disadvantage.
The Plenary Assembly is composed of over eighty-four members, depend-
ing on the number of PLN ex-presidential candidates that occupy posts
in the National Political Directorate. Ten of these members are
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representatives from the Provincial Assemblies, who may be either
professionals, i.portant industrial leaders or workers. However,
the distribution of representation in the Provincial Assemblies would
indicate that delegates to the Plenary Assembly would largely be
chosen by a non-labor constituency. It is thus likely ^ ^ prQ_
vincial Assembly representatives in the Plenary Assembly would not
have a very great appreciation for labor problems. In addition,
nineteen Plenary Assembly members come from the National Political
Directorate, none of whom are labor representatives. Sixteen members
come from the patronal and professional sectors. Sixteen other mem-
bers come from the youth and feminine action sectors, while five and
ten members come respectively from the Parliamentary Fraction and
Cantonal representatives. Labor on the other hand possesses only its
designated eight member sectoral delegation. The problem with this
structure is that labor representation may be made ineffectual by a
possible confluence of interests between the business, provincial,
National Political Directorate, and Parliamentary Fraction delegates;
or for that matter any other combination of delegations.
In a similar structural arrangement, the National Congress
incorporates over 140 members from ten different social or corporate
sectors. Only eight of those members represent labor organizations.
The function of the Congress has yet to be tested thoroughly; however,
a confluence of interests among any combination of sectors would not
be difficult to imagine. Democratic labor leaders have viewed this
structural scheme with a certain degree of skepticism. On the one
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hand, CATD leadership has resigned^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^^
effective represe„taion „m take more^ ^ ^^^
CCTD leaders, „ho remember che outcome o£^
»ith *. PLN
,
„onder u th£ _ party organization might possiMy
infringe upon labor independence. Above ail they assert, labor organ-
izations must not once again fall tat0 the trap o£ servlng party ^
terests and sacrificing labor leaders to political careers."' It
should also be carefully noted that the restructuralization of the
PLN did not destroy the power of personalistic political figures.
Even more importantly, the conservative elements that had thwarted
popular interests so many times in the past did not disappear with
the party's old organization. These elements might be expected to
oppose Labor Code reforms as vigorously as they had in the past.
Concluding Remarks
Constitutional prohibitions on union political activity have
compelled labor organizations to cloak their associations with politi-
cal parties. The close connections between the CUT and the PVP have
been maintained at the risk of involuntary dissolution. Moreover the
assertions of democratic labor leaders gives cause to wonder whether
the nature of the association between the PVP and labor has served to
advance labor interests or party interests.
On the other hand political activity prohibitions along with
electoral considerations, were important reasons for the PLN failure
to incorporate labor in its original organizational structure. The
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informal relationship that subseouently merged between the PLN and
Reru, Novarum
,
and later the CCTO> were not sufficiently strong to
produce any important legislative results, m the case of Re™
Novaru*, the incorporation of important labor leaders into the party
hierarchy and the distribution of important governs posts as a
form of political payment nrPriMf,^y c
»
P ecipitated a protracted decline in
confederation me.bership and influence. In the case of the CCTD in-
formal political contacts in both the PLN and various opposition par-
ties produced little in terms of basic legal reform.
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s the efforts of progressive PLN
leaders to defend labor interests have been complicated by the per-
sistence of conservative power that had been used to prohibit the
nomination of progressive presidential candidates, to impede the im-
plementation of Labor Code reforms, and to postpone the integration
of labor into the party's organizational apparatus. The new PLN organ-
izational framework represents a step forward in organized labor's
endeavor to find political representation; however, the advantages of
the new structure are accompanied by as many disadvantages that have
given rise to a continuing skepticism among participating labor leaders
concerning the willingness of the party to serve labor interests.
Ultimately, these skepticisms will be either vindicated or laid to rest
in the Legislative Assembly where democratic labor leaders will test
the quality of their political influence with proposals for Labor
Code reform.
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With regard to labor's legislate en~+gislativ fortunes, the Popular
Vanguard Party has consistently supposed Labor Code reform „o„-
ever, PVP strength U llmlted to three ^ ^^
Without a much firmer commitment to Labor Code reform, from either
the PLN or tbe opposition Unity Coalition, a more libera! labor rela-
tions system and greater worker representation in the autonomous in-
stitutions will be an impossibility. Between these two parties, the
PLN is in a much better position to accomplish this objective. The
party seems to be poised for a dramatic shift in labor policy, but
this will not be confirmed until the new legislature convenes in 1982.
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CHAPTER VII
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
From a historical standpoint the development of labor unionism
in Costa Rica might be understood to have passed through five periods.
In the first period, corresponding to the end of the 19th century and
the beginning of the 20th century, guild associations, or professional
organizations, marked the beginning-as in other Latin American coun-
tries-of an incipient trade union movement. It would be premature
to call these associations full fledged labor organizations, inasmuch
as they were inspired by a concern for professional competence and
mutual aid, rather than by an awareness of any contradictions between
the factors of production. The only conflict-oriented groups marking
this period in Costa Rican history were the anarcho-syndicalist groups
that were formed by European immigrants involved in the construction
of the Atlantic railroad.
Anarcho-syndicalism never had a profound impact on Costa Rican
labor unionism, but on the other hand, contact with European immigrants
helped to create an awareness of the mechanisms of capitalist exploita-
tion, at a time when the concentration of coffee production released
large numbers of small landowners from isolated rural life and created
a growing class of agricultural laborers and unemployed urban workers.
This development corresponds to the second period of Costa Rican labor
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unions, during which guild assoclations finaUy becme organlzationai
bases for collective conflicts between workers and employers. At the
same time, the participation of non-unioni 2ed unemployed workers in the
subsequent strike campaigns should not be overlooked inasmuch as it
underscored the deerpp t-n irh-i^K ig ee o whxch workers had developed a collective
consciousness. Where labor relations was concerned, it was during
this period that the relationship between organized labor and govern-
ment, if not yet formalized by legislation sanctioning collective
action, was at least standardized by a high level of government in-
volvement, and in many cases direct executive involvement, in the
settlement of labor disputes. Public security forces were invariably
dispatched to break up worker demonstrations. Subsequent audiences
between labor, management, and the Executive Power became an informal
means by which labor organizations could bring their demands to the
attention of a public authority. On the other hand, they also pro-
vided occasion for the establishment of patrimonial bonds between the
state and the working classes which, while perhaps serving immediate
economic interests, nevertheless contravened long term organizational
interests inasmuch as state intervention represented a challenge to
the influence of labor leaders. The pattern of action characterized
by patrimonial controls and rewards, or carrot and stick tactics, was
a fundamental part of conflict resolution processes that became a
premise upon which the Costa Rican labor relations system would be
built
Owing to economic circumstances and demographic changes, the
degree of class antagonisms rose during the decade of the 1930s.
rm move-
ass in-
307
A corresponding decline in the Catholic inspired social refo
ment of Jorge Volio was paralleled by an increasing working cl
terest in Marxian solutions to economic misery, that culminated in the
establishment and temporary predominance of a communist labor union
movement. This development might also be seen to have occurred de-
spite an increase in anti-union measures taken during the administra-
tion of President Le6n Cortes in the late 1930s. Economic difficul-
ties caused by the world economic depression and the destruction of
the banana industry in the Atlantic region required the state to take
a variety of initiatives. These initiatives, having been intended to
induce an economic recovery, were also accompanied by stricter con-
trols on labor union activities, which at that point in time, were
generally viewed as subversive.
A decrease in the acceptability of collective action in the
1930s was followed in the 1940s by a dramatic turnaround in govern-
ment attitude toward the problems of the working-classes, and the
feasibility of labor organizations as mechanisms of socioeconomic self-
defense. This third period of Costa Rican labor unionism, having
been marked by the emergence of a strong Catholic labor union move-
ment, was also characterized by the coexistence and alliance of the
two fundamental, and historically antagonistic strains of Costa Rican
developmental theory: Catholic social reformism and Marxian Socialism.
The Catholic reform movement was sparked by a reaction to anti-
clerical legislation undertaken by liberal governments in the
nineteenth century. It declined for a period around the beginning
308
of the century but reemergfid tn a nore perM ^ ^
"20s. m an almost parallel development) sociaiistic idMs^ ^
-rge in Cesta Rica at tne beginning o£ the cenCury> ^ they^
«« have an impact on th, labor_nt^ ^ i930s^^
Mora established the Bloque de Obreros y Campesinos.
Both ideological tendencies had succeeded, at different timas,
in dominating the Costa Rican social reform
_nt . With the re-
e^ergence of Catholic alternatives to social change in the 19,0s, the
labor union movement divided itself into two ideological camps of
roughly equal strength; but unlike past associations between Catholic
and Marxist organizations, ideological and organizational leaders of
both tendencies minimized the importance of their historical antagon-
isms and deeply rooted conceptual differences and emphasized their
common tactical objectives: the defense of the socioeconomic inter-
ests of the working classes. Some of the results of the subsequent
alliance Included the erection of organizational structures Intended
to coordinate an Intense process of union organization. The effect of
this was a dramatic increase in the number of workers belonging to
one of the two major confederations.
The years between 1940 and 1948, in this third period, were
most critical in the development of Costa Rican labor unionism, not
only in terms of the organizational gains that were made, but also,
and perhaps even more Importantly, in terms of the political repercus-
sions that were precipitated by a Catholic-Communist alliance. The
promulgation of legislation guaranteeing labor rights and the
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subset creation of . Labor Code> u£re monunentai accompUshments
that gave tremendous impetus both t0 the prQcess rf^
tion and to the coaHf<n« ~< . .lition of opposition forces. Progressive legisla-
tion coding about as . result o£ CathoUc.CoMist cooperation
a drive train of onion develops that aggravated conservative an-
tagonist. Similarly
,
the strong and increasing influence of colon-
ist party functionaries in Costa Rlcan government became a serious
source of concern for conservative capitalist groups, and an incipient
group of social democratic reformers, both of which doubted the com-
mitment of Calderon Guardia and Manuel Mora to democratic principles
of government.
Where the question of labor liberties is concerned, the promul-
gation of the Costa Rican Labor Code did not represent a dramatic
redefinition of the conflict resolution procedures that had been
established over two decades earlier. While it did threaten the patri-
monial relationships that had existed between patrons and their em-
ployees, it did not discourage the patrimonialism of the state. Never-
theless, in relation to previous legislation that had been concerned
either directly or indirectly with working-class collective action,
the code represented a tremendous labor victory that culminated a
forty year struggle during which labor organizations had no rights
whatsoever. This accomplishment, which might be viewed as a revolu-
tionary change, at least in terms of the society and politics of the
1940s, played not a small part in the creation of an opposition coali-
tion committed to the removal of Calder6n Guardia et al
.
, from posi-
tions of power.
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The reactionary aspects of eh. rebellion that accomplished
this objective became apparent in the fourth period of Costa Rican
labor unionism. The exe™n™ •ecution, imprisonment, and exile of communist
leaders, the proscription of the PVP and the involuntary dissolution
of the CTCR are all illustrative of the de gree to which a fear of
communist influence motivated opposition forces in 1Ma . And Khlle
perhaps the progressive ^,^1 Ax social democratic elements of the opposition
had committed themselves to the protection of working-class interests,
the subsequent association between the PLN and Rerum Novarum was char-
acterized by a preeminent concern for party interests. What amounted
to a patron-client relationship served to divorce important labor
leaders from their base organizations and coopt them into the party
machinery. The rapid decline of Catholic unionism along with the
destruction of communist unionism in the late 1940s and 1950s attests
to the fact that the political coalition responsible for the 1948
rebellion, although not anti-labor in its entirety, maintained a
complacence toward labor organizations that caused a precipitous de-
cline in the number of unionized workers.
While the labor legislation of the preceding decade had been
left intact, the patrimonial ties between the state and labor organ-
izations were frequently used against labor. Labor unionism and com-
munism formed an equation that called for the use of a variety of
control mechanisms ranging from the pressures of the Ministry of Labor
during conciliation proceedings, to the distorted judicial interpreta-
tion of the labor laws, to the application of physical violence.
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Several labor campaigns during this period brought important economic
gains; but like the strike movements of the 1920s, settlements between
labor, management, and government, frequently left labor at a disad-
vantage in terms of the devices that employers would be able to employ
in order to discourage union activity. While the use of carrot and
stick tactics to reward and punish organized labor was still a funda-
mental part of Costa Rican labor relations, anti-labor patronal cam-
paigns, that were carried out with impunity despite protective Labor
Code clauses, played an important part in the deunionization of the
Costa Rican labor force in the 1950s.
The contemporary period of Costa Rican labor unionism, which
might be seen to date back to the late 1960s, is characterized by
many of the attributes that marked the preceding period. The Ministry
of Labor has used its powers to initiate special investigations of
labor organizations thought to be subversive in tactics and ideologi-
cal orientation; ministry participants in conciliation proceedings pres-
sure labor leaders to accept patronal offers, while during collective
conflicts, the same representatives frequently exploit ideological
divisions among organizations; state subsidization of the democratic
labor union movement that proceeds via the Ministry of Labor creates
commitments that confine independence of action; distorted judicial
interpretations severely limit labor union activities; and anti-labor
patronal actions continue to impede the normal development of the
labor union movement.
The distinctions between the 1950s and the contemporary period
can be found in the dramatic increase in the number of unionized
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workers and in the proliferation of confederationg
. 0wing
to population increases, the expansion of the Costa Rican state, the
injection of large amounts of American capital, and the expansion of
agricultural and industrial production, the number of unionized
workers, especially in the public sector, has multiplied several times
These increases have enabled labor organizations, much more than in
the 1950s, to make use of Labor Code provisions obliging employers to
negotiate collective conventions. Accordingly, the number of collec-
tive agreements put into operation since the late 1960s has increased
in proportion to increases in the number of unionized workers. Along
with this important development, however, the strength of the Costa
Rican labor union movement is still limited by a relatively low level
of unionization, and a labor movement that is characterized by frag-
mentation and irreconcilable ideological division. Whereas most of
the unionized work force in the pre-rebellion period belonged to one
of two confederations, whose relationship was most characterized by
cooperation, the contemporary labor union movement supports four
large confederations, several important independent federations, and
numerous smaller independent unions. Fifty percent of the unionized
work force in Costa Rica fits into the latter two categories. Fur-
thermore, the relationship among the four confederations is distin-
guished by suspicion and hostility. The creation of the Marxist
oriented CUT and its democratic counterpart the FTD reflects a con-
tinuation of the traditional antagonism of Costa Rica's communistic
and democratic strains of developmental theory, an antagonism that
was overcome only once in Costa Rican history.
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Despite dramatic increases in the number of unionized workers,
and corresponding increases in the number of collective agreements,
the Costa Rican labor relations system is characterized by control
and government interference. Conciliation periods, involving the
participation of the Ministry of Labor are a required part of the
conflict resolution process. In the event that tripartite negotia-
tions fail to produce a settlement, matters must be brought before the
labor courts where judgements are rendered concerning the legality of
strike movements. Inasmuch as the Labor Code precludes most cate-
gories of workers from utilizing the strike, the vast majority of
judicial judgements are negative. If either of the two parties in the
conflict refuses binding arbitration, the collective conflict termin-
ates, and the labor union must begin the difficult and time-consuming
process of collective convention proceeding all over again. Knowing
that their collective conflict will be rejected by the courts, most
unions prefer to initiate strikes without exhausting the conciliation
process. This, however, places the union in an extremely vulnerable
position inasmuch as the combined weight of patronal and public
authority is brought to bear against the labor organization in ques-
tion. Physical violence, prison, and arbitrary firing become personal
risks while the loss of juridical personality and involuntary dissolu-
tion may become collective risks.
This sequence of action points to the conclusion that the con-
flict resolution process is characterized by the application of ascend-
ing controls. In the first place, collective conventions require the
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support of thirty percent of an the „orkers ^ a factory ^^ of
product!*,. Even during direct negotiations bet„een labor ^
—t. representatives fro* the Ministry of Labor are nsnaliy present.
More importantly, patrons are at liberty to launch anti-labor attacks
against obstinate labor leaders or organizations. Patronal pressures
are combined with pressure from the Ministry of Labor in the subsequent
conciliation process. Finally, and apart from Labor Code prohibitions,
petitions for strike authorization require the support of at least
sixty percent of the workers in a factory or area of production.
Patronal, bureaucratic, judicial, and eventually police pressures are
all used, at different times, or all together, to discourage collec-
tive action,
The Costa Rican Labor Code, while having been thought to be a
mechanism that would accomplish the liberation of the working classes,
has had an opposite effect. But if the code has served more to con-
fine and regulate rather than encourage labor activity and union or-
ganization, its effects have not been offset by other political and
bureaucratic structures which ostensibly have a representative func-
tion. In this connection the relationship between labor and the Minis-
try of Labor has been a hindrance to union activity and union forma-
tion. A wide variety of functions including the inspection of labor
organization budgets, operating procedures, and tactical and ideolog-
ical orientations, underscore the ministry's responsibility to police
the labor union movement rather than to guarantee the constitutional
right of freedom of association. With regard to the tripartite
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councUs attached to the Ministry of^ ^ ^
Power places an inordinate amount o£ declslon.making^ ^ ^
hands of governor representatives,
.any of „„on are required to be
funotionaries of the „i„istry of Labor. Consequently, tbe input of
labor organizations in matters concerning salaries and working condi-
tions is negligible.
A similar type of situation has obtained in those autonomous
institutions where space has been provided for labor representatives.
In the four institutions considered in this analysis which, it might
be noted, constitute only a small fraction of the total number of
autonomous public agencies functioning in Costa Rica, worker influence
in decision-making bodies was never strong. Even so, the representa-
tion that labor organizations have had, has either been reduced or
removed altogether, owing to a centralization process that has given
even greater discretion to the executive authority. But besides re-
ductions in the number of labor people in directive organs, and cer-
tainly as importantly, authentic worker representation in the autono-
mous institutions has been made impossible by methods of delegate
selection and delegate replacement processes, both of which increase
the discretional powers of the executive authority. Inasmuch as dele-
gates and delegate replacements in all the autonomous institutions,
as well as the tripartite councils attached to the Ministry of Labor,
are selected from large pools of applicants, appointments have become
a form of political payment and a means by which labor leaders can be
bought from their base organizations. Many labor leaders have
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^plained that the best way to insure complacency is to offer a labor
leader a high paying, high prestige job in see public institution.
Along with these considerations, it would be worthwhile to re-
emphasize the role of the Ministry of Labor in every activity that
has involved labor. Apart from the fact that the ministry has been
Placed in a key position in terms of labor relations, authorization of
union formation, regulation of union operating procedures, and the
removal of juridical personality, it also participates heavily in the
decision-making bodies of most tripartite agencies and councils where
labor has been given representation. The extent of the Ministry's
influence is most clearly revealed in the structure and operation of
the Consejo de Seguridad e Higiene where delegate selection and re-
placement, as well as the authorization and enforcement of Consejo
decisions, are all under the ministry's discretion. Similar powers
are given to the ministry in the Consejo National de Salarios, while
representative space is reserved for ministry officials in most autono-
mous institutions where labor delegates are present. When it is con-
sidered that matters concerning occupational safety and base salar-
ies are settled through organs attached to the Ministry of Labor, this
participation can be seen to have encouraged the removal of a variety
of questions from the domain of labor-management negotiations. Along
with these questions, it ought to be noted that sickness and invalid-
ity benefits, accident insurance, pensions, and worker training pro-
grams are all matters that are decided in the autonomous institutions.
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There can be little doubt that the role of labor in deciding
matters that effect its Mediate and long term future depends
greatly on the ability of labor organizations to influence the poli-
cies of the political parties. Regulations on union formation and
operation as well as collective convention and collective conflict
procedures and prohibitions are specified by the Labor Code. Changes
require legislative action. Changes in the structure and operation
of the tripartite ministry organs also require legislative approval.
At the same time, ministry functionaries, the directors of the autono-
mous institutions, and the composition of autonomous institution di-
rective bodies all depend upon the executive authority. Who these
people are, what they do, and how they are chosen are all questions of
key importance to labor organizations. They are also matters that
are affected by the activities of political parties.
The only two Costa Rican parties that have ventured to inte-
grate labor, either structurally or informally, have produced very
little in terms of concrete reforms. On the one hand, the PVP sup-
ports an organizational structure that is intended more to direct
activities in the CUT than to provide an effective means of interest
articultation; but be that as it may, the party has consistently sup-
ported Labor Code reforms and authentic labor representation in the
autonomous institutions, although its influence in the Legislative
Assembly has not been sufficient to accomplish either of these objec-
tives. On the other hand, the powerful social democratic PLN has un-
til recently rejected sectoral representation, preferring instead to
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ma:
ppress
Untain informal labor-party contacts, which have served to su
labor interests by subordinating the™ to the electoral interests of
the party.
This situation has been complicated by the existence of a power-
ful conservative faction and an increasingly conservative orientation
that precipitated serious internal confrontations in the 1960s. But
apart from the fact that PLN deputies have not been firmly committed
to the legislative interests of labor organizations, appointments to
party and government posts have had the effect of draining labor or-
ganizations of their top leaders, divorcing them from their base organ-
izations; and subordinating them to the broader interests of the party.
These informal relationships have been complemented recently
by a reorganization of the party structure that is ostensibly intended
to provide client labor organizations with a greater voice in policy
determinations and candidate selections. The new party structure, how-
ever, is similar to that of the PVP. Party cells established in each
factory have the responsibility of imparting an appreciation for party
principals and goals and, in practical terms, of coordinating labor
activity with party activity. There is some question however, about
whether the party determines what labor's initiatives will be, and if
that is the case, whether labor representatives in the party's initia-
tives will be. There can be little doubt that the new party struc-
ture has opened up many important and previously closed decision-
making structures to labor organization representative. At the same
time, however, effective labor representation in the PLN is absolutely
essential, especla lly now ln llght o£ the pa„ y , s rf ^
organizational infrastructure of its client organizations, m this
connection there are several deficiencies with the new organization
that have accounted for a guarded optimism a.ong participating labor
leaders
.
What ought to be emp hasized is that a labor-party relationship
in the PLN that suppresses rather than encourages the articulation of
labor interests would be much more damaging to immediate labor inter-
ests than the same type of situation in the PVP. That is to say, the
PVP, despite its organizational deficiencies, has always defended
labor's interests in the Legislative Assembly. On the other hand,
the conservative interests that played such a key role in sabotaging
the initiatives of progressive PLN functionaries cannot be supposed
to have disappeared. While the PVP has basically one constituency,
the PLN has several, and it would not be too far-fetched to expect
the new party to be primarily concerned with maintaining the coali-
tion of forces that has made it a majority party. This will un-
doubtedly involve compromises, the extent of which will determine
whether or not formal structural mechanisms of integration will be
added to informal personal relationships in suffocating the interests
and demands of labor organizations associated with the PLN.
It is too early to tell how effectively labor organizations
will be able to participate in the determination of party policy or
in the selection of party candidates. At the time of this writing
PLN militants were only beginning to take their places in unions
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beions^ t0 the party net„ork , ^ ^ _ ^ stated ttat ^
labo r-party relatlons ln Costa Rlca have ^^^^ uttie ^^ ^
concrete *gislatlTC reseUs. Consequently , labor organizatlOTS
,
whether they have bee„ asS oci ated „lth the PLN or the pvp, have been
forced to weather the efferi-<= of o in ttects of a regulative Labor Code, required
and burdensome bureaucratic contact* ^ ,s, and token representation in
the autonomous institutions.
The existence of these problems however, should not suggest
that workers, labor leaders, and unions in Costa Rica suffer from the
same harsh circumstances that prevail in other Central or South Ameri-
can nations. Despite similarities in the way labor has been integrated
juridically and politically, one cannot overstate the material differ-
ences between the conditions of the working classes in Costa Rica
and their counterparts in the rest of Latin America. To repeat a dis-
tinction made in the introduction of this research, Costa Rican labor-
ers enjoy much higher salaries, better working and living conditions,
and better health care benefits than workers in most Latin American
countries. While labor leaders and unions suffer from patronal and
even government persecution, there have been no incidents of assasin-
ation since the rebellion of 1948. Labor leaders and strike organizers,
who might be interned for illegal activities, always survive. This
important difference, which is acknowledged and applauded by workers
and labor lawyers despite their frequent complaints, continues to make
Costa Rican labor relations unique among Latin American nations.
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Lons in
Even so, it would be posslble tQ sjjy ^^
Costa Rica are characterized by the coexistence of two different or-
ganizational concepts that have been combined in a way that has been
disadvantageous to the labor union movement. On the one hand, the
way that labor has been integrated Juridically cannot but be considered
to be patri.onial in nature. It is virtually impossible for labor to
function without state authorization. While this relationship has at
times served labor interests more than business interests, at least
in the short run, undue obstinacy usually incurs stiff penalties.
What is considered to be obstinate depends of course on the disposi-
tion of the executive authority. At the same time, broad state respon-
sibility for labor-related matters encourages workers to look to the
government for the protection of their socioeconomic interests, rather
than to labor organizations.
On the other hand, the relationship of labor to bureaucratic
and political institutions cannot be considered to be corporatistic
,
if one means by corporatistic a system:
in which all sectors of the economy, labor and capital, would
be organized and 'harmonized' into exclusive, monopolistic
associations responsible for the management of matters within
their respective sectors, in which the various corporate groups
were integrated into a hierarchy of 'syndicates' and representa-
tional bodies culminating at the top in a series of 'corpora-
tions' for each of the nations major social, political, and eco-
nomic sectors
.
Such a situation obtains, to a greater or lesser degree, in several
Latin American countries where the functions of various institutions
such as political parties or government ministries make the existence
of parallel associations a practical impossibility.
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The Ideologies! basis o, these corporate forms of organisation
conforms to a Catholic, organicist, and patrimonial conception o,
social life in „hlch the activities of the constituent units of
society are regulated in order to serve the common good. The Labor
Code that ties Costa Rican labor organizations to the state, as well
as the peculiarities of Costa Rican conflict resolution procedures,
is unquestionably based upon these conceptions; but on the other hand,
the structure of the Costa Rican labor movement is unmistakeably plural.
In fact the abundance of ideological orientations, and tactical dis-
positions, as well as a tendency toward organizational fragmentation,
have been serious weaknesses that most confederations have recognized
and attempted to overcome.
There is little doubt that the Ministry of Labor has tended to
favor certain labor organizations, especially during PLN governments,
but such favoritism has not had the same effect on the Costa Rican
labor movement that PRI favoritism has had on the Mexican labor move-
ment. There is also little doubt that the Ministry's power of union
authorization has been used to impede the development of movements
thought to be politically subversive, but neither has this prohibited
the emergence of parallel unionism. Attempts to mold the Costa Rican
labor movement have hardly reached a point at which purges have become
a regular occurrence.
At the same time, the relationship between labor and the parties
has been characterized by a conspicuous absence of formalized struc-
tural ties. The reasoning behind this has been that political parties
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should represent individuals rather than social or occupational cate-
gories, a decidedly liberal conception of political organization.
What has thus emerged in Costa Rica, is the coexistence of a patri-
monial labor relations system, that has served to limit independent
action, and a liberal political party structure that has ignored
labor's demands to permit a greater degree of liberalism in labor
relations
.
more
Without question, this blend of conceptions has been much
to the advantage of labor than the coexistence of patrimonial labor
relations systems and corporatistic organizational structures that can
be found in more authoritarian countries. But at the same time, it
should be carefully noted that Costa Rican legal and bureaucratic struc-
tures possess characteristics that could easily facilitate the develop-
ment of a much more authoritarian labor relations system. Current
union formation and conflict resolution procedures frequently do not
make full use of repressive legal and bureaucratic mechanisms. De-
spite the number of illegal and economically damaging strikes that
have been carried out; despite the clear and close association between
the CUT and the PVP, and now the democratic unions and the PLN; and
despite the widespread claim that many strike movements are politically
motivated, labor organizations have been involuntarily dissolved only
a handful of times in Costa Rican history. But this is not to say
that the labor courts and the Ministry of Labor, perhaps during more
economically difficult or politically sensitive times, might not im-
pose a more effective repression of labor activities.
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In this connection it ought to be pointed out, if one may speak
in such genera! terms, that the Costa Rlcan^ ^ #
strong tradition of individualism tha t is reflected in tbeir unswerv-
ing faith in the parliamentary system of government. Communism, In
the view of a great many Costa Ricans, represents a serious threat
to this system; and inasmuch as the labor movement was originally
inspired by Marxist thinking, unionism and communism have come to be
synonymous. One of the dangers of this analogy arises from the effects
that increasingly strong Central American revolutionary movements have
had on the thinking of Costa Rican leaders. There is a growing con-
cern that Costa Rica will eventually be surrounded by totalitarian
Marxist governments that will not hesitate to subsidize radical ele-
ments that have made no bones about their desire to construct a Cuban
or Nicaraguan style political and economic system. Should such a
situation obtain, one would have to wonder how much it would tax the
equally strong Costa Rican tradition of political tolerance. As one
Costa Rican leader ominously commented: "it could be that we may have
to take the stick once again to the communists." Owing to the short-
sightedness of public authorities and capitalist sectors in many Cen-
tral American countries, such questions may not have to be postponed
too long.
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